Syn. 4. 60. 18.



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
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TO THE PRINCE HIS HIGHNES, HENRY FREDERICKE, ELDEST SONNE TO OVR SOVERAIGNE LORD THE KING.

HAuing heretofore (moſt worthie Prince) publiſhed a part of this booke, deſcribing the practiſe of former times, as a Paralel to the faſhion of our moderne warres: I was purpoſed after that Eſſay, not to proceed any further therein, but to leaue the reſt to the gaine of euery priuate indeuour. Yet when I found in his Maieſties princely pen, how much his Excellent wiſedome doth value theſe Commentaries, for the worthineſſe of the matter aboue al prophane Hiſtories; iudging the Author worthie more honour, then any of the Ethnicke Emperours or other great Commanders of the world; I was incouraged to adde that which remained, and make the worke perfect with all his parts. Which being brought to an end, I do in all humbleneſſe preſent to the gracious Patronage of your Princely fauor. And the rather, for-

asmuch as those maine principles of warre which his Maiestie hath set downe by way of precept to informe you, are here confirmed by Cæsars example, and proued at large frō the true grounds of that Art, according to the practise of the best discipline. Wherein if this indeuour of mine shall anie way seeme worthie your Princely regard, whose high vnderstanding in this your tendernesse, is admired by the world: I shall euer vowe my after-times to your seruices; and thinke this time improued to the vtmost. And albeit my pen hath treated of warre, yet my prayers shall euer be to the Almightie, to giue your Highnes a wise and vnderstanding heart, that you may beautifie all your dayes with the ornaments of peace; and make them happie with abundance of pietie, as the chiefest blessings of a Princely condition.

Your Highnesse

most humble seruant,

CLEMENT EDMONDS.

TO THE READER.

IT may be ſaid, that Many talke of Robin Hood that neuer ſhot in his bow. But it muſt he vnderſtood, that as well incompetent iudges as impertinẽt diſcourſers, are within this compaſſe. Such Martialiſts as are acquainted with the diſcipline of warre, or know what is fitting the cariage of an Armie, are they to whom the iudgement belongeth, that muſt either approoue or diſallow theſe labours. Amongſt whom, the former part of this worke hath alreadie found that paſſage, as by their good fauor, may happely ſerue to drawe the ſequele into the like fortune. Howſoeuer, my deſire is, that ſuch as ſhall be pleaſed to view theſe Eſſayes, will accept the ſame with that minde as I offer them, hauing bent my indeuor to gratifie ſuch as fauour the reading of this Hiſtorie: without either attribute to mine owne, or preiudice to any other mans iudgement. Farewell.

READING AND DISCOVRSE, ARE REQVISITE TO MAKE A SOVLdier perfect in the Arte militarie, how great soeuer his knowledge may be, which long experience and much practise of Armes hath gayned.

WHEN I consider the weakneſſe of mans iudgment in cenſuring things beſt knowne vnto it ſelfe, and the diſability of his diſcourſe in diſcouering the nature of vnacquanted obiectes; chooſing rather to hold any ſenſible impreſſion, which cuſtome hath by long practiſe inured, then to hearken to ſome other more reaſonable perſwaſion: I do not maruell that ſuch ſoldiers, whoſe knowledge groweth only from experience and conſiſteth in the rules of their owne practiſe; are hardly perſwaded, that hiſtory and ſpeculatiue learning are of any vſe in perfecting of their Arte, being ſo different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of ſo ſmall affinity with the life of action; wherein the vſe of Armes and atchieuments of war ſeeme to haue their chiefeſt being. But thoſe purer ſpirits embiliſhed with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes; wherein variety of accidents affordeth variety of inſtructions, and the mutuall conference of thinges happened, begetteth both ſimilitudes and differences, contrary natures, but yet ioindly concurring to ſeaſon our iudgment with diſcretion, and to enſtall wiſedome in the gouernment of the minde: Theſe men I ſay, mounting aloft, with the winges of contemplation, doe eaſily diſcouer the ignorance of ſuch Martialiſtes, as are only trained vp in the ſchoole of practiſe, and taught their rudiments vnder a fewe yeares experience, which ſerueth to interpret no other author but it ſelfe, nor can approue his maximes, but by his own authority; and are rather moued to pittie their hard fortune, hauing learned onely to be ignorant, then to enuie their skill in matter of war, when they oppoſe themſelues againſt ſo manifeſt a truth as this: that a meere practicall knowledge cannot make a perfect ſoldier.

Which propoſition that I may the better confirme, giue me leaue to reaſon a little of the groundes of learning, and diſpute from the habitude of Arts and ſciences; which are then ſaid to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in ſuch ſort apprehended, that from the variety of that indiuiduality, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maximes of rule, vniting tearms of the ſame nature in one head, and diſtinguiſhing diuerſities by differences of properties, aptely diuiding the whole body into his greateſt and ſmalleſt branches, and fitting each part with his deſcriptions, duties, cautions and exceptions: for vnleſſe the vnderſtanding be in this ſort qualified and able by logiſticall diſcourſe, to aſcend, by way of compoſition, from ſingularitie to catholike conceptions; and returne againe the ſame waie, to the loweſt order of his partitions, the minde cannot be ſaide to haue the perfection of that Arte, nor inſtructed in the true vſe of that knowledge: but guiding her ſelfe by ſome broken preceptes, feeleth more want by that ſhee hath not, then benefite by that ſhee hath. Whereby it followeth, that a ſcience deuided into manie braunches, and conſiſting in the multiplicitie of diuers members, being all ſo intereſſed in the Bulke, that a Mayme of the ſmalleſt part cauſeth either debilitie or deformitie in the bodie, cannot be ſaide to bee throughlie attayned, nor conceiued with ſuch a profiting apprehenſion as ſteeleth the minde with true iudgement, and maketh the ſcholler maiſter in his Arte, vnleſſe the nature of theſe particularities bee firſt had and obtained.

And for as much as no one ſcience or faculty whatſoeuer, in multitude and pluralitie of partes, may anie waie be comparable to the Arte militarie, wherein euery ſmall and vnreſpected circumſtance quite altereth the nature of the Action, and breedeth ſuch diſparitie and difference, that the reſemblance of their equall participating properties is blemiſhed with the diſſimilitude of their diſagreeing partes; it cannot be denied, but he that is acquainted with moſt of theſe particular occurrences, and beſt knoweth the varietie of chances in the courſe of warre, muſt needes be thought a more perfect ſouldier, and deſerueth a title of greater dignity in the profeſſion of Armes, then ſuch as content themſelues with a fewe common precepts and ouer-worne rules: without which, as they cannot be ſaid at all to be ſouldiers, ſo with them and no more, they no way deſerue the name of skilfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meere experience, or experience ioyned with reading and diſcourſe, doe feaſt the minde with more variety and choiſe of matter, or entertaine knowledge with greater plentie of nouelties, incident to expeditions and vſe of Armes, I will vſe no other reaſon to determine of this queſtion, then that which Franciſcus Patricius alleadgeth in his parallely, where he handleth this argument which I intreat of.

He that followeth a warre (ſaith he) doth ſee either the courſe of the whole, or but a part onely. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned leſſe then he that ſawe the whole: but admit he hath ſeene and learned the inſtructions of one whole warre, he hath notwithſtanding learned leſſe then he that hath ſeene the proceeding of two ſuch warres. And hee againe hath not

ſeene

ſeene ſo much as another that hath ſerued in three ſeuerall warres: and ſo by degrees, a ſouldier that hath ſerued ten yeares, muſt needes knowe more then one that hath not ſerued ſo long. And to conclude, he that hath receiued 22 yeares ſtipend (which was the iuſt time of ſeruice amongſt the Romans before a ſouldier could be diſmiſt) hath greater meaſes of experience than another that hath not ſo long a time followed the campe, and cannot challenge a diſcharge by order and cuſtome: And hence it conſequently followeth, that if in one or more or all theſe warres, there haue happened few or no actions of ſeruice, which might teach a ſouldier the practiſe of Armes; that then his learning doth not countertaile his labour. And if the warre through the negligence, or ignorance of the chiefe commanders haue beene ill caried, he can boaſt of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of militarie diſcipline, if the part which he followed were defeated and ouerthrowne, he knoweth by experience howe to looſe, but not how to gaine. And therefore it is not onely experience and practice which maketh a ſouldier worthie of his name, but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which riſe from the variety of humane actions, wherein reaſon and error, like merchants in traffique, enterchange contrarie euentes of fortune, giuing ſometime copper for ſiluer, and balme for poyſon, and repaying againe the like commoditie as time and circumſtances doe anſwere their directions. And this knowledge is onely to be learned in the regiſters of antiquitie and in hiſtories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caius Iulius Cæſar (whoſe actions are the ſubiect of theſe diſcourſes) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the prouinces of Spaine, broken the ſtrength of the Romaine Empire at Pharſalia, was held a ſouldier ſurmounting enuie and all her exceptions; and yet notwithſtanding all this, the battell he had with Pharnaces king of Pontus, was like to haue buried the glorie of his former conqueſtes, in the diſhonourable memorie of a wilfull ouerthrow: for hauing poſſeſt himſelfe of a hill of great aduantage, he began to encampe himſelfe in the toppe thereof. Which Pharnaces perceiuing, (being lodged likewiſe with his campe vpon a mountaine confronting the Romaines) imbattelled his men, marched down from his campe into the valley, and mounted his forces vp the hill, where the Romaines were buſied about their intrenchments, to giue them battel. All which, Cæſar tooke but for a brauado: and meaſuring the enemie by himſelfe, could not be perſwaded that any ſuch foole-hardines could carrie men headlong into ſo dangerous an aduenture, vntill they were come ſo neere, that he had ſcarce any time to call the legions from their worke, and to giue order for the battell: which ſo amazed the Romaines, that vnleſſe, as Cæſar himſelfe ſaith, the aduantage of the place and the benignitie of the gods had greatly fauoured them; Pharnaces had at that time reuenged the ouerthrow of Pompei and the Senat, and reſtored the Romaine Empire to libertie. Which maie learne vs how neceſſary it is (beſides experience, which in Cæſar was infinit) to perfect our knowlege with variety of chances: and to meditate vpon the effectes of other mens aduentures, that their harmes maie be our warnings, and their happie proceedings our fortunate directions.

And albeit amongſt ſo manie decades of Hiſtorie, which pregnant wits haue

preſented to theſe latter ages, we ſeldome or neuer meete with any one accident which iumpeth in all pointes with an other of the like nature, that ſhall happen to fall out in managing a warre, or ſetting forth of an armie; and ſo doe ſeeme to reape little benefit by that we reade, and make ſmall vſe of our great trauell. Yet we muſt vnderſtand that in the Audit of Reaſon, there are many offices, which through the ſoueraigne power of the diſcourſiue faculty, receiue great commodities by whatſoeuer falleth vnder their iuriſdiction, and ſuffer no action to paſſe without due triall of his nature, and examination of his ſtate; that ſo the iudgment maie not be defrauded of her reuenues, nor the minde of her learning: for notwithſtanding diſagreeing circumſtances, and differences of formes, which ſeeme to cut off the priuiledge of imitation, and fruſtrate the knowledge we haue obtained by reading, the intellectuall facultie hath authoritie to examine the vſe, and looke into the inconueniences of theſe wants and diuerſities, and by the helpe of reaſon to turne it to her aduantage; or ſo to counterpoiſe the defect, that in triall and execution it ſhall not appeare anie diſaduantage. For as in all other ſciences, and namely in geometrie, of certaine bare elements, and common ſentences, which ſenſe admitteth to the apprehenſion, the powers of the ſoule frame admirable Theoremes and Problemes of infinit vſe, proceeding with certaintie of demonſtration, from propoſition to propoſition, and from concluſion to concluſion, and ſtill make new wonders as they go, beſides the ſtrangeneſſe of their Architecture, that vpon ſuch plaine and eaſie foundations, they ſhould erect ſuch curious and beautifull buildings: ſo in the Arte Military, theſe examples, which are taken from hiſtories, are but plaine kinde of principles, on which the minde worketh to her beſt aduantage, and vſeth reaſon with ſuch dexterity, that of inequalities ſhe concludeth an equality, and of diſſimilitudes moſt ſweete reſemblances; and ſo ſhe worketh out her owne perfection by diſcourſe, and in time groweth ſo abſolute in knowledge, that her ſufficiency needeth no further directions: but as Lomazzo the Milaneſe, in that excellent worke which he writ of picturing, ſaith of a skilfull painter, that being to drawe a portraiture of graceſull lineaments, will neuer ſtand to take the ſymmetry by ſcale, nor marke it out according to rule; but hauing his iudgment habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the variety of ſhapes and proportions; his knowledge guideth his eie, and his eie directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both with ſuch facilitie of cunning, that each of them ſerue for a rule wherby the true meaſures of nature are exactly expreſſed. The like may I ſay of a skilfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his faculty, when knowledge hath once purified his iudgment, and tuned it to the key of true apprehenſion.

Lib. 3.

And although there are many that will eaſily admit a reconciliation of this diſagreement, in the reſemblãce of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well tempered ſpirit; yet they will by no meanes acknowledge, that thoſe monſtrous and inimitable exãples of valour & magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigall, & ſpendeth as though time ſhould neuer want ſuch treaſure) can anie way auaile the maners of theſe daies, which if they were as they ought to be, would appeare but conterfeit to the luſter of a golden age, nor yet comparable

ble to siluer or brasse, or the strength of yron, but deserue no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For what resemblance (say they) is betweene the customs of our times, & the actions of those ancient Heroes? They obserued equity as well in warre as in peace: for vertue rather flourished by the naturall disposition of men, then by lawe and authority; the tenure of their Empire was valour in warre and concord in peace; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deedes of armes which they had atchieued for their countrey, adorning the temples of their gods with pietie, and their priuate houses with glory, pardoning rather then prosecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing iniury: But the course of our times hath another bias, for couetousnesse hath subuerted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughtes, and subtilty teacheth vs to carrie rather a faire countenance, then a good nature; our meanes of getting are by fraud & extortion, and our manner of spending is by waste and prodigality; not esteeming what we haue of our owne, but coueting that which is not ours; men effeminated and women impudent, vsing riches as seruants to wickednesse, and preuenting natures appetite with wanton luxurity; supplanting vertue with treachrie, and vsing victory with such impiety, as though *iniuriam facere*, were *imperio uti*: and therefore the exemplarie patternes of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serue to be gazed vpon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtile to deale with honesty, and wanting courage to incounter valour. I must needes confesse, that he that compareth the history of Liuie with that of Guichardine shall finde great difference in the subiects which they handle; for Liuie triumpheth in the conquestes of vertue, and in euery page erecteth trophes vnto valour, making his discourse like Cleanthes table, wherein vertue is described in her entire maiestie, and so sweetned with the presence & seruice of the graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellencie, and charmed with the loue of her perfection: but Guichardine hath more then Theseus taske to performe, being to winde through the labyrinthes of subtilty, and discouer the quaint practises of polititians, wherein publike and open dessignes are oftentimes but shadowes of more secret proiectes, and these againe serue as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so insnared in the sleightes of subtilty, that when you looke for war, you shall finde peace; and expecting peace, you shall fal into troubles, dissentions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of Liuies fortune, and such arte is required to vnfolde the truth of these mysteries.

But to answere this obiection in a word, and so to proceede to that which followeth, I say those immortall memories of vertue which former time recordeth, are more necessary to be knowne, then any strategems of subtler ages: for equitie and valour being truely apprehended so season the motions of the soule, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peraduenture stir vp imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practises, and diuelish deuises, when euill is reproued by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the

authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steppes which the present course of the world hath traced, and plaie the Cretian with the Cretian; this obiection hindereth nothing, but that historie, especiallie these of latter times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a souldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore anie man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helpes that historie doth offer to perfect the weakenesse of a short experience, especially when no worth can counteruaile the waight of so great a businesse: for I take the office of a chiefe commander, to be a subiect capable of the greatest wisedome that may be apprehended by naturall meanes, being to manage a multitude of disagreeing mindes, as a fit instrument to execute a designe of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualifie both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidentes which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true iudgement which he ought to haue of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end, wherein our prouidence cannot haue enough either from learning or experience, to preuent disaduantages, or to take holde of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our iudgment, so it serueth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as beholde the atchieuments of vertue, commended to a perpetuall posterinie, hauing themselues the like meanes to consecrate their memorie to succeeding ages, wherein they may serue for examples of valour, and reape the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our owne fortune, and long to foresee the ende of that race which we haue taken, which is the chiefest matter of consequence in the vse of Armes; what better coniecture can be made, then to looke into the course of former times, which haue proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like meanes, and therefore not vnlikely to fort vnto like endes?

Salust. de bello Iugur.

And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice haue the first place in this Arte, and serueth as a foundation to the rest of the building? Let Marius answere this question, who enuying at the nobilitie of Rome, saith thus. *Qui postquam consules facti sunt, acta Maiorum & Græcorum militaria præcepta legere cæperint: homines præposteri, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & vsu prius est.* Whereas (saith he) reading ought to go before practise (although it follow it in course of time, for there is no reading, but of some thing practised before,) these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helme of gouernment, begin to reade, when they should practise that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiencie of knowledge by vsing out of time that, which in time is most necessarie. This testimonie gaue Marius of reading & booke learning, being himselfe an enemy to the same, for as much as all his knowledge came by meere experience. But howsoeuer his iudgment was good in this point: for since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soule, and cannot well be produced, vntill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the minde, according to which patterne the outward being and sensible resemblance is duely fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expres-

ſed, when the minde is not directed by knowledge to diſpoſe it in that ſort, as ſhall beſt agree with the occurrentes of ſuch natures, as are neceſſarily intereſſed both in the meanes and in the end thereof? And therfore ſpeculatiue knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the courſe of all practiſe is firſt to bee reſpected.

But that I may not ſeeme partiall in this controuerſie, but carrie an equall hand betweene two ſo neceſſarie yoakefellowes, giue me leaue to conclude in a word, the benefite of practiſe, and define the good which commeth from experience; that ſo nothing that hath beene ſpoken may ſeeme to come from affection, or proceede from the forge of vniuſt partiality. And firſt it cannot bee denied, but that practiſe giueth boldneſſe and aſſurance in action, and maketh men expert in ſuch things they take in hand, for no man can reſt vpon ſuch certainty, through the theorike of knowledge, as he that hath ſeene his learning verified by practiſe, and acknowledged by the teſtimony of aſſured proofe: Beſides, there are many other accõplements gotten only by practiſe, which grace the preſence of knowledge, & giue credit to that which we haue read; as firſt to learne the vſe and aduantage of the armes which we beare; ſecondly, by frequent aſpect and familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terrour, to learne to feare nothing but diſhonour, to make no difference betweene heate and cold, ſommer and winter, to ſleepe in all places as on a bed, and at the ſame time to take paines and ſuffer penury, with many other difficulties which cuſtome maketh eaſie, and cannot be gotten but by vſe and practiſe.

And thus at length, I haue brought a ſhallow diſcourſe to an abrupt end, wiſhing with greater zeale of affection then I am able with manifeſt proofe of reaſon, to demonſtrate the neceſſity, that both theſe partes were by our ſouldiers ſo regarded, that neither practiſe might march in obſtinate blindneſſe without learned knowledge; nor this againe be entertained with an idle apprehenſion without practiſe: but that both of them may be reſpected, as neceſſarie partes to make a compleat nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall part giueth life and ſpirit to the action, and practiſe as the materiall ſubſtance maketh it of a ſenſible being, and like a skilfull workman expreſſeth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore conceiued: wiſhing no man to deſpaire of effecting that by practiſe which the Theorike of knowledge commendeth. For *Cur deſperes nunc poſſe fieri, quod iam toties factum eſt?*

THE



THE SVMME OF THE FIRST BOOKE OF CÆSARS COMMENTARIES; WITH OBSERuations vpon the ſame, diſcouering the *excellencie of Cæſars militia.*

THE ARGVMENT.

IN this firſt booke, are contained the ſpecialities of two great wars, begun and ended both in a ſummer: the firſt, between Cæſar & the Heluetij: the ſecond, between him and Ariouiſtus king of the Germans. The hiſtorie of the Heluetians may be reduced to three principall heads: vnder the firſt, are the reaſons that moued the Heluetians to entertaine ſo deſperate an expedition, and the preparation which they made for the ſame. The ſecond, containeth their defeate by Ceſar: and the third, their returne into their countrey. That of Ariouiſtus deuideth it ſelfe into two parts: the firſt giueth the cauſes that induced Cæſar to vndertake that war: the ſecond intreateth of the warre it ſelfe, and particularly deſcribeth Ariouiſtus ouerthrow.

Suitchers.

CHAP. I.

Gallia deſcribed: the Heluetians diſlike their natiue ſeate, and propound to themſelues larger territories in the continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this humor, for his awne aduantage.

GALLIA is diuided into three partes, differing one from an other in manners, in language, and in lawes. The firſt part is inhabited by the Belgæ: the ſecond by the Celtæ, whom we call Galli: and the third by the Aquitani. Belgia is the northeaſt part of Gallia, bounded on the Eaſt with the riuer Rhene, and deuided from the Celtæ with the riuers Marne and Sene. The inhabitants of this Belgia, are without compariſon the ſtowteſt and beſt men at armes amongſt all the Galles: for beſides, that they are far remote from the ciuility of the Roman Prouince, and vnacquainted with traffike or entercourſe of ſtrangers,

Ceſar.

Matrona & Sequena.

gers, they are in continuall warres with the Germans, which maketh them hardy, expert and valorous. The Celtæ possest the greatest part of Gallia, and haue the Ocean, Sene, Garum, and the vpper part of Rhene for their confines. Aquitania is limited with the riuer Garume and the Perinaan hils. In each of these partes are diuers states and common weales, gouerned for the most part by the Annuall magistracie of their nobility, but all diuided into factions and partes; whereof the Hedui and Sequani, are contrarie, chiefe and opposite ring-leaders.

Two states in the duchie of Burgundie.

The chiefest reason that moued the Heluetians to forsake their countrey, was the good opinion they had of their owne vertue and magnanimity, and the smal capacity and circuit of their territories: For Heluetia being bounded with the famous riuers Rhene and Rhone, and with the lake Lemanus, and the high hanging rockes of the hill Iura; extending it selfe within these boundes, but 240 miles in length and 180 in breadth, seemed too narrow a roome to containe so warlike a people, that long before had ouerflowne the marches of their countrey, with the conceit they had of their owne valour, and that it heard that nature should oppose it selfe by riuers and mountaines against the Prowesse, which no enemy could euer resist: and therefore, they resolued to forsake their countrey, which first gaue them breath and being, rather then it should hinder a correspondent proceeding to their warlike nature. These coles of ambition were first kindled, and daily blowne, by the earnest perswasions and impulsions of Orgetorix, the chiefest man of authority amongst the Heluetians, both for his wealth and nobility, who not contented to be greatest in that manner he was; but affecting the greatnesse of princely dignity, thought no meanes fitter to shadowe the alteration of their state, then the change of their soile, and in their new seate and place of rest to laie the foundation of a new gouernment.

The lake of Geneua. Mont ioux.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

HE that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transmigrations and flittings of other nations, shall finde some vnexampled particularities in the course of their proceeding: for first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people vtterly abandoned that countrey which nature or prouidence had allotted them; vnlesse they were driuen thereunto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbour nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or some other vniuersal, which made the place inhabitable and the people willing to vndertake a voluntarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a country were so multiplied, that the place was ouercharged with multitudes of offspring, and like a poore father had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seeke new fortunes in forraine countries, and to possesse themselues of a resting seat; which might recompence the wants of their natiue country, with a plenteous reuenue of necessary supplementes: And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out manie Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire: And in this maner the ancient Galles disburdened themselues of their superfluity,

ty, and ſent them into Aſia. The Gothes came from the Ilandes of the Baltycke ſea, and in Sulla his time ſwarmed ouer Germany: beſides many other nations whoſe tranſmigrations are particularly deſcribed by Lazius. But amongſt all theſe, we find none that ſo forſooke their country, but there remained ſome behind to inhabit the ſame, from whence as frō a fountaine, ſucceeding ages might deriue the ſtreame of that ouerflowing multitude, and by them take notice of the cauſes, which moued them vnto it: for their maner was in all ſuch expeditions, and ſending out of Colonies, to deuide themſelues into two or three parts, equall both in equality and number. For after they had parted their common people into euen companies, they deuided their nobility with as great equality as they could, among the former partitions; and then caſting lots, that part which went out to ſeeke new aduentures, left their landes and poſſeſſions to the reſt that remained at home; and ſo by induſtrie they ſupplied that defect which continuance of time had drawen vpon them. And this was the means which the firſt inhabitants of the earth found out after the floud, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of ſcarcity and famine.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

HE that would prognoſticate by the courſe of theſe ſeuerall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better ſucceſſe, hath greater reaſon to foretell happines to theſe which I laſt ſpake of, then to the Heluetians; vnleſſe their valour were the greater, & quitted al difficulties which hatred and enuie would caſt vpon them: for an action which ſauoureth of neceſſitie, (which was alwaies vnderſtood in ſending out a colonie) hath a more plauſible paſport amongſt men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion: for as men can be content to tollerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; ſo on the other ſide, they count it gaine to puniſh pride with ſhame, and to oppoſe themſelues againſt the other.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

ORgetorix, thirſting after princely dignity, diſcouereth the humor of vaine glory. For not contented with the ſubſtance of honor, being already of greateſt power amongſt the Heluetians, and ordering the affaires of the ſtate by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the markes and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of maieſtie are annexed: nor conſidering that the beſt honour ſitteth not alwaies in imperial thrones, nor weareth the diadems of Princes; but oftentimes reſteth it ſelfe in meaner places, and ſhineth better with obſcurer titles. For proofe whereof, to omit antiquity, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particu-

larly Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest potentates of their time, being themselues but priuate gentlemen in that state, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoeuer the oportunity of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouation; but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition: for as a multitude of that nature, can be content to attribute a great part of their happines, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly interessed, to an eminent leader; and in that vniuersall extasie of ioie will easily admit an alteration of their state: so if the issue be in any respect vnfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie, but euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some obiect: A chiefe director is likeliest to be the marke, at which the dartes of their discontent will be throwen, and then he will finde it hard to effect what he intendeth.

CHAP. II.

Orgetorix practises are discouered: his death: the *Heluetians continue the resolution of their ex-* pedition, and prepare themselues *accordingly.*

Cæsar.

VT Orgetorix failed in the first entrance into his proiectes, for seeking to colour his attempt by the example of Casticus, a man of the like authority amongst the Sequani, and Dumnorix among the Hedui, (whom he persuaded) in their seuerall states to clime the same steps of ambition, he reuealed his intent, and ended it also: for being called by the Heluetians to answere that treason; before he came to triall, his body was found dead, not without suspition of murthering himselfe. The Heluetians notwithstanding continued their determined voyage, making preparations correspondent for the same; and for their better prouision of victuals, they thought two yeares little enough to study tillage, to furnish themselues with conuenient store of corne, and in the meane time to prouide themselues of cartes and cariages, that nothing might be wanting to make the iourney easie and the end fortunate. And that no neare border might interrupt with newe troubles, a designe of such hope, they made peace with all their neighbour nations, and resolued for their owne aduantage, to part friendes with those, whom they had euer liued with in continuall iars: finally, considering the mutability of mans nature, which scarce continueth constant the space of one houre, but altereth his determinations, according as he diuersly apprehendeth the same subiect, least any of them should chinge their minde, and suffer the difficulties of the action to ouersway the honour that might ensue thereof: in the heate of their forwardnes they made a law, which at the ende of two yeares, commanded their departure.

THE OBSERVATION.

AS these prouisoes were all requisite, so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of, which was to haue concealed by all meanes the time of their departure: for all the beastes of the wood must needes stand at gaze, when such lyons rouse themselues out of their dens, and be then very watchfull of their safety when they knewe the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needes be offered to appease their furie: Or at the least it behooued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treaty, that such as were likeliest and best able to crosse their designements, might haue beene no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their countrey by which they might go, the one narrow and difficult betweene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the countrey of the Sequanis the other through Prouence far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romans. But howsoeuer their errour was, that after two yeares prouision to go, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to go, when they came to the point they knew not what way to go.

The omission in the Heluetian expedition.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Heluetians passage through the Roman Prouince: he fortifieth the passage betweene the hill Iura, and the lake of Geneua.

CAESAR proconsull of the prouince in Gallia, being then at Rome, and hearing what course the Heluetians purposed to take, made great iourneyes to hasten into the Prouince, least it should receiue any detriment by them: and to that ende he gathered what forces he could at his first arriuall, which was but one legion, and caused the bridge at Geneua to be broken downe, to hinder them passage what he might. And when too late the Heluetians began to perceiue their omissions, for finding themselues ready to depart, they vsed all their walled townes being twelue in number, and their 400 villages besides priuat houses, with the rest of the corne which they could not carrie with them, and appointed a day to meete all vpon the banke of Rhone, which day was the fift of the Calendes of April, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius: at their arriuall vnderstanding

Caesar.

ſtanding of the reſiſtance which Cæſar made; they ſent vnto him ſome of the chiefeſt of their Tribes, to intreat a quiet paſſage through the Prouince. Although Cæſar was reſolued to deny thē their paſport, yet for that time he thought it beſt to ſtand doubtfull of an anſwere; that he might the better prouide himſelfe in the meane time, to make good his deniall if it were refuſed. The reaſon that moued him to denie them paſſage, was grounded vpon the ouerthrow which L. Caſſius a Roman Conſull had receiued by the Heluetians, wherein the Conſull himſelfe was ſlaine, and the ſouldiers ſold for bōdſlaues: And this accident procured their hinderance for two reſpects; firſt, he thought that the people of Rome could not with the maieſty of their Empire, ſhewe any fauour to a nation that had ſo foiled them, leaſt they ſhould ſeeme to ſtand in feare of ſuch as durſt make head againſt their armies, and buckle with the ſtrength of their legions. Secondly, he thought it impoſſible that the Heluetians hauing lent them ſuch a blow, could paſſe through their Prouince without further violence: and therfore in this time of deliberation, hee made a ditch, and a rampier from the hill Iura to the lake of Geneua, containing 19 miles in length. The rampier was 16 foote high with an anſwerable latitude and depth of the ditch: and this he fortified with many caſtles well manned with ſouldiers, and ſtored with munition. Notwithſtanding, the Heluetians attended peaceably their daie of audience; and then returned and receiued a deniall.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis manner of prolonging of time to renforce the troupes or get ſome other aduantage, as it was then of great vſe to Cæſar, and hath oftentimes beene practiſed to good purpoſe; ſo doth it diſcouer to a circumſpect enemie, by the directions in the meane time (which cannot eaſily be ſhadowed) the drift of that delay; and ſo inuiteth him with greater courage, to take the oportunitie of that preſent aduantage; eſpecially if tract of time maie ſtrengthen the one, and not further the other; which is eaſily diſcerned by the circumſtances of the action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe requeſt of the Heluetians ſeemed to deſerue a facile anſwere, being in effect no more then nature had giuen to the riuer Rhone, which was to paſſe through the prouince, with as much ſpeed & as little hurt as they could: but Cæſar looking further into the matter and comparing things already paſt, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maieſty of the Roman Empire to be intereſſed in the anſwere, being either to maintaine her greatnes by reſiſting her enemies, or to degenerat from ancient vertue, by gratifying ſuch as ſought her ruin, which in matter of ſtate are

things of great consequence. And further, he knew it to be an vnsafe course to suffer an enemie to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to loade him with further wronges whom he hath once iniured: not but that he could peraduenture be content to end the quarell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not vntill he haue added a bloudie end to an iniurious beginning.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

COncerning this maruellous fortification, betweene the hill and the lake, how seruiceable such workes were vnto him in all his warres; in what sort; and in howe small time, they were made, I will defer the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Alesia, where he gaue some ground of that hyperbolicall speech: *An me deleto, non animaduertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, qua non solum vobis obsistere sed etiam cælum dirnare possent?*

CHAP. IIII.

The Heluetians failing to passe the Rhone, take the way through the countrey of the Sequani. Cæsar hasteth into Italie, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, ouerthroweth part of them at the riuer Arar.

THe Heluetians perceiuing Cæsars determination, resolued to redeeme the ouersight they had committed in the course of their proiect, with the power of their forces, and to open a way by valour and armes, where peaceable intreatie had no passage: and therfore, they endeuoured some by boats, and others by fordes & shallowes, to passe the Rhone, and enter into Prouince, maugre Cæsar and his legion. But being easily repelde by meanes of the fortification, they made a vertue of necessity, and tooke the narrow and difficult way, through the territories of the Sequani: of whom by Dumnorix intercession they obtained a friendly through-fare. In the meane time, Cæsar hasted into Italie, & there inrolled two new legions, and tooke three more out of their standing campes in Aquileia: and with these fiue legions returned speedily into Gallia. At his returne hee vnderstood, that the Heluetians had passed the straites, and were now sacking the territories of the Edui, a state that had alwaies deserued well of the people of Rome. Cæsar.

The

The Ambari complained in like maner of the ſame hoſtilitie: and ſo did the Allobroges which inhabited beyond the Rhone. Cæſar not thinking it conuenient to linger any longer, and vnderſtanding that three partes of their troupes had alreadie paſt the riuer Arar, and a fourth remained to be tranſported, he thought it not good to forſlow that aduantage: and therfore at the third watch of the night, he marched out of his campe with three legions, to the place where they laie, and finding them ſcattered and diſperſed; he put the greateſt part of them to the ſword, and the reſt eſcaped into the woods neere adioyning. This part that was thus defeated, was named Pagus Tigurinus.

Zuricke.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis defeat being chiefely a ſeruice of execution vpon ſuch as were taken at a dangerous diſaduantage, which men call vnaware, containeth theſe two aduiſoes. Firſt, not to neglect that aduantage which Sertorius by the haires of his horſe taile hath proued to be very important, that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficulty to ouercome the whole. Secondly, it may ſerue for a caueat, ſo to tranſport an Armie ouer a water, where the enemy is within a reaſonable march, that no part may be ſo ſeuered from the bodie of the Armie, that aduantage may thereby be taken to cut them off all together, and ſeparate them from themſelues. The ſafeſt and moſt honourable way, to tranſport an Armie ouer a riuer, is by a bridge, placing at each end ſufficient troupes of horſe and foote, to defend the Armie from ſudden aſſaults, as they paſſe ouer the water; and thus went Cæſar ouer the Rhene into Germanie two ſeuerall times.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The maner of their watch.

COncetning the circumſtance of time, when Cæſar went out of his campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we muſt vnderſtand that the Romans diuided the whole night into foure watches, euerie watch containing three houres; and theſe watches were diſtinguiſhed by ſeuerall notes & ſound of cornets or trumpets, that by the diſtinction and diuerſitie therof, it might eaſily be knowne what watch was ſounded. The charge & office of ſounding the watches, belonged to the chiefeſt Centurio of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio, at whoſe pauilion the trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houre-glaſſe. The firſt watch began alwaies at ſunne-ſetting, and continued three houres, (I vnderſtand ſuch houres as the night contained, being diuided into twelue: for the Romans diuided their night as well as their day into twelue equall ſpaces, which they called houres) the ſecond watch continued vntill midnight; and then the third watch began, and contained likewiſe three houres; the fourth was equall to the reſt,

and

and continued vntill sunne rising. So that by this phrase *de tertia vigilia*, we vnderstand that Cæsar went out of his campe in the third watch, which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the watches, as often as we shal finde them mentioned in historie.

CAP. V.

Cæsar passeth ouer the riuer Arar: his horsemen incountred with the Heluetians and were put to the worst.

THE Heluetians hauing passed the riuer, Cæsar made haste to followe after, and making a bridge he transported ouer his legions in one day, which the Heluetians could scarce doe in twentie: And sending all his horse to the number of foure thousand which he had raised in the Prouince and amongst the Hedui, to discouer what waie the enemie tooke, it happened that they fell so neare vpon the rereward of the Heluetians, that they were forced to giue battell in a place of disaduantage, and by that meanes some of them were slaine, and the rest put to flight. The Heluetians made insolent with this victory, for as much as 500 of their men had put to route so great a multitude, began now boldly to resist, and sometimes part of their rereward would violently assault the Roman legions. Cæsar held his men from giuing battell, thinking it sufficient for the present to keepe the enemie from pillaging, forrage, and depopulation: and so they marched fifteene daies together in such sort, that there was not aboue fiue or six miles between the rereward of the Heluetians and the vangard of the Romans. *Cæsar.*

THE OBSERVATION.

THis example of the Heluetians maie lesson a commander, not to waxe insolent vpon euery ouerthrow which the enemie taketh, but duely to waie the true causes of a victorie gotten or an ouerthrowe taken; that apprehending the right currant of the action, he maie neither vaunt of a blinde victorie, nor be dismaied at a casuall mishappe. And herein let a heedfull warines so moderate the sequels of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and ielousie to keepe still that sweete sounding fame on foot, maie as farre surpasse the industrie, which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the continuance of happinesse doth exceede the beginning of good fortunes. For such is the nature of our soule, that although from her infancy euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which she lusted after; yet when she

meeteth with a counterbuffe to checke her appetite, and reſtraine her affections from their ſatisfaction; ſhe is as much troubled in that want, as if ſhe had neuer receiued anie contentment at all: for our will to euerie obiect which it ſeeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite, which is not ſatiſfied with a former quittance, but either ſeeketh preſent paiment, or returneth diſcontentment vnto the minde. And as our ſoule is of an euerlaſting being, and cannot thinke of an end, to her beginning; ſo ſhe ſeeketh a perpetuall continuance of ſuch thinges which ſhe luſteth after: which hee, that meaneth to holde fortune his friend, will endeuour to maintaine.

CHAP. VI.

Cæſar ſendeth to get the aduantage of a hill, and ſo *to giue the Heluetians battell: but was put off by* falſe intelligence: the oportunitie being loſt, *hee intendeth prouiſion of* corne.

Cæſar.

CAESAR being aduertiſed by his diſcouerers, that the Heluetians laie vnder a hill, about eight miles diſtant from his campe; and vnderſtanding that the aſcent vnto the toppe of the hill, on the further ſide from the enemie was readie and eaſie: in the third watch he ſent Labienus with two legions, to poſſeſſe themſelues of the ſaid hill, and he himſelfe followed with the reſt of the Armie in the fourth watch. His direction to Labienus was, that aſſoon as he perceiued him to charge the enemy below in the valley, that then he ſhould deſcend with as violent a ſhocke as he could, and ſo the Heluetians ſhould bee charged both in front and flancke at one inſtant. But this intent was at that time fruſtrated through the cauſeleſſe feare of one Publius Conſidius, a man helde very skilfull in matter of warre, for his experience firſt vnder Sulla, and afterward with Craſſus; who being ſent by Cæſar to diſcouer whether Labienus had tooke the Hill, was ſtroken with ſuch a terrour being ſo neare an enemie of that fame, that ſeeing the Roman enſignes diſplaied vpon the mountaine, could not be perſwaded but they were the Heluetians, & returned that aduertiſement to Cæſar: whereupon he deſiſted for that time from following his purpoſe, and retired to the next hill, where he imbattailed his ſouldiers with aduantage of the place. This oportunitie being thus loſt, becauſe the day of meaſuring corne vnto the ſouldiers, was within two daies: he would in no wiſe omit that care (although peraduenture he might haue had the like oportunity within a daie or two) but turned towardes Bibracte a great and opulent citie of the Hedui 18 miles diſtant from his campe, and there purpoſed to prouide corne to paie his ſouldiers.

Bray in the county of Retell.

THE

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THe getting of this hill as a place of aduantage, was maruellous important to the happy ſucceſſe of the battel: for the aduantage of the place is not only noted as an eſpecial cauſe of eaſy victory, throughout this hiſtorie; but in al their warres from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies from all difficulties, to what extremitie ſoeuer they were put. The firſt reaſon may be in regard of their dartes and ſlinges, and eſpecially their piles, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could not any waie be ſo auailable, being caſt countremont or in a plaine leuell, as when the decliuitie and downfall of a ſwelling banke did naturally ſecond their violent impreſſion: Neither can the ſhocke at handy-blowes bee anie thing ſo furious (which was a point of great reſpect in their battels) when the ſouldiers ſpent their ſtrength in franchiſing the iniurie of a riſing mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their courſe. And to conclude, if the battell ſucceeded not according to their deſire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a ſtrong retrait, in the higheſt part wherof, they had commonly their campes well fenced and fortified againſt all chances. If it be demaunded whether the vpper ground be of like vſe, in regard of our weapons: I anſwere, that in a skirmiſh of ſhot, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for the pieces being haſtily charged, as commonly they are after the firſt volley, if the bullet chance to lie looſe, when the noſe of the peece is lower then the breech, it muſt needes flie at randome, and be altogether vneffectuall: but when the noſe ſhall be raiſed vpward to the ſide of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his owne waight, ſhall flie with greater certaintie and furie; conſidering the nature of the pouder to be ſuch, that the more it is ſtopt and ſhut in, the more it ſeeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury. Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the ſhocke and incounter, to be aduantagious, as well for the ſword as the pike, and would deſerue as great reſpect, if the controuerſie were decided by theſe weapons, as ſeldome times it is.

Places of aduantage in the Roman warres.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BY Cauſidius his demeanour, we ſee that verified which phiſitions affirme, that nothing will ſooner carrie our iudgment out of her proper ſeate, then the paſſion of feare: and that amongſt ſouldiers themſelues, whom cuſtome hath made familiarly acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flocke of ſheepe into a ſquadron of corſelets, and a few canes or oſiers into pikes and lanciers: which may ſerue to aduiſe a diſcreet Generall, not eaſily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in ſo perfect a diſcipline and ſo experienced in the ſeruice of three famous Chiefes, was ſo ſurpriſed with feare, that he could not diſcern his friends frō his enimies: but I wil ſpeake more of this paſſion in the war, with Arioviſtus.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Their maner of victualing

IN euery relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first wordes are commonly these, *Re frumentaria comparata*; as the foundation & strength of euery expedition, without which no man can manage a warre, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art military, but must be forced to relieue that inconuenience, with the losse of many other aduantages of great cõsequence: Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni that famous Admiral of France amongst other oracles of truth, wherewith his minde was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying: That he that will shape that beast (meaning warre) must begin with the belly: And this rule was diligently obserued by Cæsar, who best knewe how to expresse the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion and liuely resemblance.

The order of the Romans was, at the daie of measuring, to giue corne to euery particular souldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: And by the measure which was giuen them, they knew the daie of the next paiment; for euerie footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for if they had paied them their whole stipend in money, it might haue beene wasted in vnnecessarie expences; but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; and the sequell of the warre was prouidently cared for by the Generall.

The corne being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they carried alwaies with them, & made into hastie cakes, daintie enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselues and their seruants: Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for Salust reckoneth this vp amongst other dishonours, of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their corne, which was giuen them by the treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of prouision had many speciall commodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualing: for it is impossible, that victualers should followe an Armie vpon a seruice, in the enemies countrey twentie or thirtie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes the Generall cannot attend aduantages and fittest oportunities, which in tract of time are often offered, but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vnequall tearmes, or to sound an vnwilling retrait. And whereas the victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the souldiers on the other side, careless of the morrow and prodigall of the present, in that turbulent marmarket, where the seller hath an eie onely to his particular, and the buyer respecteth neither the publike good nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion. Whereas the Romans by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publike good vpon the chiefe commander, whose dutie it was to prouide store of corne for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euerie priuate souldier, whome it

especially

especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the common weale had in plentifull manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not be wasted through negligence or prodigalitie; which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their prouinces and the next confederate states furnished their Armies continually with corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for prouision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui: And when they were in the enemies countrey, in the time of harueſt, the ſouldiers went out to reape and gather corne, and deliuered it threſhed and cleanſed to the treaſurer, that it might be kept vntill the daie of paiment. But to leaue this frugall and prouident manner of prouiſion as vnpoſſible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our hiſtorie, and ſee how the Heluetians were led, by a probable error, to their laſt ouerthrow.

CHAP. VII.

The Heluetians follow after Cæſar, and ouertake the rereward. He imbattaileth his legions vpon the ſide of a hill; and giueth order for the battell.

THE Heluetians, *vnderſtanding of the Romans departure by fugitiues that came vnto them, were fullie perſwaded that feare was the greateſt cauſe of their retraite: for the daie before hauing the vpper ground, they durſt not vſe the aduantage of the ſame: and hoping withall to intercept them from victuals, they followed after them with what ſpeed they could, & as they ouertooke them they charged vpon the rereward. Which when Cæſar perceiued, he ſent his horſemen to ſuſtaine the aſſault, & in the meane time he drew his forces vnto the next hill, and in the ſide thereof about the middle of the hill, hee made a triple battell of foure olde legions, on the toppe of the hill he placed two newe legions, which he had laſt inrolled in Italie, with the aſſociate forces; and to theſe hee commended the baggage and impediments of the whole Armie, and filled all the reſt of the hill with light armed men. The Heluetians on the other ſide, conuaied their cariage and impedimentes into one place; and hauing beaten backe Cæſars horſemen, with a thicke thronged batallion, they put themſelues into a phalanx; and ſo preſſed vnder the firſt battell of the Roman legions.* Caſar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

CONcerning the true ſenſe of this triple battell, which Cæſar made vpon the ſide of the hill, I vnderſtand it according to the ancient cuſtome of the Romans; who in the infancie of their militarie diſcipline, diuided their Armie into three ſortes of ſouldiers, *Haſtati, Principes,* The manner of their imbattailing.

Principes, and *Triarij*: for I omit the velites, as no part of their ſtanding battels, and of theſe they made three ſeuerall battels from front to backe: in the firſt battell were the *Haſtati*, and they poſſeſſed the whole front of the Armie, and were called *Acies prima*. Behinde theſe in a conuenient diſtance, ſtood the *Principes*, in like ſort and order diſpoſed, and were called *Acies ſecunda*: and laſtly in a like correſpondent diſtance, were the *Triarij* imbattelled and made *Aciem tertiam*. Their legion conſiſted of ten companies, which they called cohortes, and euerie cohort conſiſted of three ſmall companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Haſtati*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and an other of the *Triarij*, as I will more particularly ſet downe in the ſecond booke. And as theſe three kindes of ſouldiers were ſeparated by diſtance of place from front to backe: ſo was euerie battell deuided into his maniples; and theſe were deuided by little allies and waies, one from an other, which were vſed to this purpoſe: The *Haſtati* being in front did euer begin the battell, and if they found themſelues too weake to repell the enemie, or were happily forced to a retrait, they drew themſelues through theſe allies or diſtances, which were in the ſecond battell betweene the maniples of the *Principes* into the ſpace, which was betweene the *Principes* and the *Triarij*, and there they reſted themſelues whileſt the Princes tooke their place and charged the enemie: Or otherwiſe, if the commanders found it needfull, they filde vp thoſe diſtances of the *Principes*, and ſo vnited with them into one bodie, they charged the enemy all in groſſe; and then if they preuailed not, they retired into the ſpaces between the *Triarij*, and ſo they gaue the laſt aſſault, all the three bodies being ioyned all into one.

By triplex Acies.

Now if we examine by the current of the hiſtorie, whether Cæſar obſerued the ſame order and diuiſions in his warres, we ſhall find little or no alteration at all, for firſt this *triplex Acies* here mentioned, was no other thing but the diuiſion of the *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, according to the manner of the firſt inſtitution. And leaſt any man ſhould dreame of that ordinarie diuiſion, which is likewiſe threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that ſence he might ſaie to haue made *triplicem Aciem*, let him vnderſtand, that the circumſtances of the diuiſion haue no coherence with that diuiſion; for in that he ſaith of the Heluetians, *ſucceſſerunt Aciem primam*, preſſed neare the firſt battel or vangard, he maketh it cleare that the Armie was deuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for otherwiſe, he would haue ſaid, *ſucceſſerint dextrum aut ſiniſtrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*: for ſo were the partes of that diuiſion tearmed. Againe, in the retrait which the Heluetians made to the hill, when hee ſaith that the firſt and ſecond battell followed cloſe vpon the enemie, and the third oppoſed it ſelfe againſt the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, and ſtood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the backe. It is manifeſt, that no other diuiſion can ſo fitly be applied to this circumſtance, as that from front to backe.

But that place in the firſt of the ciuill warres taketh away all ſcruple of controuerſie, where he vſeth the verie ſame tearmes of *prima*, *ſecunda* and *tertia Acies*: for being to incampe himſelfe neare vnto Afranius, and feating leaſt his

ſouldiers

ſouldiers ſhould be interrupted in their worke, he cauſed the firſt and ſecond battell to ſtand in Armes and keepe their diſtance, to the end they might ſhroud and couer the third battell (which was imployed in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemie; and this kind of imbattailing Cæſar obſerued, in moſt of his fightes: by which it appeareth that he vſeth the verie ſame order and diſcipline for imbattailing, as was inſtituted by the old Romans.

Concerning the auncient names of *Haſtati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, which Ramus in his Militia Iulij Cæſaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole hiſtorie: I grant they are ſeldome vſed in theſe Commentaries, in the ſenſe of their firſt inſtitution: for the *Haſtati*, when the diſcipline was firſt erected, were the youngeſt and pooreſt of the legionarie ſouldiers. The *Principes* were the luſtie, and able bodied men: and the *Triarij* the eldeſt and beſt experienced. But in Cæſars campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeares, betweene the *Haſtati*, *Principes* or *Triarij*, which he nameth *Prima*, *Secunda* and *Tertia Acies*; and therefore were neuer tearmed by thoſe names, in reſpect of that difference. Notwithſtanding in regard of order and degrees of diſcipline, that vertue might bee rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthie place, the ſaid diſtinctions and tearmes were religiouſly obſerued: for in the battell with Petreius at Ilerda in Spaine, he mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, *ex primo Haſtato legionis quartæ decimæ*: and in the ouerthrow at Dirrachium he ſaith, that the eagle bearer, being grieuouſly wounded, commended the ſafetie of his enſigne to the horſemen, all the centurions of the firſt cohort being ſlaine, *præter principem Priorem*. And for the *Triarij*, there is no tearme more frequent in Cæſar then *Primipilus*, which name by the rules of the ancient diſcipline, but to the chiefeſt Centurion of the firſt maniple of the *Triarij*: wherby it appeareth that the maniples kept the ſame names in regard of a neceſſarie diſtinction, although peraduenture the *Haſtati* were as good ſouldiers, as either the *Principes* or the *Triarij*. As touching the ſpaces betweene the maniples, whereinto the firſt battell did retire it ſelfe if occaſion vrged them, I neuer found any mention of them in Cæſar. Excepting once here in England, where in a skirmiſh the Brittaines ſo vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Roman campe, that Cæſar ſent out two other cohortes to ſuccour them, who making diſtance betweene them as they ſtoode, the court of guard retired it ſelfe in ſafetie, through that ſpace into the campe; otherwiſe we neuer finde that the firſt battell made any retrait into the allies betweene the maniples of the ſecond battell, but when it failed in any part, the ſecond and third went preſently to ſecond them, as appeareth in the battell following with Arioniſtus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vſe of this triple battell, what can be ſaid more then Lipſius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof as farre forth as a ſpeculatiue iudgment can diſcerne of thinges ſo farre remote from the vſe of this age, which neuer imitateth this triple battell but only in a march: for then commonly they make three companies, a vangard, a battell and a rereward: but in imbattailing, they drawe theſe three companies all in front, making two cornets and the battell, without any other troupes to ſecond them. But let

Lib. 1. de bello Ciuili.

Lib 3. de bello Ciuili.

Lib. 5. de militia Romana.

let this suffice concerning Cæsar his manner of imbattailing and his *triplex Acies*, vntill I come to the second booke, where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commodity of their small battailions.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

A phalanx described.

THe Macedonian Phalanx is described by Polybius to be a square battell of pikemen, consisting of 16 in flancke and 500 in front; the souldiers standing so close together that the pikes of the fift ranke were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell; the rest whose pikes were not seruiceable by reason of their distance from the front, couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stoode before them, and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward to holde vp the swaie or giuing backe of the former rankes, and so to make the assault more violent and vntesistable. The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the Arte militari, which containeth order and disposition in imbattailing, for they maintained publike professors whom they called Tactici, to teach and instruct their youth the practise and Art of al formes conuenient for that purpose. And these Tactici found by experience, that 16 in flancke so ordered as they were in a phalanx, were able to beare any shocke how violently soeuer it charged vpon them: which number of 16 they made to consist of foure doubles, as first vnitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number and pluralitie; but vnitie doubled maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled againe maketh the second order of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time maketh 8, & this doubled maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnite; and in it they staied as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is 4 the Quadruple in regard of both the extremes: for euery one of these places, the Tactici had seuerall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short obseruations; he that desireth further knowledge of them, may reade Elianus, that liued in the time of Adrian the Emperour: and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo imperator, where hee shall haue the diuisions of Tetrafalangia ditalangia, Phalangia vnto a vnite, with all the discipline of the Grecians.

The chiefest thing to be obserued is, that the Grecians hauing such skill in imbattailing, preferd a phalanx before all other formes whatsoeuer; either because the figure in it selfe was very strong, or otherwise in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But whether Cæsar tearmed the battell of the Heluetians a phalanx in regard of their thicke manner of imbattailing onely, or otherwise, for as much as besides the forme, they vsed the naturall weapon of a phalanx which was the pike, it remaineth doubtfull. Brancatio in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no controuersie, but that euerie souldier carried a pike and a target, the target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensiue weapons

pons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is laid, that manie of the legionarie ſouldiers were wounded through the cart wheeles, with *tragulas & materas*, which are commonly interpreted ſpeares and iauelins: and I take them to bee weapons longer then common dartes, but whether they were ſo long as the ſariſſas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howſoeuer, this is certaine, that the Heluetians haue euer beene reputed for the true *phalangita*, next vnto the Macedonians; and that in their thicke and cloſe imbattailing, they failed not at this time of the forme of a phalanx: for they rooſed it ſo thicke with targets, that Cæſar ſaith they were ſore troubled, becauſe many of their targets were faſtned and tied together, with piles darted through them: Which argueth that their phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatſoeuer their weapon was.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæſar ſendeth away all the horſes of eaſe: exhorteth his men: and beginneth the battell.

BOTH the Armies being in this forwardneſſe, Cæſar to take away all hope of ſafetie by flight, firſt cauſed his owne horſe and then all the prinate horſes of eaſe, of the Legates, Tribunes, and the reſt of the chiefe leaders, to be carried out of the battell, and vſing ſome motiues of courage, according as the circumſtances afforded him occaſion, he gaue the ſigne of battell. The Romans caſting their piles with the aduantage of the hill, did eaſily breake the Heluetian phalanxs; and then taking themſelues to their ſwordes, they did ſecond the furie of the pile with a rude and violent cloſe.

Cæſar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE ancient ſages found it neceſſary, to a faithfull and ſerious execution of ſuch an action, to prepare the mindes of their men with wordes of encouragement, and to take away all ſcruple out of their conceites, either of the vnlawfulneſſe of the cauſe, or diſaduantage againſt the enemie: for if at anie time that ſaying be true, that *oratio plus poteſt quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For a donatiue or liberance, can but procure a mercenarie indeuour euer yeelding to a better offer, and doe oftentimes breede a ſuſpicion of wrong, euen amongſt thoſe that are willingly enriched with them; and ſo maketh them ſlacke to diſcharge their ſeruice with loialtie: yea oftentimes of friendes to become enemies. But in as

Speeches of incouragement before they gaue battell.

much as ſpeech diſcloſeth the ſecrets of the ſoule, and diſcouereth the intent and drift of euerie action, a few good wordes laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iuſtice controlled by iniquitie (for it is neceſſarie that a commander approue his cauſe, and ſettle an opinion of right in the minde of his ſouldiers, as it is eaſie to make that ſeeme probable which ſo many offer to defend with their bloud, when indeed euerie man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and reſpecteth nothing leſſe the right) a few good words I ſay, will ſo ſtirre vp their mindes in the feruentnes of the cauſe, that euery man will take himſelfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of equity; and the rather for that it iumpeth with the neceſſitie of their condition. For men are willing to doe well, when weldoing agreeth with that they would doe, otherwiſe the Acte may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by aſſent. And this maner of exhortation or ſpeech of incouragement, was neuer omitted by Cæſar in any conflict mentioned in this hiſtorie: but he ſtill vſed it as a neceſſarie inſtrument to ſet vertue on foote, and the only meanes to ſtirre vp alacrity: Or if it happened that his men were at any time diſcouraged by diſaſter or croſſe accident, as they were at Gergobia, and at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dirrachium; he neuer would aduenture to giue battell vntill he had incouraged them againe, and confirmed their mindes in valour and reſolution. But this age hath put on ſo ſcornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a ſpeech in this key, ſound it neuer ſo grauely, without ſcoffing and deriſion: and on the other ſide diſcontinuance of ſo neceſſarie a part, hath bred at length ſuch an *inutilem pudorem* in our chiefe commanders, that they had rather looſe the gaine of a great aduantage, then buy it with wordes to be deliuered in publike.

Lib. 7. de bello gallico.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Roman Pile deſcribed

IN this Chapter we may further obſerue the violence of the Roman pile, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be fruſtrated with any reſiſtance, and in that reſpect was very proper and effectual againſt a phalanx, or any other thicke and cloſe battell, or whereſoeuer els, the ſtroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the caſter: for in ſuch incounters it ſo galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keepe their order, nor anſwere the aſſault with a reſiſting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth that the only remedie againſt the pile was, to make the rankes thin, allowing to euery ſouldier a large podiſme or place to ſtand in, that ſo the ſtroke might of it ſelfe fall without hurt, or by foreſight be preuented; as it ſhal plainly appeare by the ſequell of this hiſtorie, which I will not omit to note, as the places ſhall offer themſelues to the examination of this diſcourſe. But as touching the pile, which is ſo often mentioned in the Roman hiſtorie, Polybius deſcribeth it in this manner. A pile (ſaith he) is a caſting weapon, the ſtaffe whereof is almoſt 3 cubites long, and it hath *palmarem diametrum*, a hand breadth in thickneſſe. The ſtaues were armed with an head of yron, equall in length to the ſtaffe

it

it ſelfe: But in that ſort that halfe the head was faſtened vp to the middle of the ſtaffe, with plates of yron like the head of a Halbert: and the other halfe ſtucke out at the ende of the ſtaffe like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thicknes, and ſo decreaſing leſſe and leſſe vnto the point which was barbed. This head was ſo ſlender toward the point, that the waight of the ſtaffe would bend it as it ſtucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called *Pilum*, as Varro noteth of *Pilum* a Peſtell, *quod Hoſtes feriret vt Pilum*. Lipſius finding that *Palmarem diametrum*, was too great a thickneſſe to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the ſtaffe were either round or ſquare, for they had of both ſortes, and ſo he maketh it very manageable; but nothing anſwerable to the deſcription giuen by Polybius either in forme or waight. Patricius in his Paralleli, maketh the ſtaffe to haue *palmarem diametrum* in the butte end, but the reſt of the ſtaffe he maketh to decreaſe taper wiſe, vnto the head of yron, where it hath the thickneſſe of a mans finger, and ſo it anſwereth both in forme and waight to a Peſtell, as may be ſeene by the figure, and I take it to be the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place ſetteth downe foure diſcommodities of the Pile. Firſt a furious and hoat ſpirited enemie will eaſily preuent the darting of the pile, with a nimble and ſpeedie cloſe: And ſo we read, that in the battell which Cæſar had with Arioviſtus, the Germans came ſo violently vpon them, that the ſouldiers caſt away their piles, and betooke them to their ſwordes. And likewiſe in that worthy battell betweene Cateline and Marcus Petreius, they caſt away their piles on either part. The ſecond diſcommoditie was, that the piles being ſo heauie, could not be caſt any diſtance; but were only ſeruiceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not be caſt with any aime, or as they ſay point blanke. And laſtly the ſouldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them, which might eaſily diſorder their troups, if they were not very wel experienced.

Lib. 3. de militia Romana.

Lib. 5.

Saluſt.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe laſt thing which I obſerue in this ſpeciality is, that the legionarie ſouldiers had no other offenſiue weapon, but one pile or two at the moſt, and their ſwordes. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes, for they came alwaies ſo neare before they caſt their pile, that they left themſelues no more time then might conueniently ſerue them to drawe their ſwordes: neither would their armes of defence, which was compleat, beſides a large target which they carried on their left arme, ſuffer them to make any long purſuit, or continued chaſe whenſoeuer a light armed enemie did make any ſpeedy retrait, as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

CHAP. IX.

The Heluetians fainting in the battell, retire to a *hill, the Romans follow after, and the* battell is continued.

Cæsar.

THE Heluetians were sore troubled with the Roman piles, which stucke so fast in their shields, that they were neither able to pull them out, nor to vse their targets to any purpose: and therfore after a wearisome toile, they chose rather to cast them away, and to hazard their nakednesse vpon agilitie and readinesse; then to betray their life with an vnmanageable weapon: but at length fainting with woundes, they began to giue place, and made their retrait to a hill not farre off, the better to saue themselues from the furie of the Romans. The hill being taken, and the legions following on to driue them from thence, the rereward of the Heluetians, which were the Boy and Tulingi, consisting of 15000 men stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the Romans in flanke and to inuiron them round about: which the Heluetians no sooner perceiued, but they returned and began a fresh from the hill to renew the battell, and so the legions were set vpon both in front and flanke at one instant. To remedie this difficultie, conuersa signa bipartitò intulerunt, *saith the history: the first and second battell fought against the Heluetians that returned from the hill, and the third battell turned themselues to beare the assault of the rereward, which stood readie to inclose them about, and to charge them on the backe. And here the fight was doubtfull and vehement for a long time, vntill at length they were no longer able to indure the violence of the legionarie souldiers, part of them fled to the toppe of the hill, and the rest betooke themselues to the place, where their baggage and impediments were lodged. And hitherto, here was not one man seene to haue turned his backe in all the conflict, although the fight continued from the seuenth houre vntill the euening.*

Them of Borbon and Lorame.


THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The ensignes of the Romans

CONcerning the ensignes of the Romans: we are to vnderstand that the chiefest ensigne of euerie legion was an Eagle, which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile or chiefe Centurion of the said legion. The ensigne of a maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a woolfe or a Sphinx, as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of history) by the Columne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the ensignes are figured, with such purtraitures: so that these ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore partes alwaies caried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight: and therefore in this historie, by the aspect and carying of the ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this place

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THE BATTEL WHICH CÆSAR HAD



WITH THE HELVETIANS.



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place it is ſaid, that the enſignes of the firſt and ſecond battell were carried towardes the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retrait; and the enſignes of the third battell looked an other waie, towardes the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, which ſtood of the foot of the hill: By which is ſignified, how the legions were diuided to reſiſt the brunt of the double incounter.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning the time of the daie: we are to vnderſtand that the Romans vſed not the ſame diuiſion of the daie as we commonly do: for they diuided their artificiall (which is the ſpace betweene ſunne riſing and ſetting) into 12 equall partes, which the Aſtronomers called vnequall or planetarie houres. The firſt houre of the daie began alwaies at ſunne riſing; the ſixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was ſunne ſetting. And as the day waxed longer or ſhorter, ſo theſe houres were either greater or leſſe: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, ſuch as are now vſed, but only at the *Aequinoctium*: ſo that by this maner of reckoning, *ab hora ſeptima ad veſperum*, is meant the battell began about one of the clocke according to our Computation, and continued vntill the euening. The like we muſt vnderſtand, throughout this whole hiſtorie, as often as there is mention made of the circumſtance of time. *The diuiſion of their day.*

CHAP. X.

The Heluetians continue their fight, at the cariages: but at length they left the field, and marched towardes Langiers.

THE like courage was alſo ſhewed on either ſide at their baggage, the place being fortified with cartes and wagons in ſteed of a rampier, which ſo troubled the Romans that they could not winne it vntill it was late in the night: for the Heluetians being fenced with their cariages, ſo galled the legions with dartes and iauelins, vnder the chariots and from betweene the wheeles, that the victory was not eaſily atchieued. At laſt being able no longer to reſiſt, they left the place and marched all that night, without any intermiſſion, and the fourth day they came into the Confines of the Lingones, being about 230000 that eſcaped in the battell. *Caſar.* *Langiers.*

THE OBSERVATION.

IF we conſider the nature of the action, and looke into the true cauſes of their ouerthrow, as farre as the right ſenſe of the hiſtorie ſhall direct our iudgment, we ſhall finde valour not to be wanting in the Heluetians, but rather ſuperlatiuely abounding in the Romans. For that vehement opi-

nion of their valiancie and manhood, which carried them out of the ſtreights of the country, to ſeeke larger fortunes in other kingdomes, was not ſo abated with the loſſe of the fourth part of their Hoſt at the riuer Arar; nor with the terrible furie of thoſe veteran legions: but it yeelded this effect, which Cæſar in his eſtimate of valour thought memorable, that for fiue houres ſpace or more, there was not one man ſeene to haue turned his backe. Their manner of imbattailing, had not the Romans beene the enemy, was vnreſiſtable: for being caſt into a phalanx, which in the plaines of Aſia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre ſurpaſſe any other forme of imbattailing (ſuppoſing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that diſpoſition) wherin the ſtrength of the whol is deuided into many particulars, as the violẽce of a great bodie exceedeth the force and motion of his partes, when it is diuided into ſmaller cantons. For as in a phalanx, many particular ſouldiers are by a cloſe and compact order incorporated into one entire bodie: ſo their ſeueral vertues are gathered into one head, and are as partes vnited into one generall force, which eaſily ſwalloweth vp the ability of many other leſſer quantities, into which a greater ſtrength is equally diuided.

The aduantage of the place which they got by retrait, and the double charge wherewith they ingaged the Romans both in front and flanke, was able in an indifferent conflict to haue made fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their ſide; or at the leaſt ſo to haue ſteemed the ſwelling tide of victorie, which carried the Romans ſo violently in the chaſe, that they might haue beene equall ſharers in the honour of the daie: had it not flowed from an Ocean of valour, whoſe courſe could not be hindered with any ſtops and oppoſitions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampled reſolution affected. And yet the height of this courage could not ſo alaie the heate of the Heluetians furie; but it brake foorth into dangerous flames, when they came to the place where their cariages were laide, and coſt much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for they fought with that ſpirit and induſtry, as though they meant to make triall whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the daie.

Periculum ſemper ab hoſtibus grauiſſimum ſuſtinet diuiſus & inordinatus exercitus.

The ouerthrow of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the leſſe to be maruelled at, conſidering they had no chiefe commander as we read of) then from any defect of valour: for the rules of militarie gouernment require eſpeciall care in paſſing ouer a water; for then eſpecially an Armie is in greateſt danger, when it is diſordered and diuided. And therfore the Romans atchieued this victorie by the horrible vigilancie as Tully calleth it, of their commander: who alwaies watched *opportunitates rei bene gerendæ*, as neceſſarie and ſpeedie meanes to ouercome in all his warres.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar after three daies respite, followeth after the Heluetians: he taketh them to mercie, and sendeth them backe againe to the country.

CAESAR abode three daies in the place where the battell was fought, as well to burie the dead, as to refresh the wearied spirits of his ouerlaboured souldiers, that their woundes might the better be cured: and in the meane time he sent letters to the * Lingones, not to furnish the Heluetians either with corne, or any other prouisions: for if they did, he would esteeme of them as of enemies, and take them in the number of the vanquished Heluetians; and at the three daies end, he made after them with all his forces. The Heluetians constrained through penurie and want of necessarie supplements, sent embasadors to Cæsar to intreat an acceptation of rendrie: who meeting him on the waie, threwe themselues at his feete, and with manie teares and supplications, they craued such fauourable conditions of peace, as might best comfort a distressed people, and beseeme the glory of so famous a Conqueste. Cæsar first sent them word to attend his coming in the place where they were: and at his comming he commanded them to deliuer vnto him a sufficient number of hostages and pledges, 2 to giue vp all the Armes and weapons they had, 3 and to deliuer vp the fugitiues that were fled vnto them in the time of the war. Whiles these thinges were a doing, part of the Heluetians to the number of 6000, stole out of the campe in the night, and tooke their iourney towardes the Rhene, and the Confines of the Germans: which when Cæsar vnderstood, hee sent presently to those cities, through whose territories the Heluetians had passed; and commaunded them to bring them backe againe: which being diligently performed, he welcommed them with the entertainment of an enemy, and put them all to the sword. The rest he commanded to returne into their country from whence they came, and because they had neither corne nor any other sustenance, he caused the * Allobroges to supply their necessities, and willed the Heluetians to reedifie their townes and citties which they had before destroied, and to inhabit in those friendly places which had giuen to their ancestors and themselues greater fortunes, then could elsewhere be afforded them: Wherein he was the more carefull, least if their country lying waste, the fertilitie of the soile might inuite the Germans from beyond the Rhene to tast the sweetnes which the Galles enioyed, and so the prouince should be sure of an vnquiet neighbour. In the campe of the Heluetians was found a register, containing the particular summes of all that were in that iourney, amounting to the number of 368000, whereof 92000 were fighting men: they that returned and saw the fortune of both their states, were 110000. And thus ended that warre.

Cæsar.

* Langres.

* Sauoyens.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe directions concerning their rendrie and returne, were very sound, and of good consequence. For first in that he commanded them to attend his comming in the place where they were, he tooke away al motions

tions of new trouble which often remoues might haue caused, by the oportunitie of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe that their abode in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the Lingones in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Cæsars displeasure, furnish thē with any necessaries in that extremity. Touching the security which the Romans required of the loialty of such people as they conquered; their manner was, to take as hostages a sufficient number of the men children of the chiefest men of that nation, whose liues depended vpon their parentes fidelitie, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion: which custome besides the present good, promised the like or better security to the next age, when as those children by conuersation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Roman Empire, that returning to their owne country, their actions might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be preiudiciall to the same. And least the loue of liberty and freedome should preuaile more with them, then that affection which nature had inioyned them to beare to their children: he did what he could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes and weapons as were there present: and so to become sutable to that petition of peace, which they had made. The sum of all is this. He corrected the insolencie of a furious people, & reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnes. He kept thē from sacking the possessions of manie thousandes, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them backe againe to continue their name and nation in the place, where they first inhabited; which continueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so headstrong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subiect to correction and controlment.

CHAP. XII.

The states of Gallia congratulate Cæsars victorie: *they call a councell, and discouer their inward* griefe concerning Ariouistus, and *his forces.*

Cæsar.

THE Heluetian warre being so happely ended, the Princes and chiefe men of all the states of Gallia, came to Cæsar to congratulate the happinesse of his victorie: and with all they besought him that with his good liking, they might call a Generall councell; wherein they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired with a common consent, to prefer to his consideration. Which being granted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselues by oath not to reueale the causes of their assembly, but to such as they should make choice of, to be their

Oratours.

Oratours. The counceil being ended, the same Princes returned to Cæsar, and in lamentable maner cast themselues at his feete, contending with as great earnestneſse, that those things which they deliuered might not be reuealed, as they did to haue their petition granted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discouerie of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull on most grieuous afflictions. Diuitiacus the Heduan was made speaker for the rest, and in effect deliuered these wordes.

That Gallia was vnhappely dinided into two factions, the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two states contending manie yeares for the principalitie, the Auerni with the Sequani their Clients, finding themselues the weaker partie, hired the Germans to take their part, who at the first sent them 15000 men to strengthen their faction: but afterward tasting the sweeteneſse and pleasure of the Galles, the barbarous people so liked the country, that now there were no leſſe then one hundred and twentie thousand, that were come out of Germanie and seated in their Territories. With these the Hedui and their Clients had once or twise fought, hoping by their proweſse, both to chastise the malice of the Sequani, and to cleare their country of a barbarous enemie: but their labour effected nothing but their owne calamitie, and the vtter ouerthrowe of their nobilitie and Senate: for they were driuen to deliuer the chiefest of their citie, as pledges to the Sequani, and to binde themselues by oath neuer to seeke their releaſe or freedome, nor to implore the aide of the people of Rome, but euer to remaine their perpetuall bondmen: Only Diuitiacus amongst all the Hedui could neuer be brought to that thraldome, but vsing that libertie which his resolution afforded him, he went to Rome and boldly opened his distreſsed case vnto the Senate. But in the ende, the victorie became as grieuous to the Sequani, as to the Hedui. For Ariouistus king of the Germans, was alreadie poſsest of the third part of their Territories, and at that instant he commanded them to let go another third part: for there were 24000 Germans come newely vnto him, that were allotted to that inheritance. If this violent course were not staied by the opposition of some greater nation, the Galles would soone be driuen out of their country, and be forced to imitate the Heluetians in seeking new habitations and seates of rest, farre remote from the crueltie of the Germans. Cæsar might by his owne authoritie, or by the presence of his Armie, or by the renowme of his late victorie, or by the name of the people of Rome, keepe the Germans from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia.

The people of Auuergne.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this relation, there are diuers points worthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to be directed by other mens misaduentures. As first into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirstie fauourites, by suppreſsing the better faculties of the soule, & setting such vnbrideled motions on foot, as carrie men headlong into most desperate attempts: for as it had deserued commendation in either faction so to haue carried their emulation, that by their owne meanes and strength appli-

ed to the rule of good gouernment, their authority might wholy haue swaied the inclinations of the weaker states; so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in forraine forces to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor, and in the ende were accordingly rewarded. Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrell which ciuill dissention hath broched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastlie, the often discontents of these states shew the force of a present euill, which possesseth so vehemently the powers of the soule, that any other calamity either already past or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tollerable and easie in regard of that smart which the present griefe inflicteth. So the Sequani chose rather to captiuate their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage nation, then to indure the Hedui to take the hand of them: and againe, to make themselues vassals to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping cruelty of the Germans: and finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and country, then to suffer the taxes and impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present euill in mens affections, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgment.

CHAP. XIII.

The reasons that moued Cæsar to vndertake this warre.

Cæsar.

TO these petitions of the Galles Cæsar made an answere, comporting the mildnesse of his naturall disposition, promising them his best furtherance in the cause, and doubted not but that Ariouistus would be intreated in any reasonable matter: and so he dismissed the assembly. Amongst many inducements, there were two of especiall importance, which vrged him to vndertake this warre: the first was the dishonour and blot of infamie, wherewith the present age might haue noted the Roman Empire, if vpon complaint and imploration of aide, they should haue suffered a barbarous nation to haue held the Hedui in thraldome, who in the maiesty of their Senate had oftentimes been called their brethren and kinsmen, and graced with such titles of respect, as by the tenure of loyalty and sincerity of affection, might command greater dueties then these which were required. The second reason was the feare he had, least the Germans accustoming more and more to transport the superfluitie of their increasing families ouer the Rhene, and to plant them in the fertile seates of the Galles, the Roman Prouince might at length be indangered, and Italie it selfe attempted. And therefore it seemed best vnto him, to send embassadours to Arioustus, to will him to thinke of some conuenient place of parley, where they might meete to intreat of matters concerning the publike good.

THE

THE OBSERVATION.

I Maie here take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the authoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be verie large, considering that Cæsar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Senate and people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this historie) did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legions, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allot the gouernment of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend vnto him the careful managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that regiment. For considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered gouernment, are as well external and forraine, as internall and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had beene to small purpose to haue giuen him onely authoritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome gouernment at home, and no meanes to take awaie such oppositions, which forraine accidentes might set vp against him: And so we see that Cæsar vndertooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: And this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiplie in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee indangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these wars, but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els they thought conuenient for the aduancement of the common weale, did wholy rest vpon their direction: *repub. bene gesta*, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions. Neither may we thinke that any subordinate or depending authority can be so powerfull in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commandeth without controlment, and proceedeth according to the oportunity of time and occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore whensoeuer the Roman affaires were distressed and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute command, that whatsoeuer power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate or in the people, it gaue waie to the greatnes of that magistrate; that there might be no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute command could establish, for the good of the common weale. And yet notwithstãding this absolute gouernment, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate leaders, they seemed to acknowledge that no man, how circumspect soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as farre forth as his meanes and industrie could atchieue it. For olde M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigor of Papyrius the dictator with examples of antiquity, saith: *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrociorem fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quam vt pecunia eos multaret: ca-*

The authoritie of the Roman Generals

Liuie lib. 8.

pite anquiſitum ob rem male geſtam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem eſſe. The people (ſaith he) in whome the ſoueraigne power of thinges conſiſteth, neuer ſhewed greater diſpleaſure againſt ſuch, as had loſt an Armie either by raſhneſſe or vnskilfulneſſe, then impoſing a fine vpon them: but to bring the life of a Generall in queſtion for failing in his indeuours, was neuer heard of to that daie.

The condition of the inferiour officers of their campe, was farre otherwiſe in regard of militarie diſcipline: for preſcription guided them in all their ſeruices, and the chiefeſt part of their duetie was obedience; although they ſaw euident reaſon to the contrarie, & found their directions vnperfect in that behalfe: And therefore Cæſar ſaith vpon that occaſion: *alia ſunt legati partes atque imperatoris, alter omnia agere ad præſcriptum, alter libere ad ſummam rerum conſulere debet.* The office of a legate or lieutenant, differeth from that of a generall: The one doing all things by preſcription; and the other freely deliberating of whatſoeuer may concerne the cauſe. And this courſe the Romans helde, concerning the authoritie of their Generals.

Lib. 3. de bello Ciuili.

CHAP. XIIII.

Ariouiſtus his anſwere: a ſecond embaſſage, with the ſucceſſe thereof.

Cæſar.

O that embaſſage Ariouiſtus anſwered, that if his occaſions had required Cæſars aſſiſtance, he would haue furthered them with his owne preſence. And he thought it as reaſonable that if it were in his meanes to pleaſure the Romans, Cæſar ought not to thinke much of the like labour: for his owne part, he durſt not come into thoſe quarters without an Armie, neither could he leuie an Armie without great charge. The thing that he moſt wondered at was, what the Romans had to doe in that part of Gallia, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance. Vpon the returne of this meſſage, Cæſar framed a ſecond embaſſage, the purport whereof caried this ſenſe: For as much as he thus requited the honour wherewith the people of Rome had beautified his beſt dignitie (for in Cæſars Conſulſhip by that controlling authoritie of their Empire, they had vouchſafed to eſteeme of him as a king in his dominions, and as a friend vnto their State) that he diſdained to admit of a Parlee concerning the common good: let him knowe that theſe were the thinges which he required to be performed by him. Firſt that he ſhould not ſuffer any more ſauage troupes of the Germans to be tranſported ouer the Rheine into Gallia: ſecondly, that he ſhould deliuer vp thoſe Hoſtages which he had from the Hedui and Sequani, and ſhould ceaſe to moleſt them with further iniuries. Theſe things if he did performe, Cæſar would aſſure him of a gratefull acceptation, in the behalfe of the people of Rome: otherwiſe, for as much as he himſelfe was Proconſull

of

of the Prouince in Gallia, his charge extended by the ſame commiſsion to the defence of their aſſociates and friendes; and therefore he would not neglect the iniurie of the Hedui.

To theſe mandates Ariouiſtus thus anſwered: the lawe of Armes kept this tenure among all nations, that a conquerour might gouerne a ſubdued people according as he thought beſt for his owne ſafetie. The people of Rome did not direct the courſe of their gouernment by another mans preſcript, but by their owne arbitrement: and as he had not directed the Romans, ſo ought not they to hinder the courſe of his proceedings. The Hedui hauing tried the fortune of the war, and hauing hazarded their life and libertie in the caſualtie of many battels, were by right become ſtipendarie to his Empire, whoſe Hoſtages he would retaine according to the couenants by which they made their peace. If Cæſar would needes vndertake that quarell; let him know that no man euer contended with Ariouiſtus, but to his owne deſtruction. Trie when hee would, he ſhould find what valour conſiſted in the Germans, that for 14 yeares ſpace were neuer couered with any other roofe then the Heauens.

THE OBSERVATION.

AND thus farre proceeded Cæſar with Ariouiſtus, in debating the wronges and agreeuances of the Hedui: Wherin appeareth the difference betweene a matter handled, according to morall ciuilitie in tearmes of mildneſſe and pleaſing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, and dependeth rather vpon the plainneſſe of the proiect, then ſuted with wordes fit for perſwaſion. For that which Ariouiſtus alleadged, to make good his intereſt in Gallia, was as conſonant to reaſon, as any thing to the contrarie vrged by Cæſar. But as the Lacedemonian ſaid of one, that he ſpake the truth otherwiſe then it ſhould be ſpoken: ſo it may be ſaid of Ariouiſtus anſwere, that it wanted that ſweeting humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it ſelfe; for as much as it proceedeth from a well tempered ſpirit, wherein no turbulent paſſion ſeemeth to controll the force of reaſon, nor hinder the ſentence of true iudgment; but rather ſeaſoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth couertly complaine of open wrong, and ſtrengthen her aſſertions with a pleaſing deliuerie. And therfore how great ſoeuer the controuerſie be, that partie which exceedeth not the boundes of modeſtie, but maketh mildneſſe his chiefeſt aduocate, will ſo preuaile in any auditorie, that albeit equitie doth diſallow her title; yet the maner of his cariage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he vſeth the ſequels of innocencie to proue his intereſt in that which he demandeth. But to leaue this circumſtance, as only to be noted; let vs proceed to the war it ſelfe, which I made the ſecond part of this hiſtorie.

CAP. XV.

The Treuiri bring newes of one hundred townſhips of the Sweui that were come to the Rhene. Cæſar taketh in Beſanſon: his ſouldiers are ſurpriſed with an extreame feare of the Germans.

Cæſar.
* Triers.
* The country about Cõſtãce in Germanie.



T the ſame inſtant, as this countermeſſage returned from Arioviſtus, there came meſſengers from the Hedui and * Treuiri vnto Cæſar: the Hedui complained that the * Harudes, whicb were lately come into Gallia, did ſacke their country and ſpoile their territories: neither could they conclude any peace with Arioviſtus; but by giuing ſufficient pledges for their alleageance. The Treuiri brought newes of one hundred towneſhippes of the Sueui that were come vnto the riuer Rhene to ſeeke a paſſage into Gallia, conducted by Naſua and Cimberius two brethren. Whereat Cæſar being moued thought his beſt means of preuention to conſiſt in celerity, leaſt the difficultie of reſiſting ſhould grow greater, when thoſe newe forces of the Sueui were ioyned with that power which was alreadie with Arioviſtus. And therfore hauing prouided corne, he made haſte to ſeeke the Germans, and haning gone three daies iourney on his way, he had intelligence that Arioviſtus with all his forces was going to take in Beſanſon, and that he was three daies iourney on his waie alreadie. Cæſar knowing how much it imported him to preuent that diſaduantage (for as much as the ſcite of the towne, was of that ſtrength that he that commanded it might prolong the warre at his owne pleaſure, being incircled with the riuer * Alduabis, excepting a ſmall ſpace of 600 foote, which was fortified with an exceeding high hill, and the hill ſtrengthened with a wall, and ſo ioyned to the towne) made al the haſte he could to take in the towne, & left a ſtrong garriſon in the ſame. And as he reſted there a fewe daies to make prouiſion of corne, his whole Armie was ſurpriſed with ſuch an extraordinarie feare, that their mindes were not a little troubled therewith. For the Romans enquiring of the Galles and marchantmen, concerning the quality of the Germans, vnderſtood that they were men of a huge ſtature, of courage inuincible, and of great practiſe and experience in feates of Armes: Whereof the Galles had oftentimes made triall, for when they incountred them they were not able to indure ſo much as the ſternenes of their countenance, or the fearceneſſe of their lookes: whereat the whole Armie conceiued ſuch a feare, that the courage of his men was wonderfullie appalled. The feare began among the Tribunes, and Prefects, and ſuch other as accompanied Cæſar in this iourney, and had ſmall or no skill in matter of warre, theſe men faining ſome one excuſe, and ſome an other of verie earneſt buſineſſe which called them home, deſired leaue to depart. The reſt whom ſhame would not ſuffer to forſake the campe, bewraied the like paſſion by their countenances and hauiour: For hiding themſelues in their tentes, they either bewailed their deſtiny ſecretly

* Le doux.

ſecretly to themſelues; or otherwiſe with their acquaintance and familiar friendes, they lamented the danger they were all like to fall into: ſo that throughout the whole campe there was nothing but making and ſigning of teſtamentes. And through the talke and fearefulneſſe of theſe men, the olde ſouldiers and Centurions and ſuch as had great experience in the campe, began by little to apprehend the terrour, wherewith the reſt were amazed: and thoſe that would ſeeme to be leſſe fearefull, ſaid they feared not the enemie, but the narrowneſſe of the waies, the greatneſſe of the woods that were betweene them and Ariouiſtus; or otherwiſe they caſt doubtes where they might haue prouiſion of corne; and manie ſtucke not to tell Cæſar, that whenſoeuer he ſhould giue commandement to march forward or to aduance the ſtandarts, the ſouldiers would refuſe to doe it.

OBSERVATIONS.

WHerein, for that we finde a ſtrange alteration, no waie anſwerable to that courage, which a late gotten victorie doth vſually breede in noble ſpirits; it ſhall not be amiſſe a little to inſiſt vpon the quality of the accident, and to gather ſuch breefe inſtructions from their weakeneſſe, as may beſt ſerue to qualifie the amaſement of horror, and mitigate the frenſie of ſo violent a paſſion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of nature cannot promiſe any ſuch learning, as may diſcouer the true meanes and ſecret motions, whereby a ſore conceiued feare doth trouble the ſenſes and aſtoniſh the minde; yet ſince the hiſtorie offereth it to our ſcanning, giue me leaue only to note the ſtrangenes of the circumſtance, & rudely to delineat the purtraiture of a beaſt oftener ſeene then well knowen, vſing the vnweldie pile for my penſile, and ſuting my ſpeech to a warlike auditorie. I know not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the ſenſes receiue intelligence of an eminent euill, which may either diſpoſſeſſe the ſoule of this earthly manſion, or trouble the quiet wherein ſhe reſteth: the ſpirits (as it ſeemeth) by the direction of their ſoueraigne miſtreſſe, retire themſelues into the inner cabinets and ſecreter pauillions of the body, where the chiefeſt part of the ſoule is moſt reſident, and ſo they leaue the frontire quarters of her kingdome naked and vngarrizoned, the better to ſtrengthen that capitall citie of the heart, out of which the life cannot flie but to the vtter ruine and deſtruction of the whole body: For feare is not onely a perturbation of the ſoule, proceeding from the opinion it hath of ſome euill to come, but it is alſo a contraction, and cloſing vp of the heart, when the blood and the ſpirits are recalled from the outward partes, to aſſiſt that place which giueth life and motion to all the reſt. In this chaos and confuſion of Humors and ſpirits, when the multiplicitie of faculties (which otherwiſe require an ordinate diſtinction in their ſeruice, and by the order of nature ſhould be diſpoſed into ſeuerall inſtruments, and be dilated throughout the body) are thus blended confuſedly together, the conceptions of the minde, which preſently riſe from theſe aduertiſements, are ſuddenly choaked with the diſordered mixture of ſo many ſeuerall properties, and are ſtifled as it were in the

The nature of feare.

the throng, before they can be transported to our iudgment, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate vniformitie of place which nature requireth in the powers of the minde. And hence proceedeth that amazednesse and astonishment, which so daunteth the hearts of men when they are taken with this passion, that because the soule giueth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremitie of the perturbation, benummed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read that Theophilus the Emperour in an ouerthrow which hee had giuen him by the Hagerans, was stroken with such an excessiue feare, that he could not betake himselfe to flight, *Adeo pauor etiam auxilia formidat*, vntill one of his chiefe commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deepe sleepe, threatned him with present death if he would not preuent the ruine of the Empire, by vsing that meanes, which was only left for his safetie.

Againe, if in that turbulent consistorie, the spirits chance distinctly to receiue any apprehension proceeding from the forging facultie of the soule, they carie it presently to execution before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemencie, that they leaue no place for better aduice and reknowledgment. And this is the cause that oftentimes through extremitie of feare to auoide our euill we run headlong into a worse, and finde a greater danger in the meanes we vse to auoide a lesse, because reason did not first trie the apprehension before it was deliuered to externall agents. And so we finde in the battel betweene Germanicus and the Almains, that two grosse troupes of souldiers were driuen into such an extasie of feare, that taking contrarie courses to auoide one and the same danger, they either of them fled to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they bee aduised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after afforded them no remedie.

And albeit reason be called to counsell, when a parlee is summoned of composition, yet is he eareth so small a way in the consultation, that the will of it selfe concludeth to betraie vertue to dishonour, and so to purchase peace with the losse of the soules chiefe treasure: which ought euer to be estimated at a higher rate, then any other happinesse which can betide the minde. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused feare, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there anie miserie greater, or any bondage more shamefull, seruile, or vile, then this which maketh man very abiect, of all other creatures, to redeeme the euill which the danger threateneth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggrauate the burden of the sinne with loathsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment, adding oftentimes aloes to wermewood, and making the end grieuouser then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed feare, and feare yeeldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame being alwaies mingled with wrath and anger, reuengeth it selfe vpon it selfe, and bringeth more perill then the first danger could threaten. Whereby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another, so on the contrarie part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for as enuie, hatred and anger, rise oftentimes of loue; so is ioie lessened with griefe, enuie with mercie, and feare with shame.

But

But for as much as all ſuch perturbations proceede of ignorance and inconſiderateneſſe, whereby we thinke that the euill is greater then indeede it is; let vs conſider what diſpoſition of our iudgment beſt moderateth the violent heate of theſe affections. And firſt touching the paſſages, whereby the ſoule receiueth her aduertiſements, as they are of diuers natures, the chiefeſt whereof are the eie and the eare, ſo are their auiſos different in qualitie, and require a ſeuerall conſideration to bee rightly diſcerned. The intelligence by the eie is more certaine, then that which commeth by the way of hearing: foraſmuch as the eie is a witnes it ſelfe of euery action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceiued in her proper obiect: and therfore the iudgment is not much troubled, to determine definitiuely how great or how ſmall the danger is, when the relations carie alwaies that certainty. And albeit the eare in like manner be not deceiued in her proper obiect, for it faithfully giueth vp that ſenſe, which ſound hath deliuered vnto it: yet for as much as the fantaſie hath greater ſcope to coine her vaine conceptions, in regard of the abſence of the action, it is neceſſarie that the diſcourſing facultie be called for an aſſiſtant before the iudgment can truly determine: and then it will appeare, that the truth doth not alwaies anſwere the report which is made thereof, in as much as diſeaſed ſpirits will not ſticke to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themſelues are tuned. And therefore this firſt commeth to bee conſidered of in all ſuch violent commotions, by which of theſe two ſenſes the firſt intelligence was receiued. But concerning the iudgment it ſelfe this is moſt certaine, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the fleſh, the more violent are the affections of the ſoule: And againe, the purer the iudgment is, and the higher it is lifted vppe from earthly natures, being no further intereſſed therein, then to holde a reſolution of well doing, the fewer and lighter are the affections, which trouble and moleſt it; for then it better diſcerneth the truth and falſehood, good or euil that is in thinges.

To redreſſe this inconuenience, Cæſar betooke himſelfe to the fitteſt & moſt proper remedie, which was by the authoritie of his ſpeech to reſtore reaſon to her former dignitie, & by diſcourſe which feare had interrupted in them, to put downe a vſurping paſſion which had ſo troubled the gouernment of the ſoule; recalling it to the meane of true reſolution, which was to moderat audacity with warines, but not to choake valour with beaſtly cowardice: for theſe Oratorie inducing perſwaſions were not the leaſt point of their diſcipline, conſidering how they framed the inward habite of the minde (being the fountaine and beginning of all motion) to giue life and force to thoſe actions which the ſeuerity of outward diſcipline commanded. For as lawes and conſtitutions of men inforce obedience of the bodie: ſo reaſon and perſwaſions muſt winne the ſoules conſent, according to that ſaying, *homines duci volunt, non cogi.*

CAP. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Armie, concerning this feare.

Cæsar.

CAESAR calling a Councell of war, wherein the Legates, Tribunes and Centurions of all the orders and degrees were assembled, he greatly blamed them: First, that any man should bee so inquisitiue as to imagine to himselfe, whither and vpon what seruice they were carried. Concerning Ariouistus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulshippe, most earnestly sued for the friendshippe of the people of Rome; and why then should any man misdeeme, that he should so vnaduisedly goe backe from his duety? For his owne part he was verelie perswaded, that if Ariouistus once knew his demandes, and vnderstood the reasonable offers that he would make him, that he would not easily reiect his friendshippe, nor the fauour of the people of Rome. But if he were so madde, as to make warre vpon them, why should they be affraid of him? or why should they despaire either of their owne proweße, or of Cæsars circumspectneße? For if it came to that point, the enemie that they were to incounter, had beene tried what he could doe twiße before. First, in their fathers daies, when the * Cimbri and the Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, and now of late againe in Italie, at the insurrection of the bondmen, who were not a little furthered through the practiße & discipline which they receiued of the Romans, whereby it might be discerned how good a thing it is to be constant and resolute: in as much as whom for a time they feared without cauße being naked and vnarmed, the same men afterwardes (although well armed and Conquerors withall) they nobly ouercame. And to be short, theße were no other Germans, then thoße whom the Heluetians had vanquished in diuers conflicts, not onely in their owne country where the Heluetians dwelt themselues, but also euen at home at their owne dores; and yet the same Heluetians were not able to make their partie good against our Armies. Concerning the Galles, they were ouercome more by cunning & pollicie, then by force; which although it tooke place against sauage and vnskilfull people, yet was not Ariouistus so simple as to thinke that he could ensnare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for thoße that fained the cauße of their feare to be the difficultie of prouiſion of corne, and the dangerousneße of the way, they tooke more vpon them then became their place, in presuming to teach their Generall what he had to doe, as if he had not knowne what pertained to his duty. The Sequani and Lingones had vndertooke that charge, and what the waies were, should shortly be seene: Whereas it was reported that the souldiers would not obey his mandates, nor aduance their standarts, he little esteemed it; for he was well assured, that if an Armie refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either becauße he was thought vnfortunate in his enterprises; or els for that hee was notoriously conuicted of Auarice: but the whole course of his life should witneße his innocencie, and the ouerthrow of the Heluetians his happines. And therefore that which he was minded to haue put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand: for the night following at the fourth watch he would dislodge from thence, that

* Cimbri, a nation came out of Germanie and drone out the Aduatici and are now the Zelanders. Teutoni, Germans.

that without further delay he might vnderſtand, whether ſhame and reſpect of dutie would preuaile more with them, then feare and cowardice. And though he wiſt that no man els would follow him: yet notwithſtanding he would go with the tenth legion alone, of which he doubted nothing, and would accept it as the chiefe band and guard of his perſon. Vpon the making of this ſpeech, the mindes of all men were wonderfully changed: for it bred in euery one a great alacritie and deſire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to giue him thankes by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them, aſſuring him of their readineſſe to ſet forward to the warre.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the ſpeech it ſelfe are preſented many ſpecialities, both concerning their diſcipline and militarie inſtructions, which deſerue examination; amongſt which I note firſt, the extraordinarie number admitted to the Councell, *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus:* Whereas there were vſually no more admitted to their councell of warre but the Legates, Queſtor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the firſt orders, which I vnderſtand to be the firſt *Haſtate*, the firſt *Princeps*, and the firſt *Pilum* of euery legion. And this is manifeſtly proued out of the fift Commentaries where Cicero was beſieged by Ambiorix, in which amongſt other there were two valiant Centurions, Pulfio, and Varenus: betweene whom there was euerie yeare great emulation for place of preferment, *& iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant*, ſaith Cæſar, that is, they had paſſed by degrees through the lower orders of the legion, and were very neare the dignitie of the firſt cohort, wherein as in all the reſt there were 3 maniples, and in euerie maniple two orders.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe firſt motiue which he vſeth to recall their exiled iudgment, diſcouered their breach of diſcipline: for contrarie to the courſe of militarie gouernment, they had preſumed not only to make inquirie, but to giue out whither, and vpon what ſeruice they were caried; which in the rigour of campe pollicie, could not paſſe without due puniſhment: for what can more contradict the fortunate ſucceſſe of an expedition, then to ſuffer to be meaſured with the vulgar conceit? or waied in the ballance of ſuch falſe iudgmentes? eſpecially when thoſe weake Cenſors are to be Actors, and executioners of the deſſigne: for then euerie man will ſute the nature of the action according to his own humor, although his humor be led with blindneſſe, and haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehenſion of profit or diſaduantage. And in this caſe there cannot be a better preſident then nature hath preſcribed: for as natural Agents, whileſt they concurre to produce a worke of abſolute perfection, neither know what they doe, nor can diſcerne the thinges they looke vpon; but yeeld themſelues to be guided by a moderator

of infinite knowledge: ſo ought a multitude to ſubmit their abilitie to the direction of ſome wiſe and prudent captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the loſſe of many particulars, with the health and ſafetie of the publike good. For if euery man ſhould preſcribe, who ſhould obay? *Tam neſcire quædam milites, quam ſcire oportet*, ſaith Otho in Tacitus, vpon the like diſorder: and againe, *parendo potius quam imperia ducum ſciſcitando res militares continentur*; which proueth that the greateſt vertue which is required in a ſouldier is obedience, as a thing wherein the force of all diſcipline conſiſteth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Whether men haue greater courage in their owne or in a ſtrangers country.

IN the reaſon which he vſeth to proue their diſparitie of valour, in regard of the Romans, being ſuperiour to the Heluetians that had oftentimes ouerthrowen the Germans; he ſtrengtheneth the argument with the aduantage of the place, and ſaith that the Heluetians had put them to the worſt, not onely where the Heluetians dwelt themſelues; but euen in their owne country, and at home at their owne dores: as though an enemie were charged with greater furie in the preſence of a mans own country and deareſt friendes, then in a ſtrange and vnknowne land. This queſtion was handled in the Roman Senate, by Fabius Maximus, and Scipio ſurnamed Africanus, when they ſate in counſell how to ridde their country of that ſubtile Carthaginian, that for ſixteene yeares ſpace had fretted like a canker the beautie of Italie, waſted the land and brought it to deſolation: ſacked their confederates, or alienated them from their duety, ouerthrowen their Armies, ſlaine their Conſuls, and threatned their imperiall cittie with ruine and deſtruction. Fabius vpon the motion to make warre in Africke, thought it agreeable to nature, firſt to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens poſſeſſions: when peace was eſtabliſhed in Italy, then let warre be ſet on foot in Africke; and firſt let them be without feare themſelues, before they went about to terrifie others: for thoſe forces afforded little hope of victorie in another kingdome, that were not able to free their owne country from ſo dangerous an enemie. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian common weale with the like couuſel: and concerning Hannibal, let them be ſure of this, that they ſhould finde him a ſorer enemy in his owne country, then in an other kingdome. Scipio on the other ſide, caried on with the honour of ſo glorious an enterpriſe, wanted neither reaſons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for he ſhewed that Agathocles the Syracuſian king, being a long time afflicted with the Punicke warre, auerted the Carthaginean from Cicily, by tranſporting his forces into Africke: but how powerfull it was to take awaie feare, by retorting danger vpon the oppreſſor, could there be a preſenter example then Hannibal? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betweene the ſpoile and waſt of a ſtrangers country, and to ſee their owne natiue country waſted with ſword and deſtruction: *plus animi eſt inferenti periculum, quam propulſanti*, for he that inuadeth an others kingdome, eaſily diſcouereth both the aduantage which

may

may be taken against the enemy, and the strength whereupon he reiteth: And amongst the variable euents of warre, many vnexpected occasions arise which present victory to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of thinges, that no foresight can discerne what may happen. With these and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then importance, was handled by two famous and worthy Captaines, whose mindes as it seemed, were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their owne humor, then to determine in sincerity of iudgment, vpon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrariety of their positions. But to leaue other commodities or disaduantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will only set downe some reasons to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a warre of that nature. And first this cannot be denied, the testimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the property of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victorie, and hope conceiueth such spirites as vsually follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becommeth hardie and resolute in victorie: so on the other side disaduantage and danger breede feare, and feare so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that vertue and honor giue place to distrust, and yeelde vp their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidencie & irresolution: Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth vpon an enemie in a strange country, and so preuenteth such attemptes as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giueth life vnto action, and steeleth his enterprise with resolution; for besides the commoditie of leauing when he list, and proceeding as far foorth as he shall finde his meanes able to fortunate his attemptes; hee knoweth that the strife and controuersie is not for his native country, which he quietly enioyeth, and is reserued at all times to entertaine him, howsoeuer fortune shal fauour his dessignes: but for a strangers kingdome which his ambition thirsteth after; wherein for as much as the riches and wealth of that state are laide before them as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is atchieued thereby, euerie mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the minde. But when a Prince shall be assaulted in his owne kingdome, and in the sight of his subiectes haue his land consumed with ruine and destruction: the danger will so disturbe the powers of the soule, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker partes, the better faculties will lose their prerogatiue of aduising how the enemy may be best resisted; when as euery man shal apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it. And albeit the presence of such thinges as are dearest to his soule, as the pietie and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution: yet the motiues are of such waight as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth as vnsufficient to maintaine so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: for as much as the terrour and feare of so great a danger will present a greater measure of woes to their minde, then the hope of victory

can afforde them ioy. Hence therefore groweth the difference betweene him, that ſeeketh to maintaine that eſtate which he hath in poſſeſſion by force of Armes; and an other, that ſeeketh to increaſe his meanes by valour. For the former is preſented with the danger of looſing all his eſtate, which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him; and the other looketh vpon the aduantage, which he gaineth by ouercommings which much increaſeth his valour, without any loſſe or diſaduantage, if he chance to be put to the worſt. And therfore there is alwaies great ods betweene him that hath alreadie loſt his goods, and is by that meanes become deſperate, hauing nothing further to looſe; and another, that yet keepeth his ſubſtãce, but is in danger to looſe it: for feare will ſo diſmay his mind, that he will rather diſtruſt his owne ability, then entertaine a reſolution of valour. To proue this, we neede not ſeeke other examples, then thoſe imperiall cities, in whoſe cauſe this controuerſie was firſt moued. For when Hanniball was come into Italy and had defeated Sempronius the Conſull at Trebeas, the Romans were driuen into ſuch an extaſie of terrour, that they beleeued verely that the enemie was then comming to aſſault the citie; neither had they any hope or aid in themſelues to keepe or defend the ſame. On the other ſide, Scipio was no ſooner landed in Africke, but there was ſuch a tumult in Carthage, as though the citie had been alreadie taken: neither could the opinion of victory, which Hanniball by a conquering Armie in Italy had confirmed for ſixteene yeares together, preuaile in the apprehenſion of ſo imminent a danger: And then that which Fabius borowed of nature to teach the Romans (that firſt men ought to defend their own, before they ſeeke other mens poſſeſſions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for with all ſpeed they ſent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion againſt young Scipio. If therfore other things be correſpondent, as there are many other particularities concerning the power and ſtrength of either nation to be conſidered, I take it much better for a Prince to inuade an enemie in his owne country, then to attend him at home in his owne kingdome.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

THe laſt circumſtance which I note in this ſpeech, was the truſt which he repoſed in the tenth legion, being in it ſelfe peraduenture as faultie as any other: wherein he ſhewed great arte and ſingular wiſdome. For he that hath once offended and is both burthened with the guilt of conſcience, and vpbraided with the reproch of men, can hardly be perſwaded that his fault can bee purged with any ſatisfaction. And although the puniſhment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but ſtill remaineth to caſt diſhonour vpon the offender, and to accuſe him of diſloialtie: And therefore it oftentimes happeneth, that an errour being once raſhly committed, through deſpaire of remiſſion admitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere ſcelus luendum eſt*; or maintaineth his errour by

wilfull

wilfull obſtinacie: as it is ſaide of the Lyon that being found by hunters in a caue, will rather die in the place then quit it, for ſhame that he was found in ſo baſe a place of refuge; and therfore his propertie is thus expreſſed, *ingrediendo cæcus, exeundo proteruus*. This did Cæſar wiſely preuent, by cleering the tenth legion of that, which he accuſed the reſt of the Armie, which made them ſo much the more earneſt to anſwere his expectation, in as much as they were witnes to themſelues of a common errour: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, reſolued to ſhew as great alacrity in the ſequell of the warre, and to deſerue more then the iudgment of the Emperour had imputed to their fellowes.

CHAP. XVII.

The treatie betweene Cæſar and *Ariouiſtus*.

THE reſt of the legions in like manner dealt with their Tribunes and chiefeſt Centurions, to ſatiſfie Cæſar of their obedience, affirming that they neuer doubted nor feared, no nor ſo much as thought that it belonged to them, to determine any thing concerning the courſe of the warre, but that it was onely left to their Emperour; their purgation accepted, and good inſtructions being taken by Diuitiacus, in the fourth watch he marched forward according to the purport of his former ſpeech. The ſeuenth day as he continued on his iourney, his eſpiallès brought him word, that *Ariouiſtus* with all his forces was within 24 miles of that place: who aſſoone as he vnderſtood of Cæſars comming, ſent embaſſadours vnto him, declaring that for aſmuch as he was come ſomewhat nearer, and that he might doe it without danger, he was content to admit of a parlee, vpon this condition, that Cæſar would bring no footmen to the meeting (for he feared to be ſurpriſed by treacherie) but onely horſemen, and in that ſort he would meete him. Cæſar accepted of the condition, hoping at length that he would harken to reaſon and deſiſt from wilfull obſtinacie: and becauſe he durſt not commit himſelfe to the French horſemen, he thought it beſt to take their horſes, and to ſet the ſouldiers of the tenth legion vpon them, that if he ſtood in neede he might haue a faithfull guard of his friendes about him. There was a great and open plaine, and in the middeſt thereof a riſing mount, and thither they came to the parlee: the legion which Cæſar had brought with him on horſebacke, he placed 200 paces from the ſaid mount; and likewiſe the horſemen of *Ariouiſtus* ſtood in the ſame diſtance: *Ariouiſtus* requeſted that they might talke on horſebacke, and bring each of them ten perſons to the parlee. Their expoſtulations were the ſame in effect, with thoſe meſſages which were carried betweene them by embaſſadours. Much vnkindnes tooke by Cæſar, conſidering the friendſhip which the Romans had ſhewed vnto *Ariouiſtus*, that he would not vouchſafe to treate with them: and on the other ſide as great iniurie conceiued by him, for aſmuch as the law of nations gaue no ſuch prerogatiue to any one people that they ſhould challenge in other countries by deſert:

Cæſar.

deſert: but that generally it had giuen dominion to valour, and kingdomes to conquering armies. But while the treatiſe thus continued, it was told Cæſar that Ariouiſtus his horſemen were comming neerer vnto the mount, and that they began to skirmiſh with his ſoldiours; whereupon Cæſar brake off the treatie, and withdrewe himſelfe to his men, commaunding them that they ſhoulde not caſt a weapon at the enemie: for although hee perceiued that without peril of his legion hee might haue incountered with Ariouiſtus men, yet he would not giue occaſion by putting them to flight, to haue it ſaid, that he had entrapped them vnder pretence of parlee. At his returne, when it was reported to the common ſoldiors, howe arrogantly Ariouiſtus had caried himſelfe in the treaty, forbidding the Romaines all Gallia, and that his men of armes did offer to aſſault the legion, inſomuch that the treaty was thereby broken off; the ſoldiors were more deſirous of battell then before, and by theſe degrees they obtained it. Two daies after Ariouiſtus ſent againe to Cæſar, to haue thoſe thinges perfited which were begun in the treaty. Cæſar thought it not good to make any further meeting in his owne perſon, and the rather becauſe the Germaines had no ſtaie of themſelues the daie before, but they threwe dartes and ſtones at his men; and whome ſoeuer of his men hee ſhould ſend vnto him ſhould go into great danger, as caſt into the hands of a ſauage people. The beſt way he could thinke of was, to ſend Valerius Procillus, a well accompliſht yong man, that ſpake the French toung well, and had no waie offended the Germaines, and with him he ſent Marcus Titius, a man well knowne to Ariouiſtus, vſing ſometimes to reſort as a gueſt vnto him: To theſe he gaue in charge that they ſhould diligentlie marke, and iuſtlie report vnto him what Ariouiſtus ſaid; But aſſoone as Ariouiſtus ſawe them in his campe, hee cried out to them in the preſence of his army, asking them what they had to do there, and whether they came as ſpies? And as they went about to make their anſwere, he would not heare them, but cauſed them to be caſt into irons. The ſame day he remoued, and incamped vnder the ſide of a hill 6. miles from Cæſars campe; the next day he came two miles beyond Cæſar, neerer to the middeſt of Gallia, of purpoſe to cut off all corne and conuoie as ſhould be ſent vnto the Romains, by the Hedui and Sequani. From that day forwarde, by the ſpace of fiue daies togither, Cæſar imbattailed his men before his campe, to the intent that if Arioniſtus pleaſed to giue battell, he might haue libertie when hee would; but Ariouiſtus all this while kept his armie within his campe, and daily ſent out his horſemen to skirmiſh with the Romaines. This was the manner of fighting which the Germaines had practiſed: there were 6000. horſemen, and as many ſtrong and nimble footmen, whom the horſemen had ſelected out of the whole hoſt, euerie man one for his ſafegard; theſe they had alwaies at hand with them in battell, and vnto theſe they reſorted for ſuccour; if the horſemen were ouercharged, theſe euer ſtept in to helpe them; if anie one were wounded and vnhorſed, they ſtood about him and ſuccoured him: if the matter required either to aduenture forward, or to retire ſpeedilie backe againe; their ſwiftneſſe was ſuch through continuall exerciſe, that hanging on the horſe maine by the one hand, they would run as faſt as the horſes.

THE OBSERVATION.

Foote men interm ngled amongſt horſemen.

IT may ſeeme ſtrange vnto the ſoldiours of our time, that the footemen ſhould bee mingled pell mell amongſt the horſemen, without hurte and diſaduantage to themſelues: ſo vnlikely it is that they ſhoulde either ſuccour

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the horſemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore ſome haue imagined that theſe footmen in the incounter caſt themſelues into one bodie, and ſo charging the enemy aſſiſted the horſemen. But the circumſtances of this place, and of others which I wil alleage to this purpoſe, plainly euince that theſe footemen were mingled indifferently amongſt the horſemen, to aſſiſt euery particular man as his fortune and occaſion required; and therfore the choiſe of theſe footemen, was permitted to the horſemen, in whoſe ſeruice they were to be imploied, that euery man might take his friend in whom he repoſed greateſt confidence: When they were ouercharged theſe ſtept in to helpe them, if anie man were wounded or vnhorſed he had his footeman ready to aſſiſt him; and when they were to go vpon any ſpeedie ſeruice, or ſuddainly to retire vpon aduantage, they ſtaied themſelues vpon the maine of the horſes with one hande, and ſo ran as faſt as the horſemen could go; which ſeruices they could not poſſiblie haue performed without confuſion and diſorder, if the footemen had not ſeuerally attended vpon them, according to the affection ſpecified in their particular election. The principall vſe of theſe footmen of the Germaines conſiſted in the aide of their owne horſemen vpon any neceſſity, not ſo much regarding their ſeruice vppon the enemie, as the aſsiſtance of their horſemen. But the Romains had long before practiſed the ſame Arte to a more effectuall purpoſe, namely as a principall remedy not onely to reſiſt, but to defeat far greater troupes of horſe, then the enemy was able to oppoſe againſt them. Wherof the moſt ancient memory which hiſtory mentioneth, is recorded by Liuie in the ſecond punicke war, at the ſiege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Conſul: where it is ſaid, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better, ſo their caualry was alwaies put to the worſt: & therfore they inuented this means to make that good by Art which was wanting in force. Out of the whole army were taken the choiſeſt young men, both for ſtrength & agilitie, and to them were giuen little round bucklers, and ſeuen darts apeece in ſteed of their other weapons; theſe ſoldiours practiſed to ride behind the horſemen, and ſpeedily to light from the horſes at a watchword giuen, & ſo to charge the enemy on foot. And when by exerciſe they were made ſo expert that the nouelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horſemen went forth to incounter with the enemy, euery man carying his foot ſoldior behinde him, who at the encounter ſuddainly alighting charged vpon the enemy with ſuch a fury, that they followed thē in ſlaughter to the gates of Capua. And hence ſaith Liuie grew the firſt inſtitution of the Velites, which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this ſtrategem is ſaid to be one Q. Nauius a Centurion, & was honorably rewarded by Fuluius the conſull for the ſame. Saluſt, in the hiſtory of Iugurth, ſaieth, that Marius mingled the Velites with the Cauarie of the aſſociates, *vt quacunque inuaderent equitatus hoſtium propulſarent*. The like practiſe was vſed by Cæſar, as appeareth in the thirde booke of the Ciuill warre; ſauing that inſteed of the velites, hee mingled with his horſemen 400. of the luſtieſt of his legionarie ſoldiours, to reſiſt the cauarie of Pompei, while the reſt of his armie paſſed ouer the riuer Genuſum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dirrachium, *qui tantum profecere*, ſaith the text; *Vt equeſtri*

stri prælio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent. Many other places might be recited, but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times strengthened their caualrie with footemen dispersed amongst them. The Romaine horsemen, (saith Polibius) at the first caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, and a little round buckler; but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians, which Iosephus affirmeth to bee a strong launce or staffe, and three or foure dartes in a quiuer with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their launce was most effectuall when they charged in troupe, pouldron to pouldron; and that maner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle footmen: but when they vsed their dartes, euerie man got what aduantage of ground he coulde, as our Carbins for the most part do, and so the footemen might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they woulde easilie make place for the footmen to serue among them: But howsoeuer it was, it appeareth by this circumstance howe little the Romaines feared troupes of horse, considering that the best meanes to defeate their horse was by their foote companies: But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two; the one out of Liuie, to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to footemen: the other out of Hirtius, to shewe the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen, In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius: Valerius hauing fortunatelie ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines, wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines reserued 2000. of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the leste corner of the Romaines, as they were in conflict, which tooke such effect, that the legionarie footemen of that corner were forced to retreit. Which the Romaine horsemen beeing in number 600. perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the enemy; they presently forlooke their horses, and made haste to make good the place on foote; wherein they caried themselues so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and the betooke themselues againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point. The Numidians, as Cæsar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that euer hee met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Germaines did, mingling among them light armed footemen: an Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the history saieth, that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle*. And as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rereward of the armie, according to the manner of the Numidian fight; the historie saieth, *Cæsariani interim, non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad vnum terga vertebant*. So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legionarium militem commodius sustinebat*. And euer as he marched, hee caused 300. soldiours of euerie legion to bee free and without burthen, that they might be ready vpon all occasions, *Quos in Equi-*

tatum

Lib. 6.

Lib. 3. de excid.

Lib. 3.

De bello Africano.

tum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, complurib⁹ vulnerat⁹, milites legionarij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire caperunt. I alleage the verie wordes of the historie, to take awaie all suspicion of falsifying, or wresting anie thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this dispatitie, he shall finde it to be chiefely the worke of the Roman pile, an vnresistable weapon, and the terrour of horsemen, especially when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, and fell so thicke, that there was no meanes to auoid them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troupe of horse, then the Caualry of their owne partie, although they bare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and readie they were, that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with farre greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For as the force of all the engines of olde time, as the *Balista*, *Catapulta* and *Tolenones*, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth as the onely strength and life of the engine; so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmenes & stay, which nature by the earth, or some other vnmoueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as he that lifteth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heauier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heauier then his bodie. The footmen therfore, hauing a surer staie to counterpoise their forced motion, then the horsemen had, cast their dartes with greater violence, and consequently with more certainty.

CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar preuenteth Ariouistus of his purpose, by making two Campes. The superstition of the Germans.

WHEN Cæsar perceiued that Ariouistus meant nothing leſse then to fight, but kept himselfe within his campe; least peraduenture he should intercept the Sequani and other of his associates, as they came with conuoies of corne to the Romans, beyond that place wherein the Germans abode about 600 paces frō their campe, he chose a ground meete to incampe in: and marched thither in three battels, commanding two of them to stand readie in Armes, and the third to fortifie the campe. Ariouistus sent 15000 footmen, and all his horse to disturbe the souldiers, and to hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding Cæsar as he had before determined, caused two battels to withstand the enemie, and the third to go through with the Cæsar.

worke: which being ended, he left there two legions, and part of the associate fortes, and led the other foure legions backe againe into his greater campe, and so he rested secure concerning the convoies from the Sequani, and by his greater campe cut off the passages betweene Arioüistus and the Rhene. The next day Cæsar according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his campes, and marching a little from the greater campe, he put his men in aray and profered battell to the enemie; but perceiuing that Arioüistus would not stir out of his trenches, about noone he conuaied his Armie into their seuerall campes. Then at length Arioüistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser campe: the incounter continued very sharpe on both parts, vntill the euening; and at sunsetting after many woundes giuen and taken, Arioüistus conuaied his armie againe into their campe. And as Cæsar made inquirie of the captaines what the reuson was, that Arioüistus refused battell: he found this to be the cause. The Germans had a custome, that their women should by casting of lots, and southsaying, declare whether it were for their behoofe to fight or no, and that they found by their Arte, the Germans could not get the victorie if they fought before the newe moone.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans obserued, and by which they conquered so many nations: for besides the safetie which it affoorded their own troupes, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage, and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselues, or impeach the enemie by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking vp his campe, besides many other aduantages, all auerring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: *dolabra vincendum esse hostem:* a thing long time neglected, but of late happely renewed by the commanders of such forces as serue the states in the vnited prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vse of the spade, and to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoeuer, which maie bee thought worthie executioners of the deedes of Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN the second place we may obserue, that there was no nation so barbarous (for I vnderstand the Germans to be as barbarous in regard of the motions of religion as any knowne nation of that time, being in a Climate so neare the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make vse in their greatest affaires, of that superstition to which their minde was naturally inthralled; and forge prophecies and diuinations as well to stir vp as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best

best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæsar let slip the occasion of making vse of this their religion: for vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbad them to fight before the newe moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieuing might preiudice their resolution to returne conqueters: Which may serue to proue that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueniences, which industry or fortune may discouer to their ouerthrow. It is recorded that Columbus, being Generall of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Castile sent to discouer the west Indies, & suffering great penury for want of victuals in the Ile of Iamaica: after that he had obserued how the Ilanders worshipped the moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen, he tolde the inhabitants that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the wrath of their God should quickly appeare towardes them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darkenesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, stroken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might assist their enemies to depopulate, and ouer runne their owne countrie.

CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to giue them battell, and the Germans dispose themselues therunto.

CAESAR foreslowed not that aduantage: but the next daie in the morning leauing a sufficient garrison in each of his campes, for as much as the number of his legionarie souldiers was small in respect of the multitude of the Germans, he placed al the auxiliarie troupes, for a shew before the lesser campe, and putting his legions into a triple battell, he marched towardes the campe of Ariouistus. And then at length were the Germans constrained to bring out their power, setting euery tribe & people by it selfe, in a like distance and order of battell, and inuironing their whole Armie with their cartes and cariage, that there might be no hope at all left to saue any man by flight, that durst not abide the fortune of the battell: In these chariots they placed their women, that they by their outstretched handes and teares moouing pitty, might implore the souldiers as they descended by course into the battell, not to deliuer them, the authors of their life and being, into the bondage and thraldome of the Romans. Cæsar assigned to euerie legion a Legate and a Questor, that euerie man might haue an eie witnesse of his valour: and he himselfe began the battell with the right cornet; for as much as he perceiued that part of Arioustus Armie to be the weakest. Cæsar.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THE Romaines euen from the infancie of their ſtate were euer zealous admirers of true honour, and alwaies deſired to beholde with the eye, to what meaſure of vertue euerie man had attained; that the young with greater feruency of ſpirit might founde out the celebration of *Macte virtute*, which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the leaſt part of their wiſedom, conſidering that the moſt pretious things that are, looſe much of their worth, if they be not ſuted with other correſpondent natures, whoſe ſympathie addeth much more excellencie then is diſcerned, when they appeare by themſelues without ſuch aſſiſtance. For how ſmall is the beauty which nature hath giuen to the eie-pleaſing diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall forme? or what perfection can the forme giue without a foile to ſtrengthten it? or what good is in either of them if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auaile all theſe where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an heart to imbrace it? ſuch a vnion hath nature imprinted in the diuerſitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and eſpecially in morall actions, in whoſe cariage there is a far greater exactnes of correſpondency required to approue them honorable, then was requiſite to make the iewell beautiful. And this did Cæſar in all his battels; amongſt the reſt that at Aleſia is particularly noted in this manner, *Quod in conſpectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, vtroſque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominiæ ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Liuie would expreſſe how valiantly an action was caried, he ſaith no more but *in conſpectu imperatoris res gerebatur*, which is as much to ſaie, that foraſmuch as the Romaines were diligent obſeruers of euerie mans worth, rewarding vertue with honor, and cowardice vvith reproch; euerie man bent his vvhole indeuour to deſerue the good opinion of his Generall, by diſcharging that duty which he owed to the common wealth, with all loyalty and faithfulnes of ſpirit.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell, the firſt was called *Acies recta*, when neither the cornets nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a ſtraight front; and this was their moſt vſuall manner of imbattailing.

The ſecond forme of the front was called *obliqua*, when as one of the cornets was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the reſt, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right cornet: for the right corner of an army had great aduantage againſt the left of the enemies, in regarde

of

of their weapons and furniture: But Cæsar did it in this place, because hee perceiued that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemie is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an army: for so fauorable are mens iudgementes to that which is already happened, that the sequell of euery action dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning, *Dimidium facti qui bene cæpit habet*, (saith a Poet) and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequel by the nature of a precedent cause, that the ende must needes erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qualitie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good ende without a good beginning: for although the beginning bee oftentimes disastrous and vnlucky, and the end fortunate and happie, yet before it came to that end there was a fortunate beginning: for the bad beginning was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore that his men might foresee a happy ende in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his armie to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front is called *Sinuata*, when both the cornets are aduanced forward, and the battell standeth backwarde off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best soldiours were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old soldiours in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuersie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called *gibbosa* or *gibbera Acies*, when the battel is aduanced, and the two cornets lag behinde. This forme did Haniball vse in the battell of Cannas, but with this Art, that he strengthened his two cornets with the best of his soldiours, and placed his weakest in the middest, that the Romaines following the retreit of the battell, which was easily repeld, might be inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

CHAP. XX.

The battell betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.

THE signe of battel was no sooner giuen, but the Romaines charged vpō the enemy so fiercely, as though they ment to giue themselues the lye: for seeming to acknowledge that they once conceiued any feare of the Germaines; and the enemie on the other side returned so speedie a counterbuffe, that the legions had no time to cast their Piles, and therefore they speedilie betooke them to their swordes. But the Germaines putting themselues according to their manner into a Phalanx, receiued the force of their swords, without any daunger or losse at all. In the battell there

Cæsar.

there were many legionarie ſouldiers, that were ſeene to keepe vpon the phalanx, & to pull vp with their hands the targets that couered it, and ſo to wound & kil thoſe that were vnderneath: and by that means, they brake & diſperſed it, and ſo the left cornet of the enemy, was ouerthrowne & put to flight. Now while the right cornet was thus buſied, the left cornet was ouercharged with an vnequall multitude of the Germans, which young Craſſus the Prefect of the horſemen no ſooner perceiued (hauing more ſcope and libertie then any of the commanders that were in the battell) he ſent tertiam Aciem, *the third battell, to reſcue and aide their fellowes that were in danger, by meanes whereof the fight was renewed, and all the enemie was put to flight and neuer looked backe vntill they came to the Rhene, which was about fiue miles from the place where they fought; where ſome few of them ſaued themſelues by ſwimming, others found a fewe boates and ſo eſcaped; Arioniſtus lighting vpon a little barke tied to the ſhore, with much a doe recouered the other ſide of the Rhene, and ſo ſaued himſelfe: the reſt were all ſlaine by the horſemen. As Cæſar purſued the German horſemen, it was his chance to light vpon Valerius Procillus, as he was drawne vp and downe by his keepers, bound with three chaines, which accident was as gratefull to him as the victorie it ſelfe; being ſo fortunate to recouer his familiar friend, whom the barbarous enemie, contrarie to the law of nations, had caſt into priſon; & in his own preſence had three ſeuerall times caſt lots vpon his life, whether he ſhould be then burned or reprieued vnto another time; and ſtill he was ſaued by the fortune of the lots: and Marcus Titius was found in like manner and brought vnto him. The fame of this battell being caried beyond the Rhene: the Sueui that were come to the bankes of Rhene, returned home againe, whom the inhabitants belonging to the ſaide riuer purſued, and ſlew a great number of them. Cæſar hauing thus ended two great warres in one ſommer, he brought his Armie into their wintering campes, ſomewhat ſooner then the time of the yeare required.*

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis phalanx here mentioned, can hardly be proued to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but we are rather to vnderſtand it to be ſo tearmed, by reaſon of the cloſe and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other reſpect: and it reſembled much a *teſtudo*, as I ſaid of the Heluetian phalanx. Secondly, I obſerue, that Cæſar kept the olde rule concerning their diſcipline in fight: for although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his hiſtorie; yet he omitted not the ſubſtance, which was, to haue *primam, ſecundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* ſhould begin the battell, and the ſecond ſhould come freſh and aſſiſt them; or peraduenture if the enemie were many and ſtrong, the firſt and ſecond battell were ioyned together, and ſo charged vpon the enemie with greater furie and violence: but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in ſubſidio, as they tearmed it, to ſuccour any part that ſhould be ouercharged; which was a thing of much conſequence, and of great wiſedome. For if we either reſpect the incouragement of the ſouldiers, or the caſualtie of fortune; what could be more added to their diſcipline in this behalfe, then to haue a ſecond & a third ſuccour, to giue ſtrength to the fainting weaknes of their men, and to repaire the diſaduantage which any

accident

accident ſhould caſt vpon them? or if their valour were equally balanced, and victorie ſtood doubtfull which of the two parties ſhee ſhould honour, theſe alwaies ſtept in, being freſh, againſt wearie and ouerlaboured ſpirits, and ſo drew victorie in deſpite of caſualtie vnto themſelues.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION:

The vſe of lots.

COncerning vſe of lots; it ſhall not be amiſſe to looke into the nature of them, being in former times ſo generall, that there was no nation ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greateſt affaires, by the ſentence of lots. As we may not refuſe for an vndoubted truth, that which Salomon ſaith the 16 of Prouerbs: The lots are caſt into the lap: but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: Through the knowledge whereof, Ioſua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Ionas, and the Apoſtles, to conſecrate Matthias. So whether the heathen and barbarous people, whoſe blindnes in the way of truth could direct them no further then to ſenceleſſe ſuperſtition, and put them in minde of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether theſe I ſay, were perſwaded that there was any ſupernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of deſtenie, and as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull. Ariſtotle the wiſeſt of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that effect caſuall, or proceeding from fortune; of which the reaſon of man could aſſigne no cauſe, or (as he ſaith) which hath no cauſe: So that whatſoeuer happened in any action beſides the intent of the agent and workeman, was tearmed an effect of fortune, or chance of habnab. For all other effects which depended vpon a certaine and definite cauſe, were neceſſarily produced; and therefore could not be caſuall or ſubiect to the inconſtancie of chance: And becauſe manie and ſundrie ſuch chances daily happened, which like *terræ filij* had no father, and could not be warranted, as lawfull children, either to nature or to reaſon, by the appearance of an efficient cauſe, they reduced them all to the power of fortune; as the principall efficient and ſoueraigne Motor of all ſuch vnexpected euents, that is, they made nothing elſe the gouerneſſe, and directreſſe of many things: which afterward grew to ſuch credit amongſt men, that it ſurpaſſed in dignity all naturall cauſes, and was deified with celeſtiall honour, as the Poet ſaith, *Nos te facimus fortuna deam cæloque locamus*. By the prouidence of this blinde goddeſſe which held her deity by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all caſuall actions directed, and eſpecially lots; the euent whereof depended onely vpon her pleaſure and decree: neither could their direction be aſſigned to any other power, for then their nature had been altered from chance to certainty, & the euent could not haue been called *Sors*, but muſt haue been reputed in the order of neceſſary effects, whereof diſcourſe of reaſon acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cauſe. Whereby we ſee vpon how weake an axletree, the greateſt motions of the godleſſe world were turned, hauing irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the *intelligentiæ*, that gouerned their reuolutions. All herein all ſortes of men, (although in diuers reſpectes) reſted as well contented, as if an Oracle had ſpoken vnto them, and reuealed the myſteries of fatall deſtinie.

Rome directed the maine course of her gouernment, by the fortune of this mocke destiny. For although their Consuls and Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their own fancie with the free choice of their commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authority: yet the publike affaires, which each Consull was seuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. For if an enemie were entered into their confines to depopulate and wast their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the gouernment of the cittie; and the other to command the legions, and to manage the war. If forces were to be sent into diuers prouinces and against seuerall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Consull his taske: but their peculiar charges were authorised by lots. If any extraordinarie action were to be done in the citie, as the dedication of a temple, the sanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, *Sors omnia versat*, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weake foundation of this practise in their Theologie & deepest diuinitie) we may not thinke but these skilfull Architectors of that absolute gouernment, wherein vertue ioyned with true wisdome, to make an vnexampled patterne: we may not thinke I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be preuented, but by the vse of lots. For when things are equally leueled betweene diuers obiects, and run with indifferencie to equall stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towardes one coast, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of nature be not inuersed, nor a well established gouernmẽt disturbed: So the state of Rome casting many things with equall charge vpon her two soueraigne magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented to intersse the one in that office and to discharge the other, then to appoint an arbiter, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which it could not be saide why it was so, but that it was so: for if the wisdome of the Senat had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily haue burst out into ciuill discord, considering the often contentions between the Senat and the people, the factions of Clients, & the constant mutabilitie of euery mans priuate affections necessarily inclining vnto one, although their worth were equal & by true reason indiscernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peraduenture he had not, and cast the other lower then would haue well beseemed his vertues: And therfore to cut off these, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; which without either reason or will might decide such controuersies. By this it appeareth how little the ancient law-makers respected the ground & reason of an ordinance, so the commoditie were great, and the vse important to the good of the state: for as they saw the thing it selfe to be casuall, so they saw that casuall thinges are sometimes more necessarie, then demonstratiue conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculatiue consideration of lawes and statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof maketh the common weale flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Cæsar his warre in Gallia.

THE

THE SECOND COMMENTARIE OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.

THE ARGVMENT.

LIke as when a heauy bodie lyeth vpon the skirt of a larger continued quantity, although it couer but a ſmall parcell of the whole ſurface; yet the other quarters are burthened & kept vnder with a proportionable meaſure of that waight; and through the vnion and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one totality, feele the ſame ſuppreſſion which hath really ſeaſed but vpon their fellow part: In like maner the Belgæ, inhabiting the furtheſt skirt of that triple continent, ſeemed to repine at that heauy burthen, which the Romaine Empire had laide vpon the Prouince, the Hedui, and other ſtates of that kingdome. And leaſt it might in time be further remoued and laide directly vpon their ſhoulders, they thought it expedient whileſt they felte it but by participation to gather their ſeuerall forces into one head, and trie whether they coulde free their neighbour nations from ſo grecuous a yoak; or at the leaſt keepe it frō comming any neerer vnto themſelues: And this is the Argument of this ſecond booke, which deuideth it ſelfe into two partes: the firſt containing the warres betweene Cæſar and all the ſtates of Belgia vnited together: the ſecōd recording the battailes which he made with ſome of the ſtates thereof in particular, as time and occaſion gaue him meanes to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Cæſar haſteth to his army, marcheth towardes the confines of the Belgæ, & taketh in the men of Rheims.

THE report of this confederacie being brought vnto Cæſar, whileſt he wintred beyond the Alpes, as wel by letters from Labienus, as by the common bearesay of the worlde: hee leuied two new legions in Lumbardie, and ſent them by Q. Pedius into Gallia, and aſſoone as there was any forrage in the fieldes he himſelfe came to the armie. At his arriual, vnderſtanding by the Senones & the reſt of Caſar.

the Galles that bordered vpon the Belgæ (to whom he gaue in charge to learne what was done amongst them,) that there was nothing in Belgia but musteringe of soldatours, and gathering their forces into one heade: he thought it not safe to make anie further delaie, but hauing made prouision of corne, he drewe out his army from their wintering campes, and within fifteene daies he came to the borders of the Belgæ. Assoone as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the vtterm̃ost of the Belgæ, next adioining to the Celtæ, thought it best to entertaine a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius and Antebrogius, two of the cheefe men of their state, vnto Cæsar, to submit themselues and all that they had, to the mercy of the Romaine Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsel of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracie against the Romaines: For proofe wherof they were ready to giue hostages, to receiue them into their towns, and to furnish them with corne or what other thing they stood in neede of. That the rest of the Belgæ were al in armes, and the Germains on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succour: yea their madnesse was so great, that they themselues were not able to hold backe the Suessones from that attempt, being their brethren and kinsmen in bloud, and vsing the same lawes and customes as they did, hauing both one magistrate and one forme of gouernment; but they would needs support the same quarrel which the rest of the Belgæ had vndertaken.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Might heere take occasion to speake somwhat of a particular reuoult in a generall cause; and howe a confederate state may in regarde of their owne safetie forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer the vniuersall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale: but that I onely intende to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onlie I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine gouernment, that such cities as yeelded to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasury (howsoeuer they were otherwise combined by confederacy) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that state, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

CHAP. II.

The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar. C*Æsar inquiring of the Ambassadors which came frõ Rheimes what the states were that had taken armes, and what they were able to do in matter of war: found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germaines; who passing ouer the Rhene time out of minde, droue away the Galles and seated themselues in their possessions: and that these only of al the Galles kept the Cimbri and Teutoni frõ entering into their*

their country: and in that regard they challenged to themselues great authoritie, & vaunted much in their feats of armes. Concerning their number they had these aduertisements; the [a] Bellouaci exceeded all the Belgæ in proweſſe, authoritie, and number of men, and promiſed 60000. men: and in that regard they demanded the adminiſtration of the whole warre. The [b] Sueſſones inhabiting a large and fertile countrey, and hauing 12. walled townes, promiſed to ſet out 50000. The [c] Neruij as many, the [d] Attrebatij 15000. the [e] Ambiani 10000. the Veloca ſij, and [f] Veromandui as many; the [g] Morini 25000. the Menapy 7000. the Calatani 10000. the Catuaci 19000. the [h] Eburones, Condruſones, and others 40000. Cæſar incouraging the men of Rheimes to perſiſt their faithfulnes to the Romaine Empire, propounded vnto them great offers and liberall promiſes of recompence, and commanded all their ſenate to come before him, and bring with them their noble mens ſonnes to be giuen vp for hoſtages, which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And hauing receiued two eſpecial aduertiſements from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy; and the other touching the ſingular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: hee prouided for the firſt by perſuading Diuitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole courſe of thoſe buſineſſes, to keepe aſunder the powre of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that ſo he might auoide the danger of incountering ſo great a power at one inſtant. Which might eaſilie be brought to paſſe, if the Hedui would enter with a ſtrong power into the marches of the Bellouaci, and ſacke their territories with ſword and confuſion, which Diuitiacus promiſed to performe, and to that purpoſe he ſpeedily returned into his country. Vpon the ſecond aduertiſement which preſented vnto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, he reſolued not to be too haſtie in giuing them battell, but firſt to proue by skirmiſhing with his horſemen what his enemies by their proweſſe could do, and what his own men durſt do.

[a] The country about Beauuois.
[b] The country about Soiſſons
[c] The people about Turnai
[d] Arras.
[e] Amyens.
[f] Vermandois.
[g] Terwene
[h] Leige.
296000 in al.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis rule of making triall of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obſerued by prudent and graue commanders, as the ſureſt principle whereon the true iudgment of the euent may be grounded. For if the doctrine of the old Philoſophers, which teacheth that the worde *non putabam* was neuer heard out of a wiſe mãs mouth, haue any place in the courſe of humane actions, it ought eſpeciallie to be regarded in managing theſe main points, whereon the ſtate of kingdomes and empires dependeth. For vnleſſe we be perſuaded that blind chance directeth the courſe of this worlde with an vncertaine confuſion, and that no foreſight can ſwaie the balance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I ſee no reaſon why we ſhould not by al meanes indeuor to grounde our knowledge vpon true cauſes, and leuel our proceedings to that certainty which riſeth from the things the ſelues. And this is the rather to be vrged, inaſmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceiued when they look no further then to match an enemy with equalitie of number, reſerring their valour to bee tried in the battell; not conſidering that the eye of it ſelfe cannot

diſcerne the difference betweene two champions of like preſence and outward cariage, vnleſſe it ſee their ſtrength compared together and waied as it were in the ſcale of triall: which Cæſar omitted not diligently to obſerue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For beſides his owne ſatiſfaction, it gaue great incouragement to his men, when they ſawe themſelues able to countermatch an enemie, and knew their taske to be ſubiect to their ſtrength: Neither did he obſerue it onely at this inſtant, but throughout the whole courſe of his actions; for we finde that he neuer incountered any enemie, but with ſufficient power, either in number or in valour to make head againſt them: which equality of ſtrength, being firſt laide as a ſure foundation, he vſed his owne induſtrie and skill, and the diſcipline wherein his men were trained, as aduantages to ouerſway his aduerſarie: and ſo drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himſelfe, and ſeldome failed in any of his battels.

CHAP. III.

Cæſar paſſeth his Armie ouer the riuer *Axona, leauing Titurius Sabinus incamped on the other ſide with ſixe cohorts.

*La diſne.

Cæſar.

ASSOONE as Cæſar vnderſtood, as well by his diſcouerers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of the Belgæ was aſſembled together into one place, and was now making towardes him no great deſtance off; he made all the haſte he could to paſſe his Armie ouer the riuer Axona, which deuided the men of Rheimes from the other Belgæ. Wherby he brought to paſſe, that no enemie could come on the backe of him to worke any diſaduantage: and that corne might be brought vnto him from Rheimes, and other citties without danger. And further, that he might command the paſſage backe againe, as occaſion ſhould ſerue to his beſt aduantage, he fortified a bridge which he found on the riuer, with a ſtrong garriſon of men, and cauſed Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to incampe himſelfe on the other ſide of the riuer with ſixe cohortes, commaunding him to fortifie his campe with a rampier of 12 foote in altitude, and a trench of 18 foote in breadth.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demaunded, why Cæſar did paſſe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe; and did not rather attend the enemie on the other ſide, and ſo take the aduantage of hindering him, if he ſhould attempt to paſſe ouer? I will ſet downe the reaſons in the ſequell of this warre, as the occurrences ſhall fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time let vs enter into the particularitie of theſe ſixe cohortes, that wee maie the better iudge of ſuch troupes which were imploied in the ſeruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of ſouldiers

theſe

theſe ſixe cohortes did containe, it ſeemeth expedient, a little to diſcourſe of the companies and regiments, which the Romans vſed in their Armies.

A legion what it was. Lib. 4. De vita Romuli.

And firſt we are to vnderſtand, that the greateſt and chiefeſt regiment in a Roman Armie, was tearmed by the name of Legio: as Varro ſaith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*: or as Plutarch ſpeaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus eſſent militares*; ſo that it taketh the name Legio of the choiſe and ſelecting of the ſoldiers. Romulus is ſaid to be the firſt author & founder of theſe legions, making euerie legion to containe 3000 ſoldiers: but ſhortly after they were augmented, as Feſtus recordeth vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000 to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hanniball came into Italie, and then it was augmented to 5000, but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, when Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increaſed to 6200 footmen, and 300 horſe. And ſhortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonie to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, conſiſted of 6000 footmen and 300 horſe. Out of Cæſar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men; but oftentimes it was ſhort of that number: for he himſelfe ſaith, that in this warre in Gallia his ſoldiers were ſo waſted, that he had ſcarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the ciuill war, where he ſaith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohorts, which amounted to the nũber of 55000 men: And being manifeſt as well by theſe number of cohortes, as by the teſtimonie of diuers authors, that Pompei his Army conſiſted of 11 legions; if we deuide 55000 into 11 partes, we ſhall finde a legion to conſiſt of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vſuall rate of a legion, the Romans alwaies expreſſed the ſtrength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is ſaid, that Cæſar had eight legions, which by this account might ariſe to 40000 men, beſides aſſociates, and ſuch as neceſſarily attended the Armie. Further we are to vnderſtand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and diſtinguiſhed from the reſt, and that it tooke either from their order of muſter, or inrolment; as that legion which was firſt inrolled, was called the firſt legion, and that which was ſecond in choice, the ſecond legion; and ſo conſequently of the reſt; and ſo we reade in this hiſtorie, the ſeuenth, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleuenth and twelfth legion: or otherwiſe from the place of their warfare, and ſo we read of *legiones Germanicæ, Panonicæ, Britannicæ*, and ſuch others; and ſometime of their Generall, as *Auguſtæ, Claudiæ, Vitellianæ, legiones*, and ſo forth. Or to conclude, from ſome accident or qualitie, as *Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera* and ſuch like. And this much of the name and number of a legion, which I muſt neceſſarilie diſtinguiſh into diuers kindes of ſouldiers, according to the firſt inſtitution of the olde Romans, and the continuall obſeruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the deſcription of theſe ſmaller partes, whereof a legion was compounded.

Liu. lib. 22.

Tacitus 3. hiſt.

Velites.

Firſt therefore we are to vnderſtand, that after the Conſuls had made a generall choiſe and ſworne the ſouldiers, the Tribunes choſe out the youngeſt and pooreſt of all the reſt, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place in

in regard of the other ſouldiers was both baſe & diſhonorable: not only becauſe they fought a farre off, and were lightly armed; but alſo in regard they were commonly expoſed to the enemy, as our forelorne hopes are. Hauing choſen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choiſe of them which they called Haſtati, a degree aboue the Velites, both in age and wealth, and tearmed them by the name of Haſtati; foraſmuch as at their firſt inſtitution they fought with a kind of Iauelin, which the Romaines called Haſta: but before Polybius his time they vſed Piles; notwithſtanding their ancient name continued vnto the latter time of the Empire. The third choiſe which they made was of the ſtrongeſt and luſtieſt bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes; the reſt that remained were named Triarij, as Varro ſaith, *Quod tertio ordine extremis ſubſidio deponuntur*: Theſe were alwaies the eldeſt and beſt experienced men, and were placed in the third diuiſion of the battell, as the laſt helpe and refuge in all extremity. Polybius ſaith, that in his time the Velites, Haſtati, and Principes, did conſiſt of 1200 men a peece; and the Triarij neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legion were augmented: wherof Lypſius allegeth theſe reaſons. Firſt bicauſe theſe Triarij conſiſted of the beſt of the ſoldiors, and ſo might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it ſeldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controuerſie grewe very doubtfull. Laſtly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinarie ſolowers, ranged themſelues amongſt theſe Triaries, and ſo made the third battel equal to either of the former; but howſoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

Haſtati.

Principes.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 1 de mil. Rom.

In this diuiſion of their men conſiſted the ground of that well ordered diſcipline; for in that they diſtinguiſhed them according to their yeeres and abilitie, they reduced their whole ſtrength into ſeueral claſſes; & ſo diſpoſed of theſe different parts, that in the generall cõpoſition of their whole bodie euery part might be fitted with place and office, according as his worth vvas anſwerable to the ſame: & ſo they made not only a number in groſſe, but a number diſtinct by parts and properties, that from euery accident which met with any part of the armie, the iudgement might determine how much or howe little it imported the whole bodie: beſides the great vſe vvhich they made of this diſtinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no ſmal conſequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The vſe of this diuiſion.

The diſtribution of their companies.

Manipuli.

Ordo.

The ſoldiours, at their inrolement beeing thus deuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into ſmaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and ſo they deuided the Haſtati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of thoſe 3. ſortes of ſoldiours 30. ſmall regiments, vvhich they called Manipuli: And againe, they ſubdeuided euerie maniple into two equall parts, and called them Ordo, vvhich was the leaſt companie in a legion; and according to the rate ſet down by Polybius, contained 60. ſoldiours. In euerie Ordo there was a Centurion, or Captaine, and a Lieuetenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much leſſer then the maniples of either the Haſtati or the Principes;

cipes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarij were called *subsignanos milites*, to make a difference between them and the Velites, which were not deuided into bandes; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies; so that euery Maniple had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history heere mentioneth.

Cohors. Lib. 3. de re rust.

The worde *Cohors* in latine doth signifie that part of grounde which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house, which from the same word we call a court: and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioined together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of seuerall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euerie legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarily comprehend those thirty maniples: but these 3. maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiors, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3. of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarij, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde maniple in euery kind, that could not haue been brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarij; and so al the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; & euery cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of al those sortes of soldiours that were in a legion. So that making a legion to containe 5000. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titurius Sabinus, contayned 3000. soldiours: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200. which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520. soldiours in these sixe cohortes.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of soldiours, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained 3. maniples; & euery maniple 2. orders; and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenāt, that stood in the raile of the troupe.

A legion ranged in battell.

When a legion stoode ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making iointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and so euerie fiue files had their Centurion in front, and Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battailions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how great soeuer the army were.

The first order

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stoode on the right hand, knowne by the name of *Primus ordo*: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commaunded the whole maniple. And so wee finde that the Centurion of the

first place was called *Prior Centurie*: in which sense Cæsar is to be vnderstood, where hee saith, that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, *praeter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities, first; the prioritie betweene the Centurions of the same maniple: for a cohorte, consisting of 3. maniples, vvhereof the first maniple vvere Triarij, the second Principes, and the thirde Hastati; and euerie maniple containing two orders; and euerie order a Centurion: he saith, that all the Centurions of this cohort vvere slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing vvhich I obserue, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, vvhereof a legion consisted, vvere distinguished by degrees of worthinesse, and that vvhich vvas held the vvorthiest in the censure of the Electors, tooke the prioritie both of place and name, and vvas called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; & so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

3. De bello ciuili.

Prima cohors

Neither did the legions want their degrees of preheminēce, both in imbattailing & in incāping, according either to the seniority of their inrolement, or their fauor of their General, or their own vertue: And so we read that in these vvars in Gallia, the tenth legion had the first place in Cæsars army. And thus much concerning the diuisions, and seuerall companies of a legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Vpon this description it shall not be amisse, briefelie to laie open the most apparant commodities depending vpon this discipline; the excellency vvhereof more plainely appeareth, being compared to that order, vvhich nature hath obserued in the frame of her vvorthiest creatures: for it is euident, that such workes of nature come neerest to perfect excellencie, vvhose material substance is most particularlie distinguished into parts, and hath euery part indued vvith that propertie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For beeing thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed vvith fitting abilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effects, and discouer the vvotth of an excellent nature: vvhereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse fauour in natures forge, being as abortiues, or barbarously composed, vvanting the diuersitie both of partes and faculties; are no vvay capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the former that are directed vvith so many properties, and inabled vvith the power of so wel distinguished faculties. Vvhich better works of nature the Romains imitated in the Architecture of their army, deuiding it into such necessary & seruiceable partes, as were best fitting all vses and imploiments: as first into legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein euery man knewe his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion. And thus the vniuersall multitude was by order disposed into partes, vntill it came vnto a vnitie: for it cannot bee denied, but that these centuries were in themselues so sensiblie distinguished, that euerie Soldiour caried in his minde the particular Mappe of his whole centurie: for in imbattailing, euerie centurie was disposed into 5. files, containing twelue in a file, whereof the leaders were alwayes certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other especiall occasion: and euerie

The benefit of this discipline

leader

leader knew his follower, and euerie second knewe the third man, and so consequently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and disrankt to rallie them into any forme, when euery man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imploied vpon sudden seruice, the generall Idea of the Armie being so deepely imprinted in the minde of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such conuenient troupes, both for number and quality, as might best agree with the safetie of the Armie, or nature of the action: At all occasions and oportunities, these principles of aduantage offered themselues, as readie meanes, to put in execution any dessigne, or stratagem whatsoeuer; the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euerie man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention: And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of euerie such part, their sodalitie was sweetned, or rather strengthened with the mutuall acquaintance, and friendshippe one of another, the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the middest, and the lieutenant in the rereward, and euerie man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend; which bred a true and vnfained courage, both in regard of themselues, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no small meanes to cutte off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissention: for here euerie man knew his place in the file, and euerie file knewe his place in the Centurie, and euerie Centurie in the Maniple, and euerie Maniple in the Cohort, and euerie Cohort in the Legion, and euerie Legion in the Armie; and so euerie souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and euerie place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The vvant of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall gouernment of this age, with bloudshed and murthers; whereof France is too true a witnesse, as well in regard of the French themselues, as of our English forces that haue beene sent thither to appease their tumults: for through defect of this order, which allotteth to euerie man his due place, the controuersie grew between Sir William Drurie and Sir Iohn Bowrowes, the issue wherof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue been negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commẽdation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troups, in the seruice of the states in the vnited prouinces, where they are very curious in appointing euerie man his place in the file, and euerie file in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

The benefit of small battalions: and the disaduantage of great squadrons.

To conclude this point, I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, and the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troupes stand best appointed for disposition and array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shocke, bring most men to fight with the enemie: for the principall

thinges which are required in ſetting of a battell, are ſo to order the troupes, that the depth in flanke may ſerue conueniently to withſtand the aſſault, taking vp no more men then may well ſerue for that purpoſe; and giuing meanes to the reſt to fight with the enemie; and in theſe two points, were both their defenſiue and offenſiue conſiderations comprehended. But ſmaller troupes and battailons afforde this conueniencie better then great ſquadrons, which drowne vp manie able men in the depth of their flankes, and neuer ſuffer them to appeare, but when the breaking of the ſquadron doth preſent them to the butcherie of the enemie. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I haue noted in the firſt booke, neuer caried aboue 16 in flanke, and brought 500 to fight in front. And theſe little battailons (conſidering them as they ſtood in battell ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth anſwerable to the ſame; beſides the 2 and 3 battell, which alwaies were to ſuccour them, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thicke and cloſe imbattailing admit any ſuch ſuccour behind them. Now if we cõpare the aduantages & diſcommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of theſe, we ſhall find great ods betweene them. Theſe great ſquadrons are not faiſable, but in plaine and open places, where they may either ſtand immoueable, or make eaſie and ſlow motions without ſhaking, or diſordering their bodie: but the leſſer are a ſcantling for all places, champion or wooddie, leuell or vneuen, or of what ſite or quality ſoeuer. And to conclude, if two or three rankes of theſe great battailons chance to be broken and diſordered, the whole body is as much intereſſed in the diſorder, as the ſaid rankes are; and hath leſſe meanes to rally it ſelfe, then any other leſſer companie: but if any violence chance to rout a maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Armie, then that part which it taketh: Neither can the diſranking of any one part, betraie the ſafetie of the Armie to diſorder and confuſion; for as much as their diſtinction ſerued to cut off ſuch inconueniences, and yet no waie hindered the generall vniting of their ſtrength into one body. More may be ſaid concerning this matter, but I onely point at it, and leaue the due conſideration therof, to the iudgment of our commanders, & returne to our hiſtory.

CHAP. IIII.

The Belgæ attempt the ſurpriſe of * Bibrax: Cæſar ſendeth ſuccour vnto it.

* Bray in the county of Retell.

THere was a towne called Bibrax, belonging to the ſtate of Rheimes, about eight mile from Cæſars campe; which the Belgæ thought to haue ſurpriſed, as they came along to meete with Cæſar, and ſuddenly aſſaulted it with ſuch furie, that the townesmen could hardly hold out the firſt daie. The Celtæ and Belgæ vſe one and the ſame manner, in aſſaulting a towne: for hauing beſet the whole compaſſe of the wall with rankes of ſouldiers, they neuer ceaſe flinging of ſtones vntill they finde

finde the wall naked of defendantes; and then casting themselues into a Testudo, they approch to the gate and vndermine the walles. Assoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rheimes, a man of great birth and authoritie in his countrey, who at that time was gouernour of the towne, and had beene before with Cæsar, to treat and conclude a peace: sent him word by messengers, that if there came not present succour, he was not able to holde out any longer. The same daie about midnight (vsing the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, and slingers of the Iles of Baleares, to relieue the towne; by meanes whereof, the townesmen were put in good hope to make their partie strong, and the enemie made hopeles of winning the towne: and therefore after a small stay, hauing populated their fieldes, and burned their villages and out-buildinges, they marched with all their power towardes Cæsars campe, and within lesse then two miles of his Armie, they incamped their whole hoast: which, as was gathered by the smoake and fire, occupied more ground then eight miles in breadth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to obserue two circumstances: The first is, the manner they vsed in a sudden surprise: The second is, the forme and quality of a Testudo. Although Cæsar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a towne, as peculiar, to the Galles; yet wee maie not thinke but that the Romans vsed it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any cittie: but because the Galles knew no other means to take a towne but this, therefore he setteth it downe as peculiar vnto them. The Romans called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere vrbem corona*: for as much as the souldiers inclosed the towne with a circle, and so resembled a crowne or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crown of souldiers, which incompassed a towne: And Iosephus telleth of Iotapatam, which the Romans besieged *duplici peditum corona*: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen vtmost of all. There is no further matter to be obserued but this, that in surprising a towne, they incircled it round about with thick continued rankes of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.

To take a towne by surprise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is liuely described in Liuie, after this manner. In the Amphitheater, where the people did often assemble to see strange sightes and publike shewes, were brought in (saith he) 60 lustie young men, who after some motion, and seemely march, cast themselues into a square troupe, & roofing their heads close with their targets, the first ranke which made the front of the Testudo, stood vpright on their feete; the second ranke bowed it selfe somewhat lower;

A Testudo described. Lib. 44.

the third and fourth rankes did more incline themselues, and so consequentlie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground, and so they made a bodie resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this squadron thus strongly combined togither, came two soldiours running some fiftie foot off, and threatning each other with their weapons, ran nimbly vp the side of the roofe; and sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would haue entred vpon it; sometimes againe incountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steddily as if they had been vpon firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wall, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other soldiors, that stood vpon the said wal to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiors that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; but couered their bodies with them, and so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, coulde any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vppon the Testudo, it quicklie glided downe by the decliuitie of the roofe, without anie hurte or annoyance at all.

Thus far Liuie goeth, neither doe I know what to saie further of it: the chiefest vse thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were throughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention serued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that ende they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the soldiours climed vppon the wall, *super iteratam testudinem*, by one Testudo made vpon an other; and this was the ancient forme and vse of a Testudo in a suddain assault or surprise.

Lib. 49. Dio Cassius in the actes of Anthonie, saieth, that beeing galled with the Parthian Archers, hee commanded his whole armie to put it selfe into a Testudo, which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romaines at a watch-worde giuen, rose againe with such a furie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the saide Testudo after this manner, They placed, saieth hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the middest; and those heauie armed footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles nexte vnto the enemie; the reste which bare large Ouall Targettes were thronged togither throughout the whole troupe, and so couered with their Targets both themselues and their fellowes, that there was nothing discerned by the enemy but a roofe of Targets, which were so tiled togither, that men might safely go vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselues into a Testudo; to breake through an enemy, or to route and disranke a troupe. And this vse the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regarde of the strength, for that it

couered

couered and sheltred, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

The necessitie of good discouerie.

FIrstly we may obserue, how carefully Cæsar prouided for the safetie of such succours, as he sent vnto Bibrax: for hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best and surest guides in that iourney, least peraduenture through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers: a matter of no small consequence in managing a warre, but deserueth an extraordinarie importunitie, to persuade the necessitie of this diligence. For a Generall that hath perfectlie discouered the nature of the countrey, through which he is to march, and knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousnesse of turnings, the nature of the hils and the course of the riuers, hath all these particularities as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy: And in this point Hanniball had a singular dexterity, and excelled all the commanders of his time in making vse of the way, by which he was to passe. But he that leadeth an army, by an vnknown and vndiscouered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disaduantages, as the other hath opportunitie of good fortune. Let euery man therfore persuade himselfe, that good discouerers are as the eyes of an army, and serue for lights in the darkenesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good prouidence, and make the path of safetie so manifest, that we neede not stumble vpon casualties. Cæsar in his iourney to Ariouistus vsed the helpe of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in whome amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence to discouer the waie, and acquaint him with the passages; and before hee would vndertake his voyage vnto * Britanie, he well enformed himselfe by marchants and trauailers, of the quantity of the Iland, the quality of the people, their vse of warre, and the oportunitie of their hauens: Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but hee sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of warre, to see what hee could further discouer, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that hee neuer caried his army, *per insidiosa itinera*, vnlesse he had first well discouered the places.

* *New England.*

The order which is to be obserued in discouery.

Concerning the order, which skilfull leaders haue obserued in discoueries, we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one in vnderstanding the perfect description of the countrey; and the second in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, we finde as well by this as other histories, that the Romains vsed the inhabitants of the country for guides, as best acquainted with their natiue places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; prouided alwaies, that their owne scoutes were euer abroad to vnderstand what they could of themselues, that they might not altogither relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the enemy were obserued by the horsemen, and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter of

of warre, and so the generall receiued sound aduertisements: and yet they were not too forward vpon any new motion, vnlesse they found it confirmed by diuers waies: for some espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Heluetian warre. If therefore the vse and benefit, which prudent and wise commanders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought vpon the ignorant, haue any authoritie to perswade a circumspect care herein, this little that hath beene spoken may be sufficient, for this point.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

Slingers with their arte and vse.

THe souldiers which Cæsar sent to relieue Bibrax, were Archers of Creta and Numidia, and slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kinde of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceites are held vp with the furie of these fierie engines; I will in briefe discouer the nature and vse of this weapon.

The Latines (saith Isodore) called this weapon *funda: quod ex ea fundantur lapides*. Plinie attributeth the inuention thereof to the Insulairs called Baleares. Florus in his third booke and eighth chapter, saith, that these Baleares vsed three sortes of slinges, and no other weapon besides: for a boy had neuer any meate giuen him, before he had first strooke it, with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sortes of slings, which the Baleares vsed; and saith that they had one sling with long raines, which they vsed when they would cast a farre off: and another with short raines, which they vsed neere at hand: and the third with raines of a meane size, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in *Columna Antonina* at Rome, he obserued that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his bellie, and the third in his hand; which might be their ordinarie manner of carrying them. The matter whereof they were made was threefold, the first was hempe or cotton, the second haire, and the third sinewes; for of either of these stuffes, they commonly made them: the forme and fashion of a sling resembled a platted rope, somewhat broade in the middest, with an Ouall compasse; and so by little and little decreasing into two thongs or raines. Their manner of slinging was to whirle it twise or thrise about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgill speaking of Mezentius saith,

Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.

But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas we find, that these Baleares did commonly cast a stone of a pound waight, which agreeth to these dames in Cæsar, *fundas, librales*. The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the warre with Iugurth; and by Liuie, where he saith, that the Consull prouided great store of arrowes, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst diuers nations, as well in regard of the readines, & easie reiterating of the blow, as also for that the bullet fledde verie farre, with great violence: the distance

which

which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse;

Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda.

Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foote: Their violence was such, as the same author affirmeth in his first booke and sixteenth chapter, that neither helmet, gaberdine, nor corselet could beare out the blow; but he that was hit with a sling, was slaine *sine invidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ouid, and Lucan, three of the Latine Poets saie, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling, went with such violence that it melted as it flew: whereof Seneca giueth this reason, motion (saith he) doth extenuate the aire, and that extenuation or subtilitie doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling melteth as it flieth. But howsoeuer, Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Balearean slingers brake both target, headpiece, or any other armour whatsoeuer. *Lib. 2.*

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Liuie; and the other by Vegetius: that in Liuie is called *Cestrophendo*, which cast a short arrowe with a long thicke head: the other in Vegetius, is called *fustibalus*, which was a sling made of a coard and a staffe. But let this suffice for slinges and slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light armed souldiers, and vsed chiefly in assaulting, and defending townes, and fortresses, where the heauie armed souldiers could not come to buckle; and present the place of our Hargebusiers, which in their proper nature, are *leuis armaturæ milites*, although more terrible then those of ancient times. *Lib. 2. natur. questions.*

CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronted the Belgæ in forme of battell, but without any blow giuen: the Belgæ attempt the passing of the riuer Axona; but in vaine, and to their losse: they consult of breaking vp the warre.

Caesar.

CAESAR at the first resolued not to giue them battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame and opinion conceiued of their valour: notwithstanding he daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemy could do, and what his owne men durst doe. And when he found that his men were nothing inferiour to the Belgæ, he chose a conuenient place before his campe and put his Armie in battell: the banke where he was incamped rising somewhat from a plaine leuell, was no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steepe, and the front rose a slope by little & little, vntill it came againe to a plaine, where the legions were imbattailed. And least the enemie abounding in multitude, should circumuent his men and charge them in flanke as they were fighting, he drew an ouerthwart ditch behind his Armie, from one side of the hill to the other, 600 paces in length; the ends whereof

he fortified with bulwarkes, and placed therein ſtore of engines: and leauing in his campe the two legions which he had laſt inrolled in Lombardie, that they might bee readie to be drawne forth when there ſhould neede any ſuccour, he imbattailed his other ſixe legions in the front of the hill, before his campe. The Belgæ alſo bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There laie between both the Armies a ſmall Mariſh, ouer which the enemie expected that Cæſar ſhould haue paſſed; and Cæſar on the other ſide, attended to ſee if the Belgæ would come ouer, that his men might haue charged them in that troubleſome paſſage. In the meane time the Canalrie on both ſides incountered betweene the two battels, and after long expectation on either ſide, neither partie aduenturing to paſſe ouer, Cæſar hauing got the better in the skirmiſh betweene the horſemen, thought it ſufficient for that time, both for the incouraging of his owne men, and the conteſting of ſo great an Army; and therefore he conuaied all his men againe into their campe. From that place the enemy immediatelie tooke his way to the riuer Axona, which laie behinde the Romans campe, and there finding foordes they attempted to paſſe ouer part of their forces, to the ende they might either take the fortreſſe which Q. Titurius kept, or to breake downe the bridge, or to ſpoile the territories of the ſtate of Rheimes, and cut off the Romans from prouiſion of corne. Cæſar hauing aduertiſement thereof from Titurius, tranſported ouer the riuer by the bridge all his horſemen and light armed Numidians, with his ſlingers and archers, and marched with them himſelfe: the conflict was hoat in that place, the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, ſlewe a great number of them; the reſt like deſperate perſons, aduenturing to paſſe ouer vpon the dead carkaſes of their fellowes, were beaten backe by force of weapons: and the horſemen incompaſſed ſuch as had firſt got ouer the water, and ſlewe euerie man of them.

When the Belgæ perceiued themſelues fruſtrated of their hopes, of winning Bibrax, of paſſing the riuer, and of drawing the Romans into places of diſaduantage, and that their owne prouiſions began to faile them: they called a councell of war, wherein they reſolued, that it was beſt for the ſtate in generall, and for euerie man in particular, to breake vp their campe, and to returne home vnto their own houſes: and into whoſe confines or territories ſoeuer, the Romans ſhould firſt enter to depopulate and waſte them in hoſtile maner, that thither they ſhould haſten from al parts, and there to giue them battell, to the end they might rather trie the matter in their own countrie, then abroad in a ſtrange and vnknowne place; and haue their owne houſhold prouiſion alwaies at hand to maintaine them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Diuitiacus with a great power of the Hedui, approched neare to the borders of the Bellouaci, who, in that regard, made haſte homeward to defend their country.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrſt we may obſerue the Arte, which he vſed to counteruaile the ſtrength of ſo great a multitude, by chooſing out ſo conuenient a place, which was no broader in front then would ſuffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the ſides of the hill ſo ſteepe, that the enemy

enemy could not ascende nor clime vp, but to their own ouerthrow; hee made the backe part of the hil strong by Art, & so placed his soldiors as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth how much he preferred securitie and safetie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardie resolution, which sauoreth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisedome: for he euer thought it great gaine, to loose nothing; and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that delitered vp the army safe vnto the euenings attending, vntil aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Caesar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vse hee made by passing his army ouer the riuer, and attending the enemie on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rheimes: for by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemie should attempt in any part or quarter of the lande, his forces were readie to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: & yet notwithstanding, he lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of the, as they passed ouer the riuer. For by the benefitte of the bridge which hee had fortified, he transported what forces he woulde, to make heade against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer coulde affoord him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

ANd heere the reader may not maruel, if when the hils are in labour, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soone is the courage of this huge army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? But beeing hastely caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed vpon the sight of an enemy, which is no strange effect of a suddaine humour. For as in nature all violent motions are of short continuance, and the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slowe and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the minde that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and sauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish awaie euen with the smoake thereof, and bring forth nothing but leasurable repentaunce: and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering, that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraieth their indiscreet intemperãce, in the hote pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemy, or had oportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for their mindes were so caried away with the conceite of warre, that they had no leisure to prouide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinewe of the warre: It was sufficient for euery particular man, to be knowne for a soldiour in so honorable an action, referring other matters to the care of the state. The states

in like manner thought it inough to furnish out forty or fiftie thousand men a peece, to discharge their oath, and to saue their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, beeing directed by as vnskilful gouernours, neuer looked further then the present multitude, which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man relied vpon an others care, and satisfied himselfe with the present garbe; so many men of all sortes and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seeme in greatest forwardnesse; were motiues sufficient to induce euerie man to go, without further inquiry, how they should goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, considering the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogither vpon his prouidence, and ingaged in the defence of their state and country; he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designes. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their errour, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handeling it, then it was before we first toooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other ende, then to giue Cæsar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that hee should not in all likelihood, meet with the like strength againe, in the continuance of that warre. And this was not onely *grauius bellum successori tradere*, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to drawe a dangerous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

CHAP. VI.

The Belgæ brake vp their Campe: and as they *returne home, are chased and slaughtered* by the Romaines.

Cæsar.

HIS generall resolution beeing entertained by the consent of the whole Councell of warre; they departed out of their Campe with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or gouernement: euerie man pressing to bee formost on his iourney in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away: Whereof Cæsar hauing notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiuing the reason of their departure, he kept his armie within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, vpon certaine intelligence of their departure, hee sent first his horsemen to staie the rereward, commanding Labienus to followe after with three legions; these ouertaking the Belgæ, and chasing them many miles, slewe a great number of them: And while the rereward staied, and valiantlie receiued the charge of the Romaines, the vantguarde being out of danger, and vnder no gouernment,

assoone

assoone as they heard the alarum behind them, brake out of their rankes and betooke themselues to flight; and so the Romaines slewe them as long as the sunne gaue them light to pursue them; and then sounding a retrait, they returned to their campe.

OBSERVATION.

IT hath beene an olde rule amongst soldiours, that a great and negligent errour committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. We reade of Fulvius a Legate in the Romaine armie, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike dutie: the Tuscanes tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could drawe the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine soldiours, attired like shepheardes, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine army, who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe; whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discouered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent: In like maner Cæsar not perswaded that men should bee so heedles, to carry a retrait in that disorderly and tumultuous maner, would not discampe his men to take the oportunity of that aduantage, vntill he had found that to be true, which in all reason was vnlikely. And thus 296000. Belgæ were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of gouernment and order in their departure.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Suessones; and there besiegeth Nouiodunum.

THE next day after their departure, before they could recouer thē-selues of their feare and flight, or had time to put thēselues againe in breath: Cæsar as it were continuing still the chase and victorie, led his armie into the countrey of the Suessones, the next bordering vnto the men of Rheimes: and after a long iourney came vnto Nouiodunum, a towne of good importance, which he attempted to take by surprise, as he passed along by it. For he vnderstoode, that it was altogether vnfurnished of defensiue prouision, hauing no forces within to defende it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, he was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore hauing fortified his campe, hee began to make preparation for a siege. The night following the whole multitude of the Suessones, that had escaped by flight, were receiued into the towne: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought vnto the wall, the mount raised, and the turrets built; the Galles being amazed at the highnes of the workes, such as they had neuer

Noyon.

Cæsar.

Soyssons.

neuer ſeene nor heard of before, and the ſpeede which was made in the diſpatch thereof, ſent ambaſſadours to Cæſar, to treate of giuing vp the towne, and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their ſuite.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this relation we may obſerue the induſtrious art, which the Romans vſed in aſſaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three ſortes of engines deſcribed, Vinea, Agger, and Turres.

** Lib. 4. A vinea or vine deſcribed.*

Vinea is thus deſcribed by Vegetius: A little ſtrong built houſe or houell, made of light wood, that it might be remoued with greateſt eaſe; the roofe was ſupported with diuers pillars of a foote ſquare, vvherof the formoſt were 8 foot high, and the hindmoſt 6; and betweene euerie one of theſe pillars, there was 5 foot diſtance: it was alwaies made with a double roofe; the firſt or lower roofe was of thicke plankes, and the vpper roofe of hurdles, to breake the force of a waight, without further ſhaking or diſioyning the building: the ſides were likewiſe walled with hurdles, the better to defend the ſoldiers that vvere vnder it: the vvhole length vvas about 16 foot, and the breadth 7: the vpper roofe vvas commonly couered vvith greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning. Many of theſe houels vvere ioined together in ranke, vvhen they went about to vndermine a vval: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which vvere throwen vpon it might eaſily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the foure ſides and groundſils, had in euery corner a vvheele, & by them they vvere driuen to any place as occaſion ſerued: the chiefeſt vſe of them vvas to couer and defend the ſouldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a vval. This engine vvas called Vinea, which ſignifieth a vine, for it ſheltered ſuch as vvere vnder the roofe thereof, as a vine couereth the place vvhere it groweth.

Agger or mount.

Agger, vvhich vve call a mount, is deſcribed in diuers hiſtories to be a hil or eleuation made of earth and other ſubſtance, vvhich by little and little was raiſed forward, vntil it approched neare vnto the place, againſt which it vvas built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortreſſes and turrets, and ſo fight with an aduantage of height. The matter of this mount, vvas earth and ſtones, fagots, and timber. Ioſephus ſaith, that at the ſiege of Ieruſalem, the Romans cut downe al the trees vvithin 11 mile compaſſe, for matter and ſtuffe to make a mount. The ſides of this Agger vvere of timber to keepe in the looſe matter; the forepart which was towards the place of ſeruice, was open without any timber worke: for on that part they ſtil raiſed it & brought it nearer the wals. That which was built at Maſſilia vvas 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80 foot high and 30 foote broad. Ioſephus and Egeſippus writ, that there was a fortreſſe in Iudea, 300 cubites high, which Sulla purpoſing to vvin by aſſault, raiſed a mount 200 cubites high; and vpon it, he built a caſtle of ſtone 50 cubites high, and 50 cubites broad; and vpon the ſaid caſtell he erected a turret of 60 cubites in hight, and ſo took the fortreſſe. The Romans oftentimes raiſed theſe mounts in the mouth of a hauen, and commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that ſo they might fight with much aduantage.

Amongſt

Amongſt other engines, in vſe amongſt the Romans, their moueable Turrets were verie famous; for they were built in ſome ſafe place out of danger, and with wheeles put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne. Theſe Turrets were of two ſortes, either great or little: the leſſer ſort are deſcribed, by Vitruuius, to be 60 cubites high; and the ſquare ſide 17 cubites; the breadth at the top was a fift part, of the breadth at the baſe; and ſo they ſtood ſure without any danger of falling: the corner pillars were at the baſe, 9 inches ſquare; & 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 ſtories in theſe little turrets, & windowes in euerie ſtorie. The greater ſort of towers were 120 cubites high, and the ſquare ſide was 24 cubites, the breadth at the top was a fift part of the baſe; and in euerie one of theſe were commonly 200 ſtories. There was not one and the ſame diſtance kept betweene the ſtories, for the loweſt commonly was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the higheſt ſtorie 5 cubites, and the reſt 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of theſe ſtories, were ſouldiers and engines, ladders, and caſting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of theſe Turrets were couered with yron, and wet couerings, to ſaue them from fire. The ſouldiers that remoued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the ſquare thereof, and ſo they ſtood out of danger. The new water-worke by broken Wharfe in London much reſembleth one of theſe towers.

Towers or Turrets deſcribed.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

VPon the building of theſe mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Sueſſones ſubmitted themſelues to ſuch powerfull induſtrie. For whatſoeuer is ſtrange and vnuſuall, doth much affrighte the ſpirits of an enemie, and breede a motion of diſtruſt and diffidencie, when as they finde themſelues ignorant of ſuch warlike practiſes: for noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder, in as much as the true reaſons and cauſes being vnknowen, we apprehend it, as diuers from the vſuall courſe of thinges, and ſo ſtand gazing at the ſtrangeneſſe thereof: and wonder as it addeth worth to the noueltie; ſo it inferreth diffidencie, and ſo conſequently feare, the vtter enemie of martiall valour.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæſar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the *Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.*

CAESAR taking for pledges the chiefeſt of their cittie, vpon the deliuerie of all their Armes, receiued the Sueſſones to mercie: and from thence led his Armie againſt the Bellouaci; who hauing conuaied both themſelues and their goods into the towne, called Bratiſpantium, and vnderſtanding that Cæſar was come within fiue mile of the place, all the elder ſort came foorth to meete him, ſignifying their

Cæſar.

The Bellouaci taken to mercie.

their ſubmiſsion, by their lamentable demeanour. For theſe Diuitiacus became a mediator (who after the Belgæ had broken vp their campe, had diſmiſſed his Heduan forces and was returned to Cæſar) the Hedui (ſaith he) haue alwaies found in the Bellouaci, a faithfull and friendly diſpoſition to their ſtate: and if they had not beene betraied by their nobilitie, (who made them beleeue, that the Hedui were brought in bondage by the Romaines, and ſuffered all villanie and deſpight at their handes,) they had neuer withdrawne themſelues from the Hedui, nor conſented to conſpire againſt the Romaines. The authors of this counſel, perceiuing into what great miſerie they had brought their countrey, were fled into Britanie: wherfore not onelie the Bellouaci, but the Hedui alſo in their behalfe beſought him to vſe his clemencie towardes them. Cæſar in regarde of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promiſed to receiue them to mercie; but foraſmuch as the ſtate was verie great and populous, hee demanded 600. hoſtages: Which being deliuered, and their armour brought out of the towne, he marched from thence into the coaſt of the Ambiani, who without further lingering, gaue both themſelues and al that they had into his power. Vpon theſe bordered the Neruÿ, of whom Cæſar found this much by inquirie, that there was no recourſe of marchants vnto them: neither did they ſuffer any wine, or what thing elſe might tende to riot, to bee brought into their countrey: for they were perſuaded, that by ſuch thinges their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned that theſe Neruÿ were a ſauage people, and of great valour, often accuſing the reſt of the Belgæ, for yeelding their neckes to the Romaine yoake, openly affirming, that they would neither ſende ambaſſadors nor take peace vpon any condition.

The Ambiani yeeld vp themſelues.

Cæſar hauing marched three daies iourney in their countrey, he vnderſtood that the riuer * Sabis was not paſt ten miles from his campe; and that on the further ſide of this riuer, all the Neruÿ were aſſembled together, and there attended the comming of the Romaines: with them were ioined the Attrebatÿ, and Veromandui, whom they had perſuaded to abide the ſame fortune of warre with them. Beſides, they expected a power from the Aduatici; the women and ſuch as were vnmeete for the fielde, they beſtowed in a place vnacceſſible for any armie, by reaſon of fens and bogs, and mariſhes. Vpon this intelligence, Cæſar ſent his diſcouerers and Centurions before, to chooſe out a fit place to incampe in.

*The Neruÿ. *Sãbre neere Namours.*

Now whereas many of the ſurrendred Belgæ, and other Galles were continuallie in the Romaine army, certaine of theſe (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obſeruing the order which the Romaines vſed in marching, came by night to the Neruÿ and tolde them, that betweene euerie legion went a great ſort of cariages; and that it was no matter of difficultie, aſſoone as the firſt legion was come into the campe, and the other legions yet a great way off, to ſet vpon them, vpon a ſuddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages; and ſo to ouerthrowe them: which legion being thus cut off, and their ſtuffe taken, the reſt wouldhaue ſmal courage to ſtande againſt them. It much furthered this aduice, that, foraſmuch as the Neruÿ were not able to make any power of horſe, that they might the better reſiſt the cauallrie of their borderers, whenſoeuer they made any roade into their marches; their manner was to cut yong trees halfe aſunder, & bowing the tops down to the ground, plaſhed the boughes in breadth, and with thornes and briers planted between them, they made them ſo thicke, that it was impoſsible to ſee through them, ſo hard it was to enter or paſſe through them; ſo that, whenby this occaſion, the paſſage of the Romaine army muſt needes be hindred, the Neruÿ thought the foreſaid counſell not to be neglected.

The

The place which the Romaines chose to incampe in, was a hill, of like leuell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the riuer Sabis: and with the like leuell, on the other side, rose an other hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200. paces; the bottom whereof was plaine and open, and the vpper part so thicke with wood, that it could not easilie be looked into: within these woods the Neruians kept themselues close, and in the open grounde, by the riuer side were onely seene a fewe troupes of horse, and the riuer in that place was about 3. foot deepe.

Cæsar sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the maner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruii: for inasmuch as the enemy was at hand; Cæsar (as his custom was) led 6. legions alwaies in a readines, without burthen or cariage of any thing, but their armes: after them hee placed the impediments of the whole army. And the two legions which were last inrolled were a rereward to the army, and garded the stuffe.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis trecherous practise of the surrendred Belgæ, hath fortunatelie discouered the maner of Cæsars march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no smal consequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconueniences, and capable of the greatest arte that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet cariage of a march, by this circumstance it may bee gathered, that Cæsar principally respected safetie: and secondly conueniency. If the place affoorded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, hee was content in regarde of conueniency, to suffer euery legion to haue the ouersight of their particular cariages, and to insert them among the troupes, that euery man might haue at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publike discipline. But if he were in danger of any sodain attempt, or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy; hee then omitted conuenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disaduantageous to their safety: & caried his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be ingaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their cariages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoued by their military rules, & the ancient practise of their fortunate progenitors.

The maner of the Romaine march.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a march.
1 Safety.
2 Conueniēcy

The old Romains obserued likewise the same respects, for in vnsafe & suspected places, they caried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, which as Liuie seemeth to note, was free from all cariage and impediments, which might hinder them in any sodaine alarum. Neither doth that of * Hirtius any way cõtradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Cæsar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci, that 3. legions marched in front, & after them came al the cariages, to which the 10. legion serued as a rereward; & so they marched, *pene agmine quadrato.* *Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of *agmen quadratũ*, where he saith, that where an enemie is expected, wee ought to march *agmine quadrato*, readie to fight. The most material consequence of these places alleadged is, that as ofte as they suspected anie onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing

Agmen quadratum.

**Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.*

**60. Epistle.*

differed from their vſuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratum*, or a ſquare march, inaſmuch as it kept the ſame diſpoſition of parts, as were obſerued *in quadrata Acie*. For that triple forme of imbattailing, which the Romaines generally obſerued in their fights, hauing reſpect to the diſtances between each battel, contained almoſt an equal dimenſion of front and file: and ſo it made *Aciem quadratam*; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*.

Lib. 6. Polybius expreſſeth the ſame in effect, as often as the place required circumſpection; but altereth it ſomewhat in regard of the cariages: for he ſaith that in time of danger, eſpecially where the countrey was plaine and Chãpion, and gaue ſpace & free ſcope to cleere themſelues, vpon anie accident, the Romains marched in a triple battel, of equal diſtãce one behind an other, euery battel hauing his ſeueral cariages in front: And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themſelues according to the oportunity of the place, either to the right or left hande, and ſo placing their cariages on the one ſide of their army, they ſtood imbattailed ready to receiue the charge.

Agmen longũ The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more ſecurity, & gaue ſcope to conueniency, they named *agmen longum*; when almoſt euery maniple or order, had their ſeueral cariages attending vpon them, & ſtroue to keep that way which they found moſt eaſie, both for thẽſelues & their impediments. Which order of a march, as it was more commodius then the former, in regard of particularity, ſo was it vnſafe and dangerous, where the enemy was expected: And therfore Cæſar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, when they were deluded by Ambiorix, *longiſſimo agmine*; as though they had receiued their aduertiſements from a friend, and not from an enemy.


Lib. 5. de bel. Gallico.

The vſe that may be made of this in our moderne wars

And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in quality, frõ them of ancient times; yet in this point of diſcipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obſerued, as the two poles of their motions, ſafety and conuẽniency: whereof the firſt dependeth chiefely vpon the prouident diſpoſition of the leaders; and the other wil eaſily follow on, as the commodity of euerie particular ſhal giue occaſion.


Concerning ſafety in place of danger, what better courſe can bee taken then that maner of imbattailing, which ſhall be thought moſt conuenient, if an enemy were preſent to confront them? for a well ordered march muſt either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the diſtinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of ſtrength, which the fitteſt diſpoſition can affoord it. Firſt therefore, a prudent and circumſpect leader, that deſireth to frame a ſtrong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obſerue the nature and vſe of each weapon in his army, howe they may be placed for greateſt vſe and aduantage, both in reſpect of their different and concurring qualities, as alſo in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will conſequentlie inferre the beſt and exacteſt diſpoſition of imbattailing, as the ſaid forces are capable of; which if it may be obſerued in a march, is no way to be altered. But if this exactnes of imbattailing wil not admit conuenient cariage of ſuch neceſſarie adiuncts, as pertaine to an armie; the inconuenience is to bee relieued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in

a wary



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CÆSARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in fro



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CÆSARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand.

a warie iudgment ſhall be found expedient: that albeit the forme be ſomewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their ſtrength and ſafetie conſiſteth, maie ſtill be retained.

Neither can any man well deſcend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practiſes of manie great and experienced commanders; what ſort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the reſt of the cariage was beſtowed, according as their ſeuerall iudgments thought moſt expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the iſſue of all will fall out thus; that he that obſerued this rule before preſcribed, did ſeldome miſcarrie through an vnſafe march. Let a good Martialiſt well know their proper vſe in that diuerſity of weapons in his Armie; how they are ſeruiceable or diſaduantageous, in this or that place, againſt ſuch or ſuch an enemie: and he will ſpeedily order his battell, diſpoſe of his march, and beſtow his cariages, as ſhall beſt fall out both for his ſafetie, and conueniencie.

Cæſars cuſtome was, to ſend his Caualrie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to diſcouer and impeach an enemie; for theſe troupes were nimble in motion and fit for ſuch ſeruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horſemen marched in the tayle of the Armie, and gaue ſecuritie where there was moſt cauſe of feare. But if it happened that they were found vnfit to make good the ſeruice in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and eſpecially in Africa againſt the Numidians: he then remoued them, as he beſt found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie ſouldiers, which were the ſinewes and ſtrength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horſemen could not performe. And thus he altered the antique preſcription, and vniformitie of cuſtome, according as he found himſelfe beſt able to diſaduantage an enemie, or make waie to victorie.

CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their çampe: but are *interrupted by the Neruij. Cæſar maketh haſte,* to prepare his forces to battell.

THE Roman horſemen, with the ſlingers and archers, paſſed ouer the riuer, and incountered the Caualrie of the enemie: who at firſt retired backe to their companies in the wood, and from thence ſallied out againe vpon them: but the Romans durſt not purſue them further then the plaine and open ground: in the meane time the ſixe legions that were in front, hauing their worke meaſured out vnto them, began to fortifie their campe. But aſſoone as the Neruij perceiued their former cariages to be come in ſight, which Caſar.

was the time appointed amongſt them to giue the charge, as they ſtood imbattailed within the thicket, ſo they ruſhed out with all their forces, and aſſaulted the Roman horſemen: which being eaſily beaten backe, the Neruij ranne downe to the riuer, with ſuch an incredible ſwiftneſſe, that they ſeemed at the ſame inſtant of time to bee in the woods at the riuer, and charging the legions on the other ſide: For with the ſame violence, hauing paſſed the riuer, they ranne vp the hill to the Roman campe, where the ſouldiers were buſied in their intrenchment. Cæſar had all partes to plaie at one inſtant, the flagge to be hung out, by which they gaue the ſouldiers warning to take armes, the battell to be proclamed by ſound of trumpet, the ſouldiers to be recalled from their worke, and ſuch as were gone farre off to get turfe and matter for the rampier, to bee ſent for; the battell to be ordered, his men to be incouraged, and the ſigne of battell to be giuen: the moſt of which were cut off by ſhortneſſe of time, and the ſudden aſſault of the enemie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The deſcription of the Roman campe, with all the parts belonging vnto it.

AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good cuſtomes; ſo eſpecially in their campe-diſcipline, they ſtroue to be ſingular: for it ſeemed rather an Academie, or a citie of ciuill gouernment, then a campe of ſouldiers: ſo carefull were they both for the ſafetie, and skilfull experience of their men at armes. For touching the firſt, they neuer ſuffered their ſouldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were incloſed with ditch and a rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any newe inuention or late found out cuſtome in their ſtate, but in vſe amongſt the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kinges; their manner of incamping was included within theſe circumſtances.

The Centurions made choiſe of the place.

The Centurions, that went before to chooſe out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit ſituation for their campe, firſt aſſigned the ſtanding for the Emperours pauillion, which was commonly in the moſt eminent place of the campe; from whence he might eaſily ouerview all the other partes, or any alarum or *ſignum pugnæ*, might from thence be diſcouered to all quarters. This pauillion was knowne by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongſt the auncient Romans the Generall of their Armie was called Prætor: in this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they ſtucke vp a white enſigne, and from it they meaſured euerie waie 100 foote, and ſo they made a ſquare containing 200 foot in euerie ſide, the Area, or content whereof, was almoſt an acre of ground: the forme of the *Prætorium* was round and high, being as eminent among the other tentes, as a temple is amongſt the priuate buildings of a cittie: and therefore Ioſephus compareth it to a church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or chaire of the eſtate, and the place of diuination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of maieſtie and authoritie.

The Prætorium.

The lodging of the legions.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they conſidered which ſide of the pauillion laie moſt commodious for forrage and water, and on that ſide they lodged the legions, euery legion deuided one from another by a ſtreet or lane of 50 foote

foote in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that euerie legion had in the Armie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honourable, or towardes the sides, which was of meaner reputation: And againe, according to the place of euerie cohort in his legion, so was it lodged nearer the pauillion of the Emperour, towardes the harte of the campe; and so consequently euerie maniple tooke place in the cohort, distinguishing their preheminence, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions, there went a streete of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the middest of all the legions, vvhich was called Quintana; for that it deuided the fift cohort of euery legion from the sixt. *Quintana.*

Betweene the tentes of the first maniples in euerie legion and the *Praetorium*, there went a waie of 100 foote in breadth throughout the whole campe; which was called Principia; in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice; the souldiers exercised themselues at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publike place of meeting; and it was holde for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decencie. On either side the Emperours pauillion, in a direct line to make euen & straight the vpper side of the Principia, the Tribunes had their tentes pitched, euerie Tribune confronting the head of the legion whereof he was Tribune: aboue them, towardes the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the campe was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie. *Principia.* *The tentes of the Tribunes.*

Polybius describing the manner of incamping which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as manie associates, placeth the *Ablecti* and *extraordinarij*, which were select bandes and companies, in the vpper part of the campe; and the associates on the outsides of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole campe about, was 200 foote distant from any tent: vvhereof Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the campe in battell array, might there dissolue themselues into maniples, centuries, and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And againe, if occasion vvere offered to sallie out vpon an enemie, they might verie conueniently in that spatious roome, put themselues into companies and troupes: and if they vvere assaulted in the night, the dartes and fire vvorkes, vvhich the enemie should cast into their campe, would little indammage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tentes. *The space betweene the tents and the rampier.*

Their tentes were all of skinnes and hides, helde vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11 souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euerie tent, and that societie was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefest was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contubernij*. *Contubernium.*

The ditch and the rampier were made by the legions, euerie maniple hauing his part measured out, and euerie Centurion ouerseeing his Centurie; the *The ditch and the rampier.*

approbation of the whole worke belonged to the Tribunes. Their maner of intrenching was this: the ſoldiors being girt with their ſwords and daggers, digged the ditch about the campe, which was alwaies 8 foot in breadth at the leaſt, and as much in depth, caſting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not farre off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the diſcretion of the General: but what ſcantling ſoeuer was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottome as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch was three foot in heighth, and ſometimes foure, made after the maner of a wall, with greene turfes cut all to one meaſure, halfe a foot in thickneſſe, a foot in breadth, and a foot and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no ſuch turfe; they then ſtrengthened the looſe earth, which was caſt out of the ditch, with boughes and fagots, that it might be ſtrong and wel faſtened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outſide whereof, which hung ouer the ditch, they vſed to ſtick with thicke and ſharpe ſtakes, faſtened deep in the mound, that they might be firme; and theſe for the moſt part were forked ſtakes, which made the rampier very ſtrong, and not to be aſſaulted but with great difficulty. Varro ſaith, that the front of the rampier thus ſtucke with ſtakes, was called *vallum*, a *varicando*, for that no man could ſtride or get ouer it.

Agger.

Vallum.

Praetoria porta.

Porta Decumana.

Porta principales.

Laeua.

Dextra.


The campe had foure gates, the firſt was called *praetoria porta*, which was alwaies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did vſually looke either toward the eaſt, or to the enemy, or that way that the army was to march. The gate on the other ſide of the campe oppoſite to this, was called *Porta Decumana a decimis cohortibus*, for the tenth or laſt Cohort of euery legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the ſoldiours went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were caried to execution. The other two gates were called *Portæ principales*, foraſmuch as they ſtoode oppoſite to either ende of that ſo much reſpected place, which they called *principia*, onely diſtinguiſhed by theſe titles, *laeua principalis* and *dextra*, all theſe gates were ſhut with doores, and in ſtanding Campes fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engines of defence, as Baliſtæ, Catapultæ, Tolenones and ſuch like.

Caſtra Aeſtiua.


Hiberna.

The Romaines had their ſummer Campes, which they tearmed *Aeſtiua*, and their winter Campes, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*: their ſummer campes were in like maner differenced, according to the time, which they continued in thē. For if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called thē *Caſtra* or *Manſiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called thē *Aeſtiuas* or *Sedes*: And theſe were more abſolute, aſwel in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, then the former, wherein they ſtaied but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna*, had greater labor & coaſt beſtowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them frō the vvinter ſeaſon. Of theſe we read, that the tents were either thatched with ſtraw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hoſpital, & other publike houſes. Theſe cāps haue bin the beginning of many famous towns, eſpecially whē they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did vpon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, & the Rhene. The

order



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Principia
Quintana

order which they alwaies obſerued in laying out their camp, was ſo vniforme, & well knowne to the Romaines, that when the Centurions had limited out euery parte, and marked it with different enſignes and colours, the ſoldiours entered into it, as into a knowne and familiar Citie: wherein euerie ſocietie or ſmall contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euery particular man coulde aſsigne the proper ſtation of euerie companie, throughout the whole armie.

The commodity of this incamping.

The vſe and commodity of this incamping, I briefely touched in my firſt booke: But if I were worthie any way to commend the excellency thereof to our moderne ſoldiours, or able by perſwaſion to reſtabliſh the vſe of incamping in our warres; I woulde ſpare no paines to atchieue ſo great a good, and vaunt more in the conqueſt of negligence, then if my ſenſe had compaſſed a new found out meanes; and yet reaſon would deeme it a matter of ſmall difficultie, to gaine a point of ſuch worth, in the opinion of our men, eſpeciallie when my diſcourſe ſhall preſent ſecurity to our forces, and honour to our leaders, maieſtie to our armies, and terrour to our enmies, wonderment to ſtrangers, and victorie to our nation. But ſloth hath ſuch intereſt in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and foole-hardineſſe, contempt of vertue, and deriſion of good diſcipline, to repugne the deſſignes of honour, and ſo far to ouermaiſter reaſon, that it ſuffereth not former harmes to beare witneſſe againſt errour, nor correct the ill atchieuements of ill directions: and therefore ceaſing to vrge this pointe anie further, I wil leaue it to the careful reſpect of the wiſe.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The ceremonies which they vſed in their preparation to battel.

THe fury of the enemy, and their ſodaine aſſault, ſo diſturbed the ceremonies which the Romaine diſcipline obſerued, to make the ſoldiours trulie apprehend the waight and importance of that action, which might caſt vppon their ſtate either ſoueraignty or bondage; that they were all for the moſt part omitted; notwithſtanding they are here noted vnder theſe titles, the firſt was *vexillum proponendum, quod erat inſigne cum ad Arma concurri oporteret*: for when the Generall had determined to fight, hee cauſed a skarlet coate or red flag to bee hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the ſoldiours might be warned, to prepare themſelues for the battell; and this was the firſt warning they had, which by a ſilent aſpect preſented bloud and execution to their eyes, as the onlie meanes to worke out their owne ſafetie, and purchaſe eternall honour. The ſecond was *Signum tubæ dandum*; this warning was a noiſe of manie trumpets, which they, tearmed by the name of *claſſicum à calando*, which ſignifieth calling: for after the eie was filled with ſpecies ſutable to the matter intended; they then haſted to poſſeſſe the eare, and by the ſenſe of hearing to ſtir vp warlike motions, and fil them with reſolute thoughts, that no diffident or baſe conceites might take hold of their mindes. The third was, *milites cohortandi*, for it was thought conuenient to confirme this valour, with motiues of reaſon, which is the ſtrength and perfection of al ſuch motions.

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the vse and benefit whereof I somewhat inlarged in the Heluetian warre, and could affoord much more labour to demonstrate the commoditie of this part, if my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or be thought worthie regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was *signum dandum*, which, as some thinke, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish and know themselues from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Cæsar gaue the word *Felicitie*; Brutus and Cassius gaue *Libertie*; others haue giuen *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, and such like wordes, as might be ominous to a good successe: Besides these particularities, the manner of their deliuerie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Cæsar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may bee much graced with ceremonies and complements, which like officers or attendants ad much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth farre meaner and of lesse regard.

CHAP. X.


The battell betweene Cæsar and the *Neruij*.


Cæsar.

IN these difficulties, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was, the knowledge and experience of the souldiers: for by reason of their practise in former battels, they could as well prescribe vnto themselues, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Cæsar had giuen commandement to euerie Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, vntill the fortifications were perfited; yet when they sawe extremitie of danger, they attended no countermaund from Cæsar: but ordered all thinges as it seemed best to their owne discretion. Cæsar hauing commanded such thinges as he thought necessarie, ranne hastelie to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion, where he vsed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemie was not further off, then a weapon might be cast to incounter them, he gaue them the signe of battell: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them alreadie closed and at the incounter. For the time was so short and the enemie so violent, that they wanted leasure to put on their headpieces, or to vncase their targets: and what part they lighted into from their worke, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they stated; least in seeking out their owne companies, they should loose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Armie being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the declinitie of the hill, and the breuitie of time, then according to the rule

And therefore I rather take it to bee something els then a word.




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of art; as the legions incountered the enemie in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindered by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needful to be done: & therfore in so great vncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the ninth and tenth legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles, with the aduantage of the hil, did driue the Attrebatij, breathles with running & wounded in the incounter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swordes: Neither did they sticke to follow after them ouer the riuer, and aduenture into a place of disaduantage, where the battell being renewed againe by the enemie, they put them to flight the second time. In like maner two other legions, the 11 and the 8, hauing put the Veromandui from the vpper ground, fought with them vpon the bankes of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the campe was well neere left naked. For in the right cornet were the 12 and the 7 legions, where as all the Nerij, vnder the conduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; and some of them began to assault the legions on the open side, and other some to possesse themselues of the highest part of the campe.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, and the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, and were at first all put to flight by the enemie, as they were entering into the campe, met with their enemies in the face, and so were driuen to flie out another way. In like manner, the pages and souldiers boies, that from the Decumane port and toppe of the hill, had seene the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemie in their campe; betooke them to their heeles as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treuiri (who for their prowesse were reputed singular amongst the Galles, and were sent thither by their state, to aide the Romans) first when they perceiued the Roman campe to be possest, by a great multitude of the enemie, the legions to be ouercharged and almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they tooke their waie homeward, and reported to their state, that the Romans were vtterly ouerthrowen.

Cæsar departing from the tenth legion, to the right cornet, found his men exceedingly ouercharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, and the souldiers of the 12 legion so thicke thronged on a heape, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slaine, the ensigne bearer kild and the ensigne taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slaine, or sore wounded; amongst whom Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grieuously wounded, that he could scarce stand vpon his feete; the rest not verie forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile and forsaking the field; the enemie on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he fought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any meanes or succour, to relieue them: he tooke a target from one of the kindmost souldiers (for he himselfe was come thither without one) and pressing to the front of the battell, called the Centurions by name, and incouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemie, and the Maniples to be inlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swordes.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The place and office of a primipile.

THis Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12 legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or simplie *Primipilus*, and sometimes *Primopilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensigne of euerie legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple. Neither was this dignitie, without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authors. We reade further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunality was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a law made, I know not vpon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Target described.

AND heere I may not omit to giue the Target any honour I may, and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsars hand, as in the place of greatest dignitie, and much honouring the excellencie therof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouerthwart the conuexsurface thereof; and the length foure foote, of what forme or fashion soeuer they were of: for the Romans had two sortes of Targets amongst their legionarie, the first caried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Ouall, a figure of an vnequall latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the endes, like vnto an egge, described *in Plano*: the other sorte was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a guttertile; and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened vpon another, with lint and Buls glew; and couered with an Oxe hide, or some other stiffe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of yron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middest there was a bosse of yron or brasse, which they called *Vmbo*. Romulus brought them in first amongst the Romans, taking the vse of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either sallow, alder, or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reason, for as much as these trees are colde and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood, was presently contracted and shut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let vs enter a little into

Lib. 16. c. 40.

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the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian *Weapons.*

I Promised in my sixt book that I would make a comparison, betweene the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their armies; how they do differ one from another: & in what regard, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I wil now with diligence endeuour to performe. And for as much as the armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselues by their actions, by ouercomming the armies as wel of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa as all the Easterne countries of Europe: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times seene triall, both of their battailes and forces; that knowing the reason why, the Romans do ouercome, and in their battailes carie awaie the better: we doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteeme them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue them their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgment. Concerning the battels betweene Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no neede that I speake much. For their losses are neither to be imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entreated therof when we made mention of the battels themselues, and the end it selfe of that warre doth especiallie confirme this our opinion. For vvhen they had gotten a captaine equall vvith Hanniball, euen consequentlie vvith all his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, hee trained his Armie to their weapons, and so taking them vp in the beginning, he continued them on vnto the ende.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding it serued him not to get the victory, but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtfull: concerning whom it were not vnfit, that I should saie something, least in being altogether silent, it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I will hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the disposition, and forces proper to it,

nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it, or to sustaine the violence thereof; as maie easily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an array of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scantling sixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniencie of them, 14 cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betweene the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butte ende thereof, vvhiles he standes in a readinesse to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I saie, it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites doth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his handes he doth aduance it readie to charge the enemie: By vvhich meanes it followeth, that some of the pikes doe not onely extend themselues before the second, third, and fourth ranke, but some before the formost, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thickneſſe, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behinde, as Homer maketh mention vvhen he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortifie another; one headpiece is ioyned to another, that they maie stande vnited and close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe, it must follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themselues two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betweene themselues: by which maie euidently be seene the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16 rankes in depth, or thickneſſe; the excesse of which number of rankes aboue fiue. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long inough to enlarge themselues beyond the formost rankes, they grow vtterly vnprofitable, and cannot man, by man, make any impression, or assault: but serue onely, by laying their pikes vpon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former rankes, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firme and sure; and with the thicknes of their pikes they doe repell all those dartes, which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those rankes which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe so presse vpon the former, that they doe make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the formost rankes should giue backe.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speake on the contrarie part, touching the properties and differences, as well of the armes, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell. For euerie Roman soldier for himselfe, and his weapon is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himselfe with his target; and mutually moouing whensoeuer there is occasion offered. But those which vse their swordes, do fight in a more thinne and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foote more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to bellie, that they maie vse their weapons with the better commoditie. And hence it commeth to passe,

that one Romaine ſoldiour taketh vp as much ground, as two of thoſe which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: ſo that one Romain is as it were to oppoſe himſelfe againſt tenne pikes, which pikes the ſaid one ſoldior can neither by any agilitie come to offende, or elſe at handy blowes otherwiſe annoy: And thoſe which are behinde him, are not onely vnable to repell their force, but alſo with conueniencie to vſe their owne weapons. Whereby it may eaſily be gathered, that it is impoſsible, that any battaile being aſſaulted, by the front of a phalanx, ſhould be able to ſuſtaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper compoſition.

What then is the cauſe that the Romaines do ouercome, and that thoſe that doe vſe the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victorie? (Euen from hence) that the Romaine armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, whereto it may profitablie applie it ſelfe: ſo that if it were of neceſsitie, that their enemy ſhoulde incounter them at that inſtant, eſpeciallie with their whole forces, it were queſtionleſſe not only, not without danger, but in al probabilitie likelie, that the phalanx ſhould euer carrie away the better. But if that may be auoided, which is eaſily done: ſhal not that diſpoſition then, be vtterlie vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther euident, that the phalanx muſt neceſſarily haue plaine & champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and riuers: for al theſe may hinder & diſioine it. And it is almoſt impoſsible to haue a plaine of the capacity of 20. *ſtadia*, much leſſe more, where there ſhall bee found none of theſe impediments. But ſuppoſe there bee found ſuch places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the enemy refuſe to come vnto them, and in the meane time, ſpoile, and ſacke the cities, and countrie round about; what commodity, or profit ſhal ariſe by an army ſo ordered? for if it remaine in ſuch places, as hath beene before ſpoken of; it can neither relieue their friends, nor preſerue themſelues. For the Conuoies which they expect from their friends, are eaſily cut off by the enemy, whiles they remaine in thoſe open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterpriſe, they are then expoſed to the enemy. But ſuppoſe, that the Romaine army ſhould find the phalanx in ſuch places, yet would it not aduenture it ſelfe in groſſe at one inſtant; but would by little & little retire it ſelfe; as doth plainly appeare by their vſual practiſe. For there muſt not bee a coniecture of theſe things by my words only, but eſpecially by that which they do. For they do not ſo equally frame their battaile, that they doe aſſault the enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a ſtande, and parte charge the enemie, that if at any time the Phalanx doe preſſe them, that come to aſſault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is diſſolued. For whether they purſue thoſe that retire, or flie from thoſe that do aſſault them; theſe doe diſioyne themſelues from part of their armie; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their enemies, ſtauding and attending their opportunitie: ſo that nowe they neede not anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx conſiſteth: but to aſſault where the breach is made, both behind, and vpon the ſides. But if at any

time the Romaine armie may keepe his due proprietie, and diſpoſition, the phalanx by the diſaduantage of the place, being not able to doe the like: doth it not then manifeſtlie demonſtrate the difference to be great, betweene the goodnes of their diſpoſition, and the diſpoſition of the phalanx?

To this may bee added the neceſſities impoſed vppon an army, which is to march through places of all natures, to encampe themſelues, to poſſeſſe places of aduantage, to beſiege, and to be beſieged; and alſo contrary to expectation ſometimes to come in viewe of the enemie: For all theſe occaſions neceſſarilie accompanie an armie; and oftentimes are the eſpecial cauſes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: Foraſmuch as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular diſpoſition, without a conuenient place, are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Romaine army is apt for all theſe purpoſes. For euerie ſoldiour amongſt them, beeing once armed and ready to fight, refuſeth no place, time, nor occaſion; keeping alwaies the ſame order, whether he fight togither with the whole body of the army, or particularlie by himſelfe, man to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their diſpoſition is aduantagious: ſo the end doth anſwere the expectation.

Theſe things I thought to ſpeake of at large, becauſe many of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to bee ouercome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx ſhould bee put to the worſt by the Romaine army, conſidering the nature of their weapons.

Thus far goeth Polibyus, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romaines, with the vſe of armes amongſt the Macedonians: wherein we ſee the Pike trulie, and exactlie ordered, according as the wiſe Grecians could beſt proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue moſt aduantage to the vſe thereof: ſo that if our ſquadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee ſee they doe not) they fall ſo much ſhorte of that ſtrength, which the wiſedome of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed vnto it. But ſuppoſe wee could allow it that diſpoſition, in the courſe of our wars, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet foraſmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the ſaid maner of imbattailing is tied to ſuch dangerous circumſtances of one time, one place, and one kinde of fight: I hold it not ſo profitable a weapon, as the practiſe of our times doth ſeem to make it, eſpecially in woody countries, ſuch as Ireland is; where the vſe is cut off by ſuch inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtles, if our commanders did but conſider of the incongruity of the Pike & Ireland, they would not proportion ſo great a number of thē in euery company, as there is; for commonly halfe the company are pikes, which is as much to ſaie in the practiſe of our wars, that halfe the army hath neither offenſiue nor defenſiue weapōs, but only againſt a troupe of horſe. For they ſeldom or neuer come to the puſh of pike, with the foot cōpanies, where they may charge & offende the enemy: & for defence, if the enemy think it not ſafe to buckle with thē at hād, but maketh more aduantage to play vpon thē a far off with ſhot; it affordeth ſmal ſafety to ſhake a long pike at them, and ſtand faire in the meane time, to entertaine

a volleie of ſhot with the body of their battailion. As I make no queſtion, but the pike in ſome ſeruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; ſo I aſſure my ſelfe, there are weapons if they were put to triall, that would counteruaile the pike euen in thoſe ſeruices, wherein it is thought moſt profitable.

Concerning the Target, we ſee it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatſoeuer, aſwell in regard of the diuers and ſundrie ſortes of imbattailing, as the qualitie of the place wherſoeuer: for their vſe was as effectuall in ſmall bodies and centuries, as in groſſe troupes and great companies; in thinne and ſpacious imbattailing, as in thicke thronged Teſtudines. Neither could the nature of the place make them vnſeruiceable; for whether it were plaine or couert; leuel or vnequall; narrow or large, if there were any commodity to fight, the Target was as neceſſarie to defend, as the ſword to offend: beſides the conueniency, which accompanieth the Target in any neceſſitie impoſed vpon an armie, whether it bee to march through places of all natures, to make a faſt march, or a ſpeedie retraite, to incampe themſelues, to poſſeſſe places of aduantage, to beſiege and to be beſieged, as Polybius ſaith, with manie other occaſions which neceſſarilie accompanie an armie. The vſe of this weapon hath beene too much neglected in theſe latter ages, but may be happilie renued againe in our nation, if the induſtrie of ſuch as haue laboured to preſent it vnto theſe times, in the beſt faſhion, ſhall finde anie fauour in the opinion of our commaunders. Concerning which Target, I muſt needes ſaie this much, that the light Target will proue the Target of ſeruice, whenſoeuer they ſhall happen to be put in execution: for thoſe which are made proofe, are ſo heauie and vnwieldie, (although it be ſomewhat qualified with ſuch helpes as are annexed to the vſe thereof,) that they ouercharge a man, with an vnſupportable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight diſproportionable to his ſtrēgth. For our offenſiue weapons, as namely the Hargebuſiers and musketiers, are ſtronger in the offenſiue part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable and fit for ſeruice. Neither did the Romains regard the proofe of their Target further, then was thought fit for the readie vſe of them in time of battel, as it appeareth in many places, both in the ciuill warres and in theſe Commentaries: for a Romaine pile hath often times darted through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and faſtened them both to the ground, which is more then a musket can wel do; for the bullet commonly reſteth in the bodie. And although it may be ſaid that this was not cōmon, but rather ŷ effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it ſerueth to proue, that their Targets were not proofe to their offenſiue weapons, when they were well deliuered and with good direction. For I make no doubt, but in their battailes there were oftentimes ſome hinderances, which woulde not ſuffer ſo violent an effect, as this which I ſpeake of: for in a volley of ſhotte, wee muſt not thinke that all the bullets flie with the ſame force, and fall with the like hurt; but as armour of good proofe will hardly hold out ſome of them; ſo ſlender armes and of no proofe, will make good reſiſtance againſt others. And to conclude, in a battell or incounter at hand, a man ſhall meete with more occaſions, ſuting the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then ſuch as will aduantage the

the heauie Target of proofe, or counteruaile the surplus of waight, which it carieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of proofe, in some places and in some seruices: which I deny not to those, that desire to bee secured from the extremity of peril: but this falleth out in some places and in some particular seruices, and hindereth not but that the vniuersal benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important occasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sworde of the Targetiers, that according to the practise of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot be that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance: And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must bee verie short, otherwise it will neuer bee readilie drawne out. I saie that the sworde of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to command the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, wil easily discouer. But let this suffice concerning the vse of the pike and the Target.

CHAP. XI.

The battell continueth, and in the ende Cæsar ouercommeth.

Cæsar.

AT the presence of their Generall, the soldiours conceiued some better hopes, and gathering strength and courage againe, when as euery man bestirred himselfe in the sight of the Emperour, the brunt of the enemie was a litle staied. Cæsar perceiuing likewise the seuenth legion, which stood next vnto him, to bee sore ouerlaide by the enemy, commaunded the Tribunes by little and little, to ioine the two legions together, and so by ioining backe to backe, to make two contrarie fronts; and beeing thus secured one by another from feare of being circumuented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the meane time the two legions, that were in the rereward to guarde the cariages, hearing of the battell, doubled their pace, and were discried by the enemy vpon the top of the hill. And Titus Labienus, hauing won the campe of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher ground what was done on the other side of the riuer, sent the tenth legion to helpe their fellowes, who vnderstanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fled, in what case the matter stood, and in what daunger the campe, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose comming there happened such an alteration and change of things, that euen such as were sunke downe, through extreame griefe of their woundes, or leaned vpon their Targets, began againe to fight a fresh, and the Pages and the boies perceiuing the enemie amazed, ran vpon them vnarmed, not fearing their weapons:

the

the horſemen alſo ſtriuing with extraordinarie valour, to wipe away the diſhonour of their former flight, thruſt themſelues in all places before the legionarie ſouldiers. Howbeit the enemie in the vtmoſt perill of their liues, ſhewed ſuch manhood, that as faſt as the formoſt of them were ouerthrowen, the next in place beſtrid their carkaſes, and fought vpon their bodies: and theſe being likewiſe ouerthrowen, and their bodies heaped one vpon another, they that remained, poſſeſt themſelues of that mount of dead carkaſes as a place of aduantage, and from thence threwe their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them againe to the Romans. By which it may be gathered, that there was great reaſon to deeme them men of hautie courage, that durſt paſſe ouer ſo broade a riuer, climbe vp ſuch high rockes, and aduenture to fight in a place of ſuch inequalitie. The battell being thus ended, and the nation and name of the Neruij being well neare ſwallowed vp with deſtruction, the elder ſort with the women and children, that before the battell were conuaied into Ilands and Bogs, when they heard thereof, ſent ambaſſadours to Cæſar, and yeelded themſelues to his mercie; and in laying open the miſerie of their ſtate affirmed, that of 600 Senatours they had now left but three; and of 60000 fighting men, there was ſcarce fiue hundred that were able to beare Armes. Cæſar, that his clemencie might appeare to a diſtreſſed people, preſerued them with great care, graunting vnto them the free poſſeſſion of their townes and country, and ſtreightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or iniurie at all.

OBSERVATIONS.

AND thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battell, which Ramus complaineth of as a confuſed narration: much differing from the direct and methodicall ſile, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule holde good, which learned Rhetoritians haue obſerued in their Oratorie, that an vnperfect thing ought not to be told in a perfect maner; then by Ramus leaue, if any ſuch confuſion do appeare, it both ſauoureth of eloquence, and wel ſuteth the turbulent cariage of the action, wherein order and skill gaue place to fortune, and prouidence was ſwallowed vp with peraduenture. For that which Hirtius ſaith of the ouerthrow he gaue to Pharnaces, may as well be ſaid of this; that he got the victorie, *plurimum adiuuante deorum benignitate, qui cum omnibus bellis caſibus interſunt, tum præcipue iis quibus nihil ratione potuit adminiſtrari.* For ſo it fell out in this battell, and the danger proceeded from the ſame cauſe, that brought him to that puſh in the battell with Phamaces: for he well vnderſtood that the Neruij attended his comming on the other ſide the riuer Sabis: Neither was he ignorant how to fortifie his camp in the face of an enemy, without feare or danger, as we haue ſeene in his war with Arioviſtus; when he marched to the place where he purpoſed to incamp himſelfe with 3 battels, and cauſed two of them to ſtand ready in armes to receiue any charge, which the enemy ſhould offer to giue, that the third battell in the meane time might fortifie the camp. Which courſe would eaſily haue fruſtrated this ſtratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard leſſe dangerous; but he little expected any ſuch reſolution,

Li. de militia Iu. Ca.

so contrarie to the rules of militarie discipline, that an enemie should not sticke to passe ouer so broad a riuer, to clime vp such steepe and high rocks, to aduenture battell in a place so disaduantagious, and to hazard their fortune vppon such inequalities. And therefore, hee little mistrusted any such vnlikelie attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his owne ouerthrow, if the legions had beene ready to receiue them. Which may teach a generall that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses; nor too carefull in his best aduised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily bee preuented, and the safest course weakened with an vnrespected circumstance: so powerful are weake occurrences in the maine course of the waightiest actions; and so infinite are the waies, wherby either wisdom or fortune may worke. Neither did this warne him, to prouide for that which an enemy might do, how vnlikelie soeuer it might seeme vnto him, as appeareth by that accident in the battel with Pharnaces: which practise of attempting a thing against reason and the arte of warre, hath found good successe in our moderne wars; as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding, it is to be handeled sparingly, as no way fauoring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *temeritas non semper felix*, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefest helpes which the Romaines founde, were first the aduantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Heluetian warre. Secondlie, the experience, which the soldiours had got in the former battailes, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they caried themselues as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and vndanted iudgment of the General, which ouerswaied the peril of the battel, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherin we may obserue, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battel rested vpon his directions, he wholy intended warines & circumspection, so in the hazard and peril of good hap, he confronted extremity of danger with extremity of valor, and ouertopt fury, with a higher resolution.

CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselues to a strong hold, and are taken by Cæsar.

Cæsar.

* *either Domay or Bosleduke in Brabant.*

THE * *Aduatici before mentioned, comming with all their power to aide the Nerui, and vnderstanding by the way of their ouerthrow, returned home againe; and forsaking all the rest of their townes, and vplles, conuaied themselues and their wealth into one strong and wel fortified town, which was compassed about with mighty walls and steepe downefals, sauing in one place of 200. foot in breadth, where there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent, which passage they had fortified with a double wal of a large*

altitude,

altitude, and had placed mightie great stones and sharpe beames vpon the walles redie for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni, who in their iourney into Italy had left such caringes on this side of the Rhene, as they coulde not conueniently take along with them, in the custodie of these forces; who after the death of their fellowes, being many yeares disquieted by their neighbours, somtimes inuading other states, and sometimes defending themselues, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselues in. At the first comming of the Romaine army, they sallied out of the towne, & made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Cæsar had drawne a rampier about the towne of 12 foot in height, 15 miles in compasse, and had fortified it with castles very thicke about the towne; they kept themselues within the wall: And as they beheld the vines framed, the mount raised, and a towre in building a far off; at first they began to laugh at it, and with scoffing speeches frō the wal, began to aske with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romaines were but little men in respect of the Galles) a towre of that huge massie waight should bee brought vnto the walles? But when they saw it remoued, and approching neere vnto the towne, as men astonished at the strange and vnaccustomed sight thereof, they sent ambassadors to Cæsar, to intreat a peace with this message: They beleeued that the Romaines did not make war, without the special assistance of the gods, that could with such facility transport engines of that height, & bring them to incounter at hand, against the strongest part of their town: and therfore they submitted both themselues, and all that they had, to Cæsars mercy; desiring one thing of his meere clemency, that he would not take away their armes, forasmuch as al their neighbors were enemies vnto them, and enuied at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselues, if they shoulde deliuer vp their armor: so that they had rather suffer any inconuenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murthered by them, whom in former time they had held subiect to their command.

To this Cæsar answered, that hee would saue the city rather of his owne custome, thē for any desert of theirs; so that they yeelded before the Ram touched the wal: but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present deliuery of their armes; for he would do by thē as he had done by the Neruij, and giue cōmandement to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answere being returned to the city, they seemed contented to doe whatsoeuer hee commanded them, and thereupon casting a great part of their armour ouer the wall into the ditch, insomuch as they fild it almost to the top of the rampier: and yet (as afterward was known) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, and for that daie caried themselues peaceably. Towards night Cæsar commanded the gates to be shut, and the soldiours to be drawn out of the towne. But the Aduatici hauing consulted together before, forasmuch as they beleeued that vpon their submission, the Romaines woulde either set no watch at all, or at the least, keepe it verie carelesly; partlie with such armour as they had retained, and partly with Targets, made of barke or wrought of wicker, which vppon the sodaine they had couered ouer with leather, about the third watch where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest; they issued sodainly out of the towne with al their power: but signification thereof being giuen by fieri, as Cæsar had commanded, the Romains hasted speedilie to that place. The enemy fought verie desperatelie, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romains in a place of disaduantage, at length with the slaughter of 4000. there rest were driuen backe into the towne. The

next daie when Cæsar came to breake open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the soldiors, and sold al the people and spoile of the towne: the number of persons in the towne amounted to 53000. bondslaues.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Circũuallatio

IN the surprise, attempted by the Belgæ vpon Bibract, I set downe the maner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their sodaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any aduantage in the course of the war) they then prepared for the siege, in that maner, as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inuironed the town about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the saide rampier, with many castles and fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the town from any forraine succor or reliefe: and withal secured themselues frõ sallies or other stratagems, which the townsmen might practise against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumuallatio*; the particular description wherof, I refer vnto the history of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set down by Cæsar.

In the seuenth commentaria.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Aries or the Ram.

Cales.

THe Ram, which Cæsar heere mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Romaine Engines, and helde that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention theteof, to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrow a castle, they tooke a long beame or timber tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees, they ouerthrewe the whole towre. The Romaines had two sortes of Rams, the one was rude and plaine, the other artificial and compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtraited in the column of Traian at Rome.

Aries simplex

Aries composita.

The compound Ram is thus described by Iosephus; a Ramme (saith he) is a mighty great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthned at one end with a head of yron, fashioned like vnto a Ram; and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto an other beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars, and hanging thus equallie balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backeward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his yron heade: neither is there any towre so strong, or wal so broad, that is able to stande before it. The length of this Ramme was of a large scantling, for Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian warre had a Ram eighty foote long: and Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsuallie 106. and sometimes 120; and this length gaue great strength and force to the engine.

engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of ſouldiers: and their forces being ſpent, they were ſeconded with another Centurie; and ſo the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermiſſion. Ioſephus ſaith, that Titus, at the ſiege of Ieruſalem, had a ramme for euerie legion: it was oftentimes couered with a vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more ſafety. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vntill the ramme had touched the wall, they could not preſume of any acceptation of rendrie; for as much as by their obſtinacie, they had brought in perill the liues of their enemies, and were ſubdued by force of Armes, which affoordeth ſuch mercie as the victor pleaſeth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe Aduatici, as it ſeemeth, were not ignorant of the ſmall ſecuritie, which one ſtate can giue vnto another, that commendeth their ſafetie to be protected by it: for as Architas the Pythagorean ſaith, a bodie, a familie, and an Armie are then well gouerned, when they containe within themſelues the cauſes of their ſafetie; ſo we muſt not looke for anie ſecuritie in a ſtate, when their ſafetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection. For the olde ſaying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quiſquam teget, quem propria arma non texere.* Although in this caſe the matter was well qualified, by the maieſtie of the Roman Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia, wherof the Hedui with their aſſociates were very gainful witneſſes: but amongſt kingdomes, that are better ſuted with equalitie of ſtrength & authority, there is ſmall hope of ſafetie to be looked for, vnleſſe the happy gouernment of both do mutually depend vpon the ſafetie of either nation. For that which Polybius obſerued in Antigonus king of Macedonia, taketh place for the moſt part amongſt all Princes; That kinges by nature eſteeme no man, either as a friend or an enemie, but as the calculation of profit ſhall finde them anſwerable to their proiectes. And contrariwiſe, it cutteth off many occaſions of practiſes & attempts, when it is knowne that a ſtate is of it ſelfe able and readie to reſiſt the deſſignes of forraine enemies, according to that of Manlius: *Oſtendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipſi remittent.*

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

THe manner of ſignifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great vſe in the night ſeaſon, where the fortification was of ſo large an extenſion: for fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeed it is, for as much as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reaſonable diſtance cannot be diſcerned from the fire it ſelfe, and ſo it ſeemeth much greater then it is in ſubſtance: and contrariwiſe,

To giue notice of an Alarum by fire.

in the daie time it sheweth lesse then it is; for the cleare brightnesse of the aire doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall bodie: and therefore their custome was to vse fire in the night, and smoake in the daie, suting the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie, that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

Lib. 25.

The punishments which the Romans laied vpon a conquered nation.

AND albeit after the victorie, the Romans inflicted diuers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemie; yet as Flauius Lucanus saith in Liuie, there was no nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towardes a conquered nation, were these; either they punished them by death, or solde them for bondslaues, *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub iugum*; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie states.

Of the first we finde a manifest example in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his ambassadours by force, contrarie to the law of nations, he put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus saith, that an enemie was said to be sold *sub corona*, in as much as the captiues stood crowned in the market place, where they were set out to sale; as Cato saith in his booke *de re militari, vt populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus, supplicatum eat? quam re male gesta coronatus vaneat*. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, for as much as the soldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keepe them together; and this round-about-standing was called *Corona*. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therfore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: for as much as amongst the Greekes, by the speare or pike, was signified the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub iugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallowes, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laide vpon their necke the yoake of thraldome. Liuie saith, that Quintius the dictator dismissed the *Aequos sub iugum*; and this *iugum* was made of 3 speares, whereof two were stucke vpright in the ground, and the third was tied ouerthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub iugum*, were vngirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe they tooke awaie their landes and territories, and either solde it for mony, & brought it into the treasurie, or deuided the land amongst the Roman people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which Liuie hath manie pregnant examples.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

Crassus taketh in all the maritimate cities that lie to the Ocean: the legions are carried into their wintering campes.

THE same time Pub. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion to the maritimate cities that laie to the Ocean, aduertised him that al those states had yeelded themselues to the people of Rome: The wars being thus ended, and all Gallia being setled in peace, there went such a fame of this warre among other barbarous people, that from nations beyond the Rhene there came ambassadours to Cæsar, offering both hostages and obedience to whatsoeuer he commanded them. But Cæsar willed them to repaire vnto him againe in the beginning of the next sommer, for as much as he then hasted into Lumbardie, after he had placed his legions in their wintering campes. For these thinges, vpon the sight of Cæsars letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for 15 daies together, which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the second Commentarie.

Cæsar.

Of this supplication I wil speake in the latter ende of the 4 booke.

OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS VPON THE THIRD BOOKE OF CÆSAR HIS COMMENTARIES.

THE ARGVMENT.

THis Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter ende of the former ſommer; wherein the Belgæ had ſo leane a harueſt: and then it proceedeth to the warre betweene Cæſar and the Veneti; Craſſus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curioſolitæ: And Titus Labienus, with the Treuiri.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, being ſent to cleere the paſſage of the Alpes, was beſieged by the Seduni and Veragri.

Cæſar. CAESAR taking his iourney into Italie, ſent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horſemen vnto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whoſe territories are extended from the riuer Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, vnto the tops of the higheſt Alpes. The ende of this voyage was chiefely to cleare the Alpes of theeues and robbers, that liued by the ſpoile of paſſengers that trauelled betweene Italie and Gallia: Galba hauing order, if he found it expedient to winter in thoſe partes, after ſome fortunate incounters and the taking of ſome caſtles and holdes, he concluded a peace, and reſolued to place two cohortes of his legion, amongſt the Nantuates; and himſelfe to winter with the other cohortes, in a towne of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This towne being ſited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mightie high hils, was deuided by a riuer into two partes, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he choſe for his wintering campe, and fortified it about with a ditch and a rampier. After he had ſpent many daies of wintering, and giuen order, that corne ſhould be brought thither for prouiſion; he had intelligence vpon a ſudden, that the Galles, in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was allotted vnto them; and that the hils which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne ſtood, were poſſeſt with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reaſons of this ſudden commotion were cheefly the

the paucitie of the Roman forces, not making a compleat legion; for as much as two cohorts wintered amongſt the Nantuates: beſides many particulars, that were wanting vpon neceſſarie occaſions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themſelues, the place affoorded ſuch aduantage, that they were perſwaded by reaſon of the ſteepe declinitie of the hill, that the Romans would not indure the brunt of the firſt aſſault: beſides this, it greeued them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hoſtages; and the Alpes, which nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as boundes betweene two large kingdomes, to be ſeaſed vpon by the Roman legions, and vnited to their Prouince.

Vpon theſe aduertiſements, Galba not hauing as yet finiſhed the fortification of his campe, nor made prouiſion of corne and forrage for the winter ſeaſon, in that he little feared any motion of warre, being ſecured of their amitie, and obedience, both by hoſtages and rendrie: he preſently called a councell of warre, to determine what courſe was beſt to be taken. In which councell the mindes of many were ſo amazed, with the terrour of ſo vnexpected a danger, when they beheld the hils peſtered with armed ſoldiers, the paſſages taken and intercepted by the enemie, and no hope left of any ſuccour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other waie for their ſafetie, then leauing behind them their baggage and impediments, to ſallie out of their campe, and ſo to ſaue themſelues by the ſame waie they came thither: notwithſtanding the greater part concluded, to referre that reſolution to the laſt puſh; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the campe.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHich aduiſe although at this time ſorted to ſmall effect; yet it better ſuted the valour of the Romans, and ſauoured more of tempered magnanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakeneſſe of their mindes, by their ouer haſtie and too forward reſolution. For as it imported greater danger, and diſcouered a more deſperate ſpirit, to breake through the thickeſt troupes of their enemies, and ſo by ſtrong hand to ſaue themſelues by the helpe of ſome other fortune; ſo it manifeſted a greater apprehenſion of terrour, and a ſtronger impreſſion of feare, which can affoord nothing but deſperate remedies: for deſperate and inconſiderate raſhnes riſeth ſooner of feare, then of any other paſſion of the mind. But ſuch as beheld the danger with a leſſe troubled eie and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their ſpirite, reſeruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vpon any enterpriſe the enemie ſhould attempt; they I ſay, ſo gaue greater ſcope to fortune and inlarged the boundes of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The enemie setteth vpon the wintering campe: Galba ouerthroweth them.

Cæsar.

THE councell being dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such thinges, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enemie at a watchword giuen assaulted the campe, on all sides with stones and dartes, and other casting weapons: the Romans at first when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soeuer of their campe seemed to be in greatest danger, and want of helpe, thither they came with succour and relieue; but herein they were ouermatched. For the enemie being spent and wearied with fight, whensoeuer anie of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwaies fresh combatants to supplie it: but the Romans by reason of their small number, had no such helpe. For their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for wearinesse nor woundes, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And hauing thus fought continually the space of sixe houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enemie persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch and breake downe the rampier, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation: P. Sex, Baculus the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to be so sore wounded in the Neruian battell, and Caius Volusenus Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisedome, ranne speedily to Galba and tolde him, that the only waie of safetie was to breake out vpon the enemie, and to trie the last refuge in that extremitie. Whereupon they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease a while from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the campe; and so to rest themselues a little and recouer their strength: and then at a watchword to sallie out of their campe, and laie their safety vpon their vertue; which the souldiers executed with such alacritie and courage of spirite, that breaking out at all the gates of the campe, they gaue no leasure to the enemie to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a noueltie. And thus fortune being suddenly changed, they slewe more then the third part of 30000, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to staie vpon the hils neere about them.

OBSERVATIONS.

The force of noueltie turning the fortune of a battell.

WHich strange alteration liuely describeth the force of noueltie, and the effectuall power of vnexpected aduētures: for in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romans defended the campe, and the Galles charged it by assault, the victorie held constant with the Galles, and threatned death and mortality to the Romans. Neither had they any meanes

meanes to recouer hope of better ſucceſſe, but by trying another waie; which ſo much the more amazed the Galles, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victorie, by a ſet fight continuing the ſpace of ſixe houres, without any likelihood of contrarietie, or alteration. Which practiſe, of fruſtrating a deſſigne intended by an indirect and contrary anſwere, ſerued the Romans oftentimes to great aduantage; as beſides this preſent example, in this Commentarie we ſhall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnellos, with the ſame ſtratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption and ſallying out, when they expected nothing but a defenſiue reſiſtance from the rampier. From whence a commander may learne, to auoide two contrarie incommeniences, according as the qualitie of the warre ſhall offer occaſion: firſt (if other thinges be anſwerable, which a iudicious eie will eaſily diſcouer) that a ſallie made out at diuers portes of a holde, will much mitigate the heate of a charge, and controll the furie of an enemie. And on the other ſide, he that beſiegeth any place what aduantage ſoeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better aſſure himſelfe of good fortune, if he appoint certaine troupes in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the reſt that are buſily imploied in the aſſault may prouide to anſwere it, without diſorder or confuſion. Which order, if the Galles had taken, they had not in likelihood ſo often been deceiued.

CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelli giue occaſion of a new warre.

THE enemie being thus defeated, Galba was vnwilling to trie fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corne and forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next daie he returned towardes the Prouince, and without let or reſiſtance, brought the legion ſafe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the* Allobroga, and there he wintered. Caſar. *Sauoient.

After theſe thinges were diſpatched: Caſar ſuppoſing for manie reaſons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of anie new warre, the Belga being ouerthrowen, the Germans thruſt out, and the Seduni amongſt the Alpes ſubdued and vanquiſhed; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great deſire to ſee thoſe nations: there grewe a ſudden tumult and diſſention in Gallia vpon this occaſion. Pub. Craſſus wintering with the ſeuenth legion in Anion neare vnto the Ocean, and finding ſcarcitie of corne in thoſe partes; he ſent out the Prefects of the horſemen, and Tribunes into the next cities to demaund corne, and other prouiſions for his legion, of whom Titus Terraſidius was ſent vnto the* Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the* Curioſolita, Q. Velanius, and Titus Silius to the* Veneti. Theſe Veneti were of greateſt authoritie amongſt all the maritimate nations in that coaſt, by reaſon of their great ſtore of ſhipping; with *Le Perche. *Cornoaille in Bretaine *Vannet.

which they did trafficke into Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour ſtates in skill and experience of ſea-faring matters; hauing the moſt part of ſuch as vſed thoſe ſeas, tributaries to their ſtate: Theſe Veneti firſt aduentured to retaine Silius and Velanius, hoping thereby to recouer their hoſtages which they had giuen to Craſſus. The finitimate cities induced by their authoritie and example, for the ſame reaſon, laide hold vpon Trebius and Terraſidius; and ſending ſpeedie ambaſſages one vnto another, canuired by their Princes and chiefeſt magiſtrates, to approue their fact by common conſent, and to attend all the ſame euent of fortune; ſolliciting alſo other cities and ſtates, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Anceſtors, then to indure the ſeruile bondage of a ſtranger.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The weakenes of our iudgement in regard of the knowledge of future times.

THe circumſtance in this hiſtorie, which noteth the ſudden breaking out of warres, when the courſe of thinges made promiſe of peace: ſheweth firſt, what ſmall aſſurance our reaſon hath of her diſcourſe, in calculating the natiuitie of *After-chances*; which ſo ſeldome anſwere the iudgment we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we ſpeake of happineſſe, we finde nothing but miſerie: and contrariwiſe, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruel, if when almoſt all nations are at oddes, and in our beſt conceites, threaten deſtruction one to another, there happen a ſudden motion of peace; or if peace be in ſpeech, ſoothing the world with pleaſing tranquilitie, and through the vncertainty of our weake probabilities, promiſe much reſt after many troubles: there follow greater wars in the ende, then the former time can truely ſpeake of. Which being well vnderſtood, may humble the ſpirits of our hautie polititians, that thinke to comprehend the concluſions of future times, vnder the premiſſes of their weake proiectes, and predeſtinate ſucceeding ages, accorto the courſe of the preſent motion: when an accident ſo little thought of, ſhall breake the maine ſtreame of our iudgment, and falſifie the Oracles which our vnderſtanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wiſe commander, to preuent an euill that may croſſe his deſſigne, (how vnlikely ſoeuer it be to happen) by handling it in ſuch manner, as though it were neceſſarily to confront the ſame. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it ſelfe both the cauſes of his being; and the direct meanes to reſiſt the repugnancie of a contrarie nature: and ſo hap what will, it hath great poſſibility to continue the ſame.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THis practiſe of the Veneti may inſtruct a circumſpect Prince in caſes of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eie ouer that Prouince or city, which ſhall be found moſt potent and mightie amongſt the reſt, then of any other inferiour ſtate of the ſame nature and condition: for as example of

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it selfe is of great Authoritie, making improbabilities seeme full of reason, especially when the intention shal sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Acte of superiour personages: it must needes be verie effectuall to stirre vp mens mindes, to approue that with a strong affection, which their owne single iudgment did no waie allow of. And therfore equalitie bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie can not affoord, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same. *The Authority of exãple.*

CHAP. IIII.

Cæsar hauing aduertisement of these new troubles, hasteth into Gallia and prepareth for the warre.

*ALL the maritimate states being by this meanes drawne into the same conspiracie, they sent a common ambassage vnto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deliuer vp the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, in as much as he was then a great way distant from his Armie, he commanded Gallies and shippes of warre to be built vpon the riuer * Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that Gallie men, Mariners, and Shipmasters should be mustered in the Prouince: which being speedely dispatched, assoone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Cæsars arriuall, and considering how haynous a fact they had committed, in detaining the ambassadours and casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred and inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answere so eminent a danger, & especially such necessaries, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.* *Cæsar.* * *Ligeris.*

THE OBSERVATION.

FRom hence I may take occasion, briefely to touch the reuerent opinion, which all nations, howe barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceiued of the qualitie and condition of ambassadours: and what the groundes are of this vniuersall receiued custome, which in all ages, and times hath held Authenticall. And first we are to vnderstand, that all man kinde (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane society; that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselues are vnnaturall, as proceeding from corruption and defect) driue them into extreme discord and disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect: *The groundes of that reuerent opinion which is held of ambassadors.*

yet without a necessarie entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discord it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion, & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bondes of nature, and so powerfull are the lawes which she enacteth. And therfore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vses thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it from falling, making warr, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a law, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the ende of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treatie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seeme so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onelie intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefest obiect, the death and mortality of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill gouernment: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the meanes of amitie and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgment of all nations, as vnworthie of humane societie. Last of all, it is an iniurie of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extreme infamie, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish ambassadours for the faults of their state: considering that their chiefest dutie consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued, which may as well tende to the aduancement and honour of that cittie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire warre or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of ambassadours, is reuerently to be respected, and defended from brutish and vnnaturall violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either partie, in the entrance of this warre.

Caesar.

THE Veneti conceiued great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: for as much as all the passages by land were broken and cut off, with armes and creekes of the sea; and on the other side, nauigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanels, and shelues of the coast. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to be had in those quarters. And if it happened, that the course of thinges were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themselues were strong in shipping: whereas the Romans had none

none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallowes, Portes and Ilands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should finde the vse of Nauigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were accustomed vnto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with prouision, and brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make warre, taking the Osismi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambiliariti, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as confeders and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motiues stirred vp Cæsar to vndertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yeelded themselues by rendrie, and giuen hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so manie cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and states to the like insolencie. And therefore vnderstanding, that almost all the Galles were inclining to noueltie and alteration, and of their owne nature, were quicke and readie to vndertake a warre; and further, considering that all men by nature desired libertie, and hated the seruile condition of bondage: he preuented all further insurrections of the other states, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Caualrie, vnto the *Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rheine: to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes and the rest of the Belgæ, to keepe them in obedience; and to hinder such forces, as might peraduenture be transported ouer the riuer by the Germains, to further this rebellious humour of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12 legionarie cohortes, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolitæ, Vnelli, to disappoint any practise which rebellious mindes might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towardes Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himselfe marched thitherward with the rest of the foote forces.

*Triers.

Lendrignez. Lysieux. Nantes. Aurenche. Leondoul. Cities in little Britaine

Caluis.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first booke, I obserued the authoritie which the Roman leaders had to vndertake a warre, without further acquainting the senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generals had, not to vndertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill and hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect: informed their iudgments of the importance of that action, and so tried whether the benefit would answere their labour. And thus we finde the reasons particularly deliuered, that moued Cæsar first to vndertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the necessitie of that warre with the Belgæ: and nowe the motiues which induced him to this with the maritimate cities of Bretaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germanie, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he lieth

downe

downe as the groundes and occasions of those warres, and could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Galles, and to keepe them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that continent; and so setling the wauering disposition of the further skirtes, with the waight of his Armie, and the presence of his legionarie souldiers, which he sent readie to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the enemie; whom he so little feared concerning the vpshot of that quarrell, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Armie vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

CHAP. VI.

The maner of their shipping, and their sea-fight.

Cæsar.

THE scite of almost all these cities was such, that being built in pointes and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twise in 12 houres, be approched by foot forces, nor yet with shipping neither: for againe in an ebbe, the vessalles were laid on the ground, and so left as a praie to the enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equal to the wals of the town, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey, both themselues and their cariages, into the next townes, and there helpe themselues with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman fleete by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not aduenture to put out of the riuer Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, and the tides great. The shipping of the Galles was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Roman shipping, the better to beare the ebbes, and shalowes of that coast: the foredecke was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the hugenesse of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for the ribbes and seates were made of beames of a foote square, fastned with yron pins of an inch thicke: in steed of cables, they vsed chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant of the vse thereof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman nauie, with this kinde of ships was such, that they onely excelled them in celeritie and speedie nimblenes, with force of oares; but in all other thinges, either concerning the nature of the place, or the dangers of the foule weather, were farre inferiour vnto them: for the strength of them was

such,

such, that they could neither hurt them with their beake-heads, nor cast a weapon to anie purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if anie gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselues to the mercie of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safetie shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chances the Roman nauie stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATIONS.

The causes of the ebbing and flowing of the sea.

AND here, let it not seeme impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulairs haue of nauigation, briefly to set downe the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seeme necessarie to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularitie, and well approued rules in our Arte of nauigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heauens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancie of motion, we esteeme of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalistes chiefly vnderstand celestiall influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is deuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betweene the east horizon and the noone meridian, which they cal a flowing quarter: the second, from the noone meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and againe, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrarie effects, are the sunne and the moone, as they are caried through these distinct partes of the heauen. And although experience hath noted the moone to be of greatest power in watrie motions; yet we may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therfore we are to vnderstand, that when the moone or the sunne begin to appeare aboue the right horizon, and enter into that part of the heauen which I tearmed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high floud. And againe, as those lightes passing the meridian, decline to the west, and runne the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth and returneth againe from whence it came. Againe, as they set vnder the west ho-

rizon and enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth againe to flow, and still increaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then againe, it refloweth, according as the sunne and moone are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the east horizon.

Spring tides. And hence it happeneth that in coniunction or new of the moone, when the sunne and the moone are caried both together in the same flowing, and ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebbes are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moone, when these lightes are caried in opposite quarters, which we haue described to be of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, doe ioyne their forces, to make perfect this worke of nature in the ebbing and flowing of the sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moone is caried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sunne doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of nature doth necessarily require: then are the tides lessoned, as dailie experience doth witnesse.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, deuide euerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moone maketh in their reuolutions, into equall parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantitie of 6 houres: and therfore that which Cæsar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12 houres, there are alwaies 2 high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland citie, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule; let him vnderstand that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceiued principally of the sea it selfe; and secondarily of such portes and hauens, as stand either neare or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought conuenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing and flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

The manner of their shipping. Concerning the shipping of the Romans, whereof posteritie hath onely receiued the bare names, and some fewe circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critickes of these times haue laboured to set foorth a fleet, answerable to that, which the tearmes and title mentioned in historie seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answere their charge. For manie men rest vnsatisfied, first touching the names themselues, whereof wee finde these kindes,

Names { *Longas.* *Onerarias.* *Actuarias.* *Triremes.* *Quadriremes.* *Quinqueremes.*

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second ships

of

of burthen: the third, ſhips that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the reſt ſounding according to their Names; for I dare not intitle them with a more particular deſcription. Nowe whether theſe Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a ſeuerall ſorte of ſhipping by themſelues; or the generall Names of the *Quadriremes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, for as much as euerie kinde of theſe might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*, as it yet remaineth in controuerſie: ſo it is not much materiall to that which wee ſeeke after. But that which moſt troubleth our ſea-Critickes, is in what ſenſe they maie vnderſtand theſe vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadriremes*, and *Quinqueremes*, whether they were ſo tearmed in regard of the number of rowers, or watermen that haled continually at an oare, as the cuſtome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwiſe, becauſe a *Trireme* had three orders of oares on either ſide, a *Quadrireme* foure, and a *Quinquereme* fiue: whereof they tooke their diſtinction of Names.

Such as holde, that a *Trireme* had on each ſide three rankes of oares, and ſo conſequently, of a *Quadrireme* and *Quinquereme*; alleadge this place of Liuie, to make good their opinion. In the warres betweene Rome and Carthage, Lælius meeting with Adherball in the ſtraightes of Gibraltar, each of them had a *Quinquereme*, and ſeauen or eight *Triremes* a piece, the current in that place was ſo great that it gaue no place to Arte, but carried the veſſailes according to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertaintie the *Triremes* of the Carthaginean, cloſed with the *Quinquereme* of Lælius: which either becauſe ſhe was *pondere tenacior*, as Liuie ſaith, or otherwiſe, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus ſcindentibus vertices facilius regeretur*; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which reſiſted the billowe and ſteamed the current, ſhe ſunke two of the *Triremes*, and ſo got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a *Quinquereme* had *plures remorum ordines*, then a *Trireme* had; and therefore it tooke the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare. *Lib. 27.*

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret *Ordo Remorum*, to be a couple of oares one anſwering another, on each ſide of the veſſaile, which we call a paire of oares: So that a *Quinquereme* being far greater and longer then a *Trireme*, had more paires of oares then a *Trireme* had, and thoſe oares were handled with fiue men at one oare, according to the vſe of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this, and come to their manner of ſea-fights, wee muſt vnderſtand that the Romans, wanting the vſe of Artillerie and managing their ſhips of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vſe of their Arte, in their conflictes and incounters by ſea: for all their ſhippes of ſeruice, which we tearme men of warre, carried a ſtrong beake-head of yron, which they called *roſtrum*, with which they ranne one againſt another, with as great violence and furie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Arte gaue great aduantage; for he that could beſt skill to turne his ſhip, with greateſt celeritie, and ſo fruſtrate an offer; or with ſpeedie and ſtrong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victorie. *Their maner of ſea fights.*

In the battell, which D. Brutus had with the Maſſilians, we reade that two *Lib. 2. de bello ciuili.*

Triremes charging the Admirall, wherein Brutus was one at the one ſide, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Marriners ſo cunningly handled the matter, that when they ſhould come to the hurt, they ſpeedily in a trice of time, wound themſelues from betweene them, and the two Triremes met with ſuch a carriere one againſt another, that one brake her beakehead, and the other ſplit with the blowe.

For this skill and fortune withall, Euphranor the Rodian was of great fame in Cæſars time; although his ende found too true the ſaying of the Hiſtorian, that Whom fortune honoureth with many good haps, ſhe oftentimes reſerueth to a harder deſtinie; as other ſeamen beſides Euphranor, can truely witneſſe.

This firſt brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boording one of another, then the art and practiſes of their land ſeruices came in vſe: for they erected turrets vpon their deckes, and from them they fought with engines and caſting weapons, as ſlinges, arrowes, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with ſword and target. Neither did the legionarie ſouldier finde any difference, when he came to the point, betweene their fight at ſea and that at land: ſauing that they could not be martialed in troupes and bandes, in regard wherof the ſea ſeruice was counted more baſe, and diſhonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuerſie, by ſlinges and caſting weapons: which kinde of fight was of leſſe honour, then buckling at handy-blowes.

CHAP. VII.

The battell continueth; and Cæſar ouercommeth.

Cæſar.

THE maner of their fightes being this, as I haue deſcribed, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his nauie, knewe what to doe or what courſe of fight to take: for the ſhipping of the Galles was ſo ſtrong, that the beake-head of their Quinqueremes could performe no ſeruice vpon them: and although they ſhould raiſe turrets according to their vſe, yet theſe would not equall in height the poupe of the enemies ſhipping, ſo that therein alſo the Galles had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might foile ſo great a nauie, which amounted to the number of 230 ſhippes of warre. One thing there was amongſt their proviſions which ſtood them in great ſteed: for the Romans had prouided great ſharpe hookes or ſickles, which they put vpon great and long poles, theſe they faſtened to the tackling which held the maine yarde to the maſt; and then haling away their ſhip, with force of Oares, they cutte the ſaid tackling, and the maine yard fell downe: Whereby the Galles, whoſe onely hope conſiſted in ſayling and yare turning of their ſhips, loſt at one inſtant, both their ſailes and the vſe of their ſhipping: And then the controuerſie fell within the compaſſe of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gals; and the rather, inaſmuch as they fought in the ſight of Cæſar and

and the whole Armie, no valiant act could be ſmothered in ſecret; for all the hilles and clifts, which affoorded neare proſpect into the ſea, were couered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yardes being cutte downe, and the Romans indeuouring with great furie to boord them, failed not to take manie of their ſhips: which the Galles perceiuing, and finding no remedie nor hope of reſiſtance, began all to flie, & turning their ſhips to a forewind, were vpon a ſudden ſo becalmed, that they were able to make no waie at all. Which fell out ſo fitly for the Romans, that of ſo great a nauie, verie few through the helpe of the euening eſcaped to land, after they had fought the ſpace of 8 houres: with which battell, ended the warre with the Veneti, and the reſt of the maritimate nations. For all ſort of people both young and olde, in whom there was either courage, counſell, or dignitie, were preſent at this battell, and all their ſhipping was taken and loſt; ſo that ſuch as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their townes any longer: and therefore yeelded themſelues to Cæſar, in whom he vſed the greater ſeueritie, that he might thereby teach all other barbarous people, not to violate the law of nations: for he ſlew all the Senat with the ſword, and ſolde the people for bondſlaues.

THE OBSERVATION.

The force of induſtrie.

IN this battell I chiefly obſerue the good fortune, which vſually attendeth vpon induſtrie: for amongſt other prouiſions, which the diligence of the Romans had furniſhed out to the vſe of this war, they had made readie theſe hookes, not for this intent wherin they were imploied, but at all occaſions & chances, that might happen, as ſeruiceable complements rather then principall inſtruments: and yet it ſo fell out, that they proued the only meanes, to ouerthrow the Galles. Which proueth true the ſaying of Cæſar, that induſtrie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good ſucceſſe, with extraordinary labour: for induſtrie in action is as importunitie in ſpeech, which forceth an aſſent beyond the ſtrength of reaſon; and ſtriueth through continuall purſuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that diſpoſition, which will eaſily admit whatſoeuer is required: In like manner diligence and labourſome induſtrie, by circumſpect and heedefull cariage, ſeldome faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For euerie action is intangled with many infinite adherents, which are ſo intereſſed in the matter, that it ſucceedeth according as it is carried anſwerable to their natures. Of theſe adherentes, ſome of them are by wiſedome, foreſeene; and directed to that courſe which may fortunate the action: the reſt being vnknowne, continue without either direction or preuention, and are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyonde the compaſſe of our wiſeſt reach, and ſtand in the waie either to aſſiſt or diſaduantage: Of theſe, induſtrie hath greateſt authoritie; in as much as ſhe armeth her ſelfe for all chances, whereby ſhe is ſaid to command fortune.

CHAP. VIII.

Sabinus ouerthroweth the * Vnelli, with the manner thereof.

* La Perche.

Cæsar.

WHILE *theſe things happened in the ſtate of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entereth with his forces, into the confines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridouix was made chiefe commander, hauing drawne the* * *Aulerci and the* * *Eburonices, with a great number of vagabondes and theeues into the ſame conſpiracie: Sabinus incamping himſelfe in a conuenient place, kept his ſouldiers within the rampier. But Viridouix, being lodged within leſſe then two miles of Sabinus his campe, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him oportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus refuſed in ſuch ſort, that he began not onely to be ſuſpected by the enemie of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reprochfull ſpeeches of his owne ſouldiers; which opinion of feare being once ſetled in the mindes of the enemie, he vſed all meanes to increaſe it, and caried it ſo wel, that the enemie durſt approch the verie rampier of the campe. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the abſence of the Generall, to fight with an enemie of that ſtrength, but vpon ſome good oportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perſwaſion of feare, Sabinus choſe out a ſubtile witted Gall, whom he perſwaded with great rewards, and further promiſes, to flie to the enemie, and there to carrie himſelfe, according to the inſtructions, which he ſhould giue him. This Gall, comming as a reuolter to the enemy, laide open vnto them the feare of the Romans: the extremitie that Cæſar was driuen into by the Veneti; and that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces ſecretly out of his campe, and to make all the haſte he could to relieue Cæſar. Vpon which aduertiſement, they all cried out with one conſent, that this oportunity was not to be omitted; but ſetting apart all other deuiſes, to go and aſſault the Roman campe. Many circumſtances perſwaded the Galles to this reſolution; as firſt the lingering & doubt which Sabinus had made, when he was offered battell: ſecondly the intelligence which this fugitiue had brought: thirdly the want of victuals, wherein they had bin negligent and vnaduiſedly careleſſe: fourthly the hope they conceiued of the warre of Vannes; and laſtly, for that men willingly beleeue that which they would haue come to paſſe. The force of theſe motiues was ſo ſtrong, that they would not ſuffer Viridouix, nor the reſt of the captaines, to diſmiſſe the councell vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and go to the Roman campe. Which being granted, they gathered rubbiſh and fagots to fill vp the ditch, and with cheerefull harts, as though the victorie were alreadie gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped, which was the toppe of a hill riſing gently from a leuell, the quantitie of 1000 paces: hither the Gals haſted with all expedition; and to the intent the Romans might not haue ſo much time, as to put on their armour, the Galles for haſte ran themſelues out of breath.*

* Rhone.
* Eureux.

Sabinus

Sabinus incouraging his ſouldiers, gaue the ſigne of battell, and ſallying out at two ſeuerall gates of his campe, it fell out that through the oportunitie of the place, the wearines and vnexperience of the enemie, the valour of the Roman ſoldier and their exerciſe in former battels, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the firſt incounter; but preſently tooke themſelues to flight, of whom verie few eſcaped. And ſo it happened that at one time, Sabinus had newes of the ouerthrow at ſea; and Cæſar of Sabinus victory by land. Vpon theſe victories, all the cities and ſtates yeelded themſelues to Titurius: for as the Galles are prompt to vndertake a warre, ſo are they weake in ſuffering, and impatient of the conſequents and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis practiſe of a counterfeit feare was often put in vſe by the Roman leaders, as well to diſappoint the expectation of an enemie, as to draw them into an inconuenience, & ſo to defeat them of their greateſt helpes in time of battell. Cæſar comming to ſuccour the campe of Cicero made ſuch vſe of this Art, that he put to route a great Armie of the Galles, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly ſet downe by Cæſar.

The vſe which the Romans made of a counterfeit feare. Lib. 5.

The chiefeſt thing in this place, which brought them to their ouerthrow, was diſappointment: for it is a thing hardly to be digeſted in buſineſſes of ſmal conſequence, to be fruſtrated of a ſetled expectation, when the minde ſhall diſpoſe her ſelfe to one only intent, and in the vpſhot meete with a counterbuffe to croſſe her purpoſes, and ſo defeat her of that hope which the ſtrength of her reaſon hath entertained: how much more then in things of ſuch importance, when we ſhall proceede in a courſe of victorie, and humour our conceites with that we wiſh and would haue to happen; and in the end meete, either with bondage or death; muſt our beſt wittes be appauled? hauing neither reſpite nor means, to thinke how the euill may be beſt preuented. Which the wiſe Romans well vnderſtood, and counted it no diſhonour to be reproched with ſhamefull cowardice, by ſuch as knew not the ſecrets of wiſedome; while they in the meane time foreſaw their good fortunes, ſhrowded vnder the cloake of a pretended diſtruſt.

Let theſe examples inſtruct a leader, ſo to take the oportunitie of any ſuch fortune, that in the execution he omit not the chiefeſt points of order and diſcipline, as well for the better effecting of the deſſigne, as for his owne ſafety and the ſecuritie of his Armie. For order is as the ſinewes and ſtrength of martiall diſcipline, vniting the particular members into the firme compoſition of a well proportioned bodie: and ſo it maketh it more powerfull then any number of diſunited partes, how able or infinite ſoeuer. I might here alleadge infinite examples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux ſerue for all; wherein the proteſtantes ouercharging the catholike Army, followed the retrait ſo hard, that they quickly became maſters of the field: and then neglecting martiall diſcipline, fell in confuſedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more

glorious

glorious by ſlaughter and mortalitie: the Duke of Guiſe all this while bouged not a foot: but in vnexampled patience kept his regiment cloſe together, and would not ſuffer them to reſcue their general that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewiſe diſperſed and broken; and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the Victor Proteſtant, and the vanquiſhed Catholike; he diſſolued that terrible cloud that had hung ſo long in ſuſpence, and ſo changing the fortune of the daie, that he tooke the chiefeſt of their Princes priſoners, with little or no loſſe of his owne men: ſo powerfull is order in the deedes of Armes, and of ſuch conſequence in obtaining victorie. And thus we haue firſt ſeene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well diſſembled, may caſt vpon a credulous and vnaduiſed enemie, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an errour, which their owne credulitie doth afterward auouch: and ſecondly, what ſtrength and ſafetie conſiſteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to ſet vp.

CHAP. IX.

The Proceedings of Craſſus in Aquitanie.

Cæſar.

*AT the ſame inſtant of time it happened alſo, that Pub. Craſſus comming into Aquitania, (which both in regard of the large extenſion of the country, as alſo for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and conſidering that he was to make warre in thoſe partes, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was ſlaine, and the Armie ouerthrowen; and where Lucius Manilius was faine to flie with the loſſe of his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therfore hauing made prouiſion of corne, and muſtered many Auxiliarie forces, and ſent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouſe and Narbone, he caried his Army into the confines of the * Sontiates, which was no ſooner knowne but they leuied great forces both of horſe & foote, and with their horſe charged vpon the Romans in their march: which being eaſily repelled, as they followed the retrait, the infanterie of the Galles ſhewed it ſelfe in a valley as it laie in ambuſh. Theſe ſetting vpon the Romans renewed the battell, and there the fight continued hot a long time; the Sontiates being animated with the former victories, ſaw all the hope of Aquitanie relie vpon their vertue: and the Romans on the other ſide, deſired to ſhew what they were able to doe of themſelues, without their grand Captaine, and vnder the conduction of a young ſouldier: At length the enemy ouerwaged with proweſſe, and wearied with woundes, betooke themſelues to flight; of whom the Romans ſlewe a great number. And then marched directlie to the towne of the Sontiates, and laid ſiege vnto it; the ſiege grew hot on both ſides; the Romans approched the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts: the townesmen defended themſelues ſome time, by ſallying out; ſometimes, by vnderminting the mounts and fortifications, wherin the Aquitani are very skilfull. But when they perceiued the induſtry of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Craſſus to accept their rendry: which*

* *Enocati.*

which being granted, and al the armie intending the deliuery of their Armes; Adcantuanus their chiefe magistrate, fled out in the meane time at an other port of the citie, with 600. deuoted companions whom they called Soldurij: but as they attempted to escape, the soldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his euasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betooke themselues to armes; and so repelled him againe into the towne, where he desired to bee taken in the number of the submissiue multitude. Crassus hauing taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the Vocontij.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THese skilfull and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all the Cities in Aquitaine, were those, whom the Romans called *Euocati*: such as were free from warfare, and exempted by their lawes from giuing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeares, or the magistracy which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priuiledge: And in that regard were sent for by letters, intreating their assistance in the cariage of that war, as men wel acquainted with the nature of such businesses. Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction, although they had no part in command or authority. *Euocati.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN this fight we may further obserue, their maner of defence against Mountes, and Caualieros; which we find chiefly to bee mines. Iosephus in the Iewish warre saith, that the Romans hauing raised an exceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art, that as they digged vnderneath, they supported the mount with huge props and planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage, they set all the timber worke, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire, which taking fire with the helpe of brimstone and pitch, the mount fell vpon a sodaine, to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

At the siege of *Auricum*, we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take the earth from the mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most parte made of woode, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all meanes to burne it; as it happened at the siege of Massilia: and oftentimes when both burning and vndermining failed, they confronted it, with an other mount within the walles, to disappoint the disaduantage by equall contesting of it; and so made it vnprofitable. Concerning mines, this much may I saie, without preiudice to that Art: that the chiefest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a dessigned place, which is best got by instrument and helpe of Geometrie, where other markes of certainty are wanting: secondlie, the direction of the myne, that wee may not erre in our course which the compasse affoordeth: thirdlie, the strengthening of the mine with timber worke, *Lib. 7. de bello Gall.*

if neede require: laſtly, the countermining and croſſemeeting: All which parts haue very many circumſtances, and require a larger diſcourſe, then may bee thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe ſtrange contract betweene theſe Soldurij, and their chiefetaine, may wel deſerue a place amongſt theſe obſeruations, eſpeciallie conſidering the obligatorie conditions, which either party ſtood bound to obſerue: for the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatſoeuer ill chance or diſaſter ſhoulde happen to befall him. If death, which is the laſt end of all ſenſuall miſerie, tooke hold of their head, theſe deuoted were tied voluntarilie to follow him the ſelfe ſame way: neither in any memory was there euer man found, that refuſed to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be ſlaine. Which bloudy league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the courſe of nature, multiplying particular deſtinie to a generall calamitie: ſo was it dangerous in a well ordered ſtate, if the ringleader were either ambitious, or ſought to practiſe any thing contrarie to good gouernement: for hee himſelfe would preſume much vpon the aſſiſtance of his Soldurij; and they on the other ſide, muſt needs wiſh well to his attempts that were ſo intereſſed in his life & death.

CHAP. X.

The Galles raiſe new forces, againſt Craſſus.

Cæſar.

THe barbarous Galles were much troubled, that a towne of that ſtrength ſhould ſo ſoone bee taken; and therefore they ſent ambaſſadours into all quarters, coniured one with another, confirmed their couenants with mutuall hoſtages, and leuied what power they were able to make: ſending for aide out of Spaine, and from other ſtates that bordered vpon Aquitaine; at the comming of theſe forces they began to make warre, with a great power, and with many ſoldiours of great fame. For they appointed ſuch leaders as had ſeene the experience of Sertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the arte militarie: theſe according to the cuſtome of the people of Rome, beganne to take places of aduantage, to fortifie their campe, and to intercept the Romaines from free paſſage of conuoies, and neceſſary entercourſes. Which when Craſſus perceiued, and conſidering withall, that his owne forces were ſo few, that hee could not well diſmember them vpon any ſeruice or aduantage; and that the enemy went out at his pleaſure, kept the paſſages, and left notwithſtanding, a ſufficient gariſon in his campe; by which meanes their corne and prouiſion would in time grow ſcarce, and the enemy waxed euery daie ſtronger: he thought it his beſt courſe not to linger any longer, but preſently to giue them battel.

The

The matter being referd to a councel of warre, when hee vnderſtoode that all men were of the ſame opinion, he appointed the next daie to giue them battaile; and in the dawning putting his men in a double battaile, and placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middeſt, he attended to ſee what the enemy would doe. The Galles, although they were perſuaded, that they might aduenture battel both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowes of warre, as alſo in reſpect of the paucitie of the Romains; yet they thought it better to blocke vp the paſſages, and ſo cut off all cariages, and conuoies of corne; and ſo the victory would follow without bloudſhed: and if the Romans for want of corne ſhould offer to make a retreit, they would then ſet vpon them as they marched, wearied with trauell, and heauilie laden with their burthens. This reſolution being approued by the whole councell of the Galles, when the Romans imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their campe.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

THis Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder and yonger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote againſt Pompeie and Metellus; and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in the end was trecherouſly ſlaine by Perpanna at a banket. He was a man of great ſpirit, and of admirable diſpatch; and vnder him were theſe captaines brought vp, which Cæſar commendeth for their skil in armes. *Sertorius.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN hiſtories, propounding to our conſideration the deedes and moniments of former ages, we may obſerue two eſpeciall meanes, which the great commanders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victory, and ouermaſter their enemies: the firſt by cunning and wiſe cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the ſecond, by forceable meanes & waging of battel; the one proceeding from wiſdom and the better faculties of the ſoule; and the other depending vpon the ſtrength and ability of the body. Concerning the firſt, it hath euer bin held more honorable, as better ſuting the worth of the ſpirit and the diuine eſſence of our nature, ſo to direct the courſe of an action, that the aduerſe part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the proiects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occaſions, & ſo through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuerſie before they come to blowes, & conclude the matter by tearmes of arte, taken from the directions of good prouidence. For to ſpeake a truth, the action of battel, as it is the laſt part in that faculties; ſo it is the worſt in regarde of chriſtian duty, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his ſecond wife, which the Diuines do note to be borne to the ruine and deſtruction of mankind, then the children of grace, whoſe ioy conſiſteth in peace and loue.

Two meanes to atchieue victorie and to ouermaſter their enemies

Tubalcaine by war and Naamah by the flood.

Cæsar in the first of the ciuill warres respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for hauing shut vp Afranius, and Petreius in a place of disaduantage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enemie: *Cur etiam secundo prælio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optime de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunam periclitaretur?* And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Arte, and the Romaine industry; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romains at their owne weapon. This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest waie in these vncertaine and casual euentes: for that which resteth vpon corporall strength, and maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is verie terrible euen to the better party, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For it were a miracle of fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoeuer, that the victor army shoulde buie so great a fortune without bloudshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophee to honour at the sole cost of the enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure. And for the vncertaintie in a battell, who knoweth not what infinite chances and changes may happen in euery small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that party, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy and sorrow? and therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the waie-wardnes of fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires. This I say is chiefely to be imbraced, if our meanes wil affoord vs that happinesse: but howsoeuer I holde it wisedome so to entertaine this course of victorie, that we omit not the chiefest helpes of furtherance when it commeth to blowes, but to thinke of this conquest by arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discreete cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the latter, and by the helpe of battell, sought to free himselfe from those disaduantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

Not to forgo an aduantage

We Obserue further out of this place, that what course soeuer be taken, a discreet leader wil not easily forgo an aduantage, without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certainty of a benefit, vpon probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For so he might forgo his fortune by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are oftner seene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

THE

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

FVrther I obſerue, this double battell to be anſwerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for their vſuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the firſt might haue a ſecond, and a third helpe: but where their number would not affoord that commoditie, they then made two battels, that there might be the ſuccour of a ſecond ſupplie. But they neuer fought with one ſingle battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their hiſtories.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

THe laſt thing which I obſerue, is the place, where Craſſus beſtowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the diſpoſition of his troupes to battell; which is here ſaid to be, in *mediam Aciem*: for as their Armies were diuided into three battels; ſo euerie battell was deuided into three parres; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein theſe Auxiliarie forces were in this ſeruice beſtowed: of theſe he afterward ſaith, that in as much as he durſt not put any confidence in them, he commanded them to ſerue the Romans in time of battell, with ſtones and weapons, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount. The reaſon why ſuſpected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battell hath not ſuch ſcope to fling out, or take aduantage of place to doe miſchiefe, as the cornets haue: for whereſoeuer there hath boene ſet battels fought, the ſtrength of their armie conſiſted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall inſtruments of the battell; and as long as theſe ſtood ſound, the victorie went alwaies certaine on that part: for the cornets kept the enemie both from incompaſſing about the bodie of their Armie, and had the aduantage alſo of charging vpon the open ſide of their aduerſarie. At the battell of Cannas Hanniball put the weakeſt of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemie, left the two cornets behind: ſo that, when the enemie came to charge vpon the battell, they eaſily beat them backe, and as they followed the retrait fell in betweene the two cornets, wherein the ſtrength of the Armie conſiſted, and being by them incompaſſed on each ſide, were defeated and ouerthrowen. And thus we ſee the aduantage which a Generall hath, when his two cornets ſtand firme; although the battell ſhrinke in the incounter. Hanniball in the battell he had with Scipio in Africke, placed the ſtrangers in the front and in the rereward, according peraduenture as he found their number and the vſe of their Armes, which are circumſtances to be conſidered in this caſe, and depend rather vpon the iudgment of a generall, then of anie preſcription that can be giuen in this matter.

The place where ſuſpected forces are beſt beſtowed in battell.

CHAP. XI.

Crassus taketh the campe of the Galles: and with their ouerthrow endeth that warre.

Cæsar.

CRASSVS vnderstanding their drift, and finding his men willing to set vpon their campe, incouraged his soldiers; and to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: and as some began to fill vp the ditch; and others with casting weapons to beate the Galles from the rampier, he commanded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom he had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the soldiers that fought, and to carrie earth and turfe to the mount; that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy began valiantly to make resistance, and to caste their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Roman souldier; the horsemen in the meane time riding about the campe of the Galles, brought worde to Crassus that the rampier at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the commanders of the horse, to incourage their men with great promises and rewardes; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, tooke foure cohorts that were left in the campe, and carrying them a further waie about, that they might not be discouered by the enemy; while all mens eies and mindes were intent vpon the fight, they speedely came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsmen had found to be weake, which being easily broken down, they had entered the campe before the enemie could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour & shout being heard about that place, the Roman legions renuing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, began to charge them a fresh with great furie: the Galles being circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselues ouer the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But for as much as the country was open and champion, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of 50000 there scarce remaineth the fourth part.

THE OBSERVATION.

Lib. 3. Auertimento secundo.

FRom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, how an enemie that is strongly incamped, and for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great cõsequence, in matter of warre: and therefore deserueth due consideration. Concerning which he laieth this downe for a maxime, that all forts and strong holds are taken by the foot, and that campes and lodgings are taken by the head: By which

which is meant, that he who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and prouided, must first get the foot and take hold of the ditch; and then sease himselfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for he saith, that mounts and eminent eleuations are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouertop them; which may be easily preuented by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall carie his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouertop the holdes. But all campes and lodgings are taken by the head: That is, by mountes and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height command the champion. For he holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemie shall make without. This foundation being laide, he proceedeth to discouer a waie, how to raise a mount maugre the enemie, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murther them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar at the siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geometricians call Helicall; by this double ditch, he maketh his approch to anie place of most aduantage, where he maie in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to plaie vpon any quarter of the campe. The censure of this practise, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme in the behalfe of these workes, that they were of high esteeme amongst the Romans, when daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to finde out the readiest meanes, both for security and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these workes, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practises: but our men had rather flie vpon desperat aduentures, and seeke victory in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

Lib. de bello Gallico.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar vndertaketh the warre with the *Menapij and Morini.*

AT the same time also, although the sommer was almost at an end, yet for as much as all Gallia was in peace, and the Morini only with the* Menapij stood out in armes, and had neuer either sent ambassadour, or otherwise treated of peace; Cæsar thinking that warre might quickly be ended, lead his Armie into their country. At his comming, he found them to carrie the wars farre otherwise, then the rest of the Galles had done: for vnderstanding that the greatest nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Romans, were beaten and ouerthrowen; and hauing whole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuaied both themselues and their goods into those quarters:*

Cæsar

Cæsar.
** Teroüine*
** Cleue and Gueldres.*

Cæſar comming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his campe, not diſcouering any enemy neare about him; but as his men were diſpearſed in their charges, they ſuddenly ſallied out of the woods and aſſaulted the Romans; but being ſpeedely driuen in againe with the loſſe of manie of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, had ſome few of their men ſlaine. The time that remained, Cæſar reſolued to ſpend in cutting downe the woods; and leaſt the ſouldiers might bee taken vnawares, while they were buſied in that worke, he cauſed them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either ſide of the Armie; that they might ſerue for a defence, againſt ſudden aſſaultes. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies; ſo that their goods and cattell was taken by the Romans: but they themſelues were fled into thicker woods. At which time there happened ſuch a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue of the worke; and the ſouldiers could no longer indure, to lie in tentes of skins: and therefore Cæſar, after he had waſted and ſpoiled their country, burned their townes, and their houſes; he carried backe his Armie, and placed them in ſuch citties to winter in, as were ſubdued by the late warres.

OBSERVATIONS.

THe Iriſh rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogs, doe entertaine the like courſe of warre, as the Morini did with Cæſar: the meanes which he vſed to diſappoint them of that practiſe, was to cutte downe the woods, which if it be thought monſtrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of warre; let them conſider that the Roman diſcipline wrought greater effectes of valour, then can bee made credible by the vſe of theſe times. For beſides their exquiſite diſcipline, which of it ſelfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampled magnanimitie; their induſtrie was admirable in the execution thereof, and carried it with ſuch vnceſſant trauell, that the ſouldiers thought it great happines when they came to wage battell with the enemie; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the hazard of their liues. Neither let it ſeeme ſtrange, that the Romans vndertooke to cut down the woods; but rather let vs admire their facilitie in ſo difficult a taske: for as the hiſtorie witneſſeth: *magno ſpacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate:* a great quantitie of ground was rid in a few daies with incredible ſpeede. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each ſide of the legions, to hinder anie ſudden aſſault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deſerueth as great admiration, as the former part. There is another place in the ſixt booke of theſe Commentaries, which expreſſeth more particularly the nature of ſuch warres, and may ſerue to acquaint vs with that which Cæſar did in theſe difficulties.

The Eburones or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods and bogges, and made vſe of them in the warre they had with Cæſar: The matter (ſaith hee) required great diligence, not ſo much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie, (for there could no danger come from an enemie that was frighted and diſperſed) as the ſafetie of euerie particular ſouldier, which in part did pertaine

pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For the desire of bootie caried manie of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to go either thicke together or close imbattailed. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to bee rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, and deuide his men into many bodies: but if hee would haue the maniples to keepe at their ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Roman Army required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the enemie: neither did they want courage to laie ambushments, and to circumuent such as they found alone, stragling from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; prouiding rather to be wanting in the offensiue part (although all mens mindes were set on fire with reuenge) then to hurt the enemie with the losse of the Roman souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering states, to come out and sacke the Eburones, and they should haue all the praie for their labour: that the life of the Galles rather then his legionarie souldiers might be hazarded in those woods; as also that, with so great a multitude, both the race and name of that people might bee quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true motion of the Irish warres, which may be better obserued by such as know those warres by experience, then by my selfe that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to preuent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases: I will leaue it to be done by themselues. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.

THE FOVRTH COMMENTARIE.

THE ARGVMENT.

THE Vsipetes, and Tenchtheri are driuen to seeke newe seates in Gallia; they driue the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are ouerthrowen by Cæsar. That warre being ended, he made a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carried his Armie ouer into Germanie. He taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri; and giueth libertie to the Vbij: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Britanie, with the occurrences of that warre.

CHAP. I.

The *Vsipetes, and *Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, ouer the Rhene into Gallia: the nature of the Sueui.

*Those of Zutphen.
*Of Hassia.

Cæsar.

THE winter following, Pompeie and Crassus being Consuls, the Vsipetes and Tenchtheri, two Germaine nations, passed ouer the Rhene, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their flitting, was the ill intreatie, which for manie yeares together they had receiued of the Sueui, the greatest & warlikest nation amongst the Germains. For these Sueui had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearely furnished their warres, with 1000 men a piece; and kept as manie at home to maintaine both themselues, and their Armies abroad: and these the yeare following were in Armes; and the other staied at home, and performed the like dutie; and so by this meanes, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and matter of warre. They liued chiefly vpon cattell and milke, and vsed much hunting, which was the cause (what through the qualitie of their diet, their continuall exercise, and libertie of life, being neuer tied to any discipline, nor vrged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong and of a large stature, vsing skins and hides for their cloathing, which couered but part of their body, the rest being naked. Their horsmen oftentimes, in time of battell, forsooke their horse, and fought on foot;

being

being taught to ſtand ſtill in one place, that when they would they might returne vnto them. Neither was there any thing more baſe, or diſhoneſt in the courſe of their life, then to vſe furniture for horſes: & would aduenture to charge vpon great troupes of horſe, that vſed Equipage, with a few of their owne qualitie. They admitted no wine to be brought in vnto them, leaſt it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them vnapt for labour. The greateſt honour in their opinion, was to haue their bordering Territories lie waſt and deſolate: for ſo it would be thought, that manie ſtates together, would not reſiſt their conquering valour: and it was reported, that the country laie waſt from them one waie 600 miles together.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practiſe of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked reſolution of valour auaileth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuill diſcretion, to make vſe of that greatneſſe which proweſſe hath obtained: for notwithſtanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were ſo vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it ſorted to no other ende, then to maintaine barbariſme at home, and deſolation abroad; where as true valour is alwaies ſubordinate to the preſeruation of common weales, and is as the defenſiue armes of ciuill ſocietie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it reſembleth an humour that aboundeth in this age, eſpecially in the particular hauiour of our young galants, whoſe naked valour reuelling it ſelfe onely in the lie and in the ſtabbe, for want of other aſſiſtant vertues to temper the heat of ſo brittle a mettall, leadeth them into ſuch inconueniences and diſordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddie headed raſhneſſe; and in lieue of vertues guerdon, is repaide with irriſion.

CHAP. II.

The motiues, inducing the Vſipetes to come ouer the Rhene into Gallia.

NEXT vnto theſe Sueui, inhabited the Vbij, a very ample and potent ſtate: and through their entercourſe and trafficke with marchants, ſomewhat more ciuill, then the reſt of the Germans. With theſe, the Sueui had often waged battell: and albeit they could not expell them out of their country, foraſmuch as their ſtate was very great and populous; yet by continuall incurſions they brought them vnder, and much weakned their eſtate. In the ſame caſe were the Vſipetes and Tenchtheri: for hauing made head againſt the Sueui Caſar.

for many yeares together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three yeares through the continent of Germanie, at last they arriued where the *Menapij inhabited the bankes, on both sides the riuer Rhene: but being terrified with the arriuall of such a multitude, they forsooke all their dwellings beyond the riuer, and planted themselues on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

*Geldres and Cleeue.

The Vsipetes with their associates, hauing tried all meanes, and not finding themselues able to passe ouer by force, for want of boates; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapij, fained a retrait to their olde habitation: and after three daies iourney, their horsemen in one night speedely returned againe, and slew the Menapij, both vngarded and vnprouided. For they vpon the departure of the Germans, feared not to returne ouer the riuer into their townes and houses: these being slaine, and their shipping taken, they got ouer the riuer, before the rest of the Menapij had anie notice of their comming: by which meanes they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and liued that winter vpon the prouision they found there.

Cæsar vnderstanding of these thinges, and fearing the weakenesse of the Galles, in as much as they are sudden and quicke in their resolutions, and withall desirous of nouelties: he durst no waie trust their vnconstancie; for it was their practise and custome to staie trauellours and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knew, concerning anie thing that had happened; and the common people would flock about marchants in faires and markets, and learne of them whence they came, and what newes they brought from thence: and by these rumours and hearesaies they directed the maine course of their actions; wherof they could not but repent themselues, being grounded vpon such weake intelligence, as was vsually coined to please the multitude. Which custome being knowne, Cæsar to preuent a greater warre, hasted to his Armie sooner then he was woont to doe.

OBSERVATIONS.

SVch as haue spent their time in the contemplation of nature, and haue made diligent search of the temperature & quality of climates and nations, haue all with one consent made choler the regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the saide humour vsually breedeth. Neither haue these conditions, which Cæsar so long agoe obserued in the ancient Galles, anie disresemblance from that, which the learned of this age haue deliuered, concerning the nature of the said inhabitants: but that irresolute constitution, which breedes such nouelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same vnto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes, and people, or what els so long a time hath changed; which argueth the vnresistable power of celestiall influence, establishing an vniformitie of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The cause of the diuersity in the temperature of nations, which are differenced by

by North and south, is not without apparant cause, attributed to their propinquitie, or distance from the course of the sunne, which distinguisheth by heate and cold the Northren and Southerne climates of the earth, and separateth the inhabitants thereof, by the dominion of their actiue qualities. But the reason whie two nations which are both in the same climate, and vnder the same parallel, receiuing the vertue of the celestial bodies, by the same downefal and rebound of their beames, being differenced only by East and West, are so much disunited in nature, and so vnlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be as some haue imagined, for asmuch as the all incloſing spheare, which remaineth quiet and immoueable aboue the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diuerſly distinguished with varietie of properties; which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth; and so keepe a perpetuall residency of one and the same quality, in one and the same place; and make also the varietie of fashions in such partes, as otherwise are equall fauorites of the heauens maiestie, by receiuing an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the saide quarters of the earth are in themselues diuerſly noted, with seuerall qualities, which appropriate the selfe same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other vnknown cause: I wil leaue euery man to satisfie himselfe with that which seemeth most probable vnto him, and proceed to the discouerie of this cholericke passion. Wherein I will indeuor to shew how impatiencie, sodaine resolution, and desire of noueltie, are naturall adiuncts of this humor: And if Cæsar made vse of this philosophie in the managing of that warre, let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must laie for a maxime that which long experience hath made authenticall, that the motions of the minde are either quicke or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for as the flegmaticall humor, is of a moist, cold and heauy nature, begetting weake and grosse spirits, and benumming the instruments with a liueles disability; so is the motion of the internall faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow maner, according to the qualitie of the instruments, whereby it moueth: and therefore men of this watrish constitution, are no way apt to receiue an impression, nor to entertaine any sensible apprehension, vnles it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions; and then also they proceede as slowlie in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choise of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flaua bilis*, being of a hote piercing nature, and resembling the actiue vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the viuacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had beene oftentimes presented vnto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily receiued, and possesseth the apprehending faculte, with such facility of entrance, that it moueth the other powers of the soule, with as great efficacie at the first conception, as if it had beene brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of vndoubted truth: It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and

fit diſpoſition of the inſtrumentes, which proceedeth from heate the chiefeſt qualitie in cholet) that the obiect is at the firſt moment ſo ſtrongly ſetteled, in the firſt receiuing facultie, that the other powers of the minde, with as great ſpeede manifeſt their offices, concerning the apprehenſion; and deliuer a ſentence anſwetable to the ſtrength of the firſt conception: which maketh them ſo impatient of delaie, and ſo ſodainly to alter their former reſolutions, not ſuffering the diſcourſiue power to examine the ſubſtance thereof, by conference of circumſtances; nor to giue iudgment according to the courſe of our intellectual court. It behoooueth therefore euery man, in that vnſteady diſpoſition, eſpecially in matter of moment, to be ſuſpicious of his owne credulity, and not to giue place to reſolution, before his iudgement be informed, by diſcourſe of the ſtrength or weakenes of the conceiued opinion.

But to leaue theſe ſpeculatiue meditations, to Philoſophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right vſe of paſſions is either true wiſdome, or commeth neereſt to the ſame; I will onely touch in a worde what degree of choler beſt befitteth a ſoldier; or howe it auaileth, or diſaduantageth in matter of warre. And firſt it cannot bee denied, that there is almoſt no paſſion, that doth more eclips the light of reaſon, or ſooner corrupteth the ſinceritie of a good iudgement, then this of anger, which we now ſpeake of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaſeth it ſelfe in his owne actions, or followeth them with greater heate in the execution. And if the trueth chance to ſhewe it ſelfe, and conuince a falſe pretended cauſe, as the authour of that paſsion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage euen againſt truth and innocency. Piſo condemned a ſoldier for returning from forraging, without his companion, being perſuaded that he had ſlaine him: but at the inſtant of the execution, the other that was miſſing, returned, and with great ioy of the whole army, they were caried to the generall, thinking to haue much gratified him, with the manifeſtation of the truth: but hee through ſhame and deſpight, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a ſubtilty which his paſsion furniſhed him withall, he made three culpable for that he found one innocent; the firſt, becauſe the ſentence of death was paſt againſt him, and was not to bee recalled without the breach of law: the ſecond, for that hee was the cauſe of the death of his companion: and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandement.

Concerning matter of warre, as it conſiſteth of differenced partes; ſo hath choler diuers effectes. In caſe of diſcourſe and conſultation, when as the powers of the minde ought to bee cleere of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the vnderſtanding, and troubleth the ſincerity of a good iudgement, as Cæſar noted in his ſpeech to the ſenate concerniug Cateline: and therefore a commander muſt, by al meanes indeuor to auoid, euen the leaſt motions of ſo hurtfull a paſsion; and ſeaſon his affections, with that grauity and conſtancy of ſpirit, that no turbulent diſpoſition may, either hinder his vnderſtanding, or with-hold his will from following that courſe, which reaſon appointeth, as the beſt means to a fortunate ſucceſſe: alwaies remembring, that al his actions are preſented vpon a ſtage, and paſſe the cenſure of many curious beholders, which applaud graue and patient motions, as the greateſt proofe of true wiſdom;

Saluſt.

and

and disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere cariage of an action, how iust soeuer otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and furie of battaile, I take anger to be a necessarie instrument to set valour on foote, and to ouerwage the difficulties of terrour, with a furious resolution: for considering that the noblest actions of the minde, stande in neede of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to bee the fittest meanes, to aduance the valiant carriage of a battaile: for as feare is trecherous and vnsafe, so anger is confident and of an vnquenchable heate; and therefore a Commaunder ought by all meanes, to suggest matter of anger against an enemie, that his men may behold them with a wrathfull regard, and thirst after the daie of battell, to satisfie their furie with the bloud of their aduersaries. If any vrge that it hath beene heretofore obserued of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battel they were more then men, and in the latter end they were lesse then women; and therfore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for seruice, as we seem to make it. I answere, that there is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was obserued in the Galles, and the passion of anger, wel kindled in the minde: for the first is subiect to alteration and contrarietie of actions; but the other is furious, inuincible, neuer satisfied but with reuenge. And so that of Aristotle is proued true, that anger serueth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue; whereunto some answere very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for wee doe manage other weapons, and this doeth manage vs; our hande guideth not it, but it guideth our hande; it possesseth vs, and not wee it, as it happened in the raigne of Tyberius, amongst the mutinous legions at *Vetera*: and therefore a Commaunder ought to take greate heede, whome he maketh the obiect of that anger, which kindleth in his army: for as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to bee wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regarde of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiors. *Tacit. 1. Anal.*

But to leaue this hastie matter, and fall neerer that which we seeke after. I may not omit the prognostication, which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the euent whereof proued the trueth of his predictions; which sheweth what aduantage a learned general that hath bin somwhat instructed in the schoole of nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the actiue rudiments of the war, & thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a seriant or lanceprizado containeth.

CAP.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth to his armie, marcheth towards the Germaines, and by the way treateth of conditions of peace.

Cæsar.

CÆSAR being come to his armie, found that to haue happened which he before suspected: for some of the States of Gallia had sent messengers vnto the Germaines, to leaue the bankes of Rhene, and to come further into the continent, where they should find ready, whatsoeuer they desired. Whereupon the Germaines began to make further incursions, and to waste the lande as far as the confines of the [a] Eburones. The Princes of the Galles beeing called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what hee had discouered, concerning their reuolt; and confirming their mindes with an approbation of their loialtie, hee commanded certaine troupes of horse to be leuied, and resolued to make warre vpon the Germains; and hauing made prouision of corne, hee directed his march towards them. From whom as he was on the way, within a few daies iourney of their campe, he receiued this message: The Germains as they were not willing to make warre vpon the Romains, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood, if they were iustly prouoked; for their ancient custome was to answere an enemy by force, and not by treaty; yet this much they woulde confesse, that they came thither very vnwillingly, being driuen by violence out of their possessions. If the Romaine people would accept of their friendship, and either giue them territories to inhabite, or suffer them to keepe that which they had got by the lawe of armes, they might proue profitable friends vnto them. They only yeelded to the Sueui, to whome the Gods in feates of armes were inferior; any other nation they wold easily conquer.

[a] Liege.

To this Cæsar answered what hee thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keepe their owne, would get possessions out of other mens hands. Gallia had no vacant plate to entertaine so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the [a] Vbij, whose agents were at that instant in his campe, complaining of the iniurie of the Sueui, and desiring aide against them; this much he himselfe would intreat of the Vbij. The messengers went backe with these Mandates, promising within three daies to returne againe to Cæsar: in the meane time, they desired him, not to bring his armie any neerer their quarters; which request Cæsar denied: for vnderstanding that a fewe daies before, a great part of their Caualrie were passed ouer the Mosa, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the returne of their horsemen.

[a] Colonia Agripina.

When Cæsar was come within twelue miles of their campe, their Ambassadors returned; and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towardes them: but being denied of their suite, they besought him to sende to those troupes of horse, which marched before the army, that they should not fight nor make anie hostile incounter; and that he would giue them leaue to send messengers to the Vbij, of whose entertainement they would e willingly accept, if the Princes

and

and senate would sweare faith & safe continuance vnto their people. Neither would they require more then 3. daies, to negotiat this busines. Cæsar conceiued this treatie to import nothing else, then the returne of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within 3. daies; notwithstanding hee promised them to march but foure miles further that day, to a conuenient watring place: in the meane time he sent to the commanders of the horse that were before, not to prouoke the enemy to fight; and if they were set vpon to sustaine the charge, vntil he came neerer with the armie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIrst we may obserue his dissebling of the practise of the Galles, with the Germans; & the incouragement which he gaue them in a faithful and loial affection to the people of Rome, when he himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honor and a good respect of their friendes required: for he well vnderstood that his presence did take away al scruple of any further motion in that kind; & therfore to haue obiected vnto thē their errors, had not been to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he tooke the way, to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the apparance of faithful friends, that they might not bee discouraged, by the detection of their reuolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, vpon this resolutiō that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhene; we may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents and denials, as might manifest his readines to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as he was content they should take a quiet farewel of Gallia, and plant themselues in the possesions of the Vbij; so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disaduantage his forcible cōstraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for he well knewe that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authoritie in a parlee, then any other motiue, howe reasonable soeuer.

Moreouer wee may obserue, howe carefull hee was not to impose vpon the Germaines a necessity of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding vnto them the association of the Vbij) by which they might auoide the hazarde of battaile. Which thing was alwaies obserued by Commanders of ancient times, who diligently searching into the nature of thinges, founde that neither of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hande and the tongue) had euer brought so many excellent works to that type of perfection, vnles they had bin forced thereunto by

Vincitur haud gratis iugulo qui prouocat hostem.

neceſſitie: and therefore wee are wiſely to handle the courſe of our actions, leaſt while we ſtand too ſtrict vpon a violent guarde, we giue occaſion to the enemy, by the way of *Antiperiſtaſis*, to redouble his ſtrength; and ſo furniſh him with that powerfull engine, which Vetius Meſcius calleth *vltimum* and *maximum telum*, the laſt and greateſt weapon; the force whereof ſhall better appeare by theſe examples.

Liu. lib. 9. Some few of the Samnites, contrarie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incurſions into the territories of the Ramaine confederates; the ſenate of that ſtate ſent to Rome, to excuſe the fact, and to make offer of ſatisfaction: But being reiected, Claudius Pontius generall of their forces, in an excellent oration which he made, ſhewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but choſe rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore neceſsity conſtrained them to put on armes: *iuſtum eſt bellum* (ſaith he) *quibus neceſſarium, & pia arma quibus, niſi in Armis, ſpes eſt.*

Liu. lib. 7. Caius Manlius, conducting the Roman legions againſt the Veij, part of the Veian armie had entered the Romaine campe; which Manlius perceiuing, hee haſted with a band of men to keepe the breach, and to ſhut in the Veij: which they no ſooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they ſlew Manlius; and had ouerthrown the whole campe, had not a Tribune opened the a paſſage, by which they fled away.

In like manner Camillus, the wiſeſt of the Romaine Captaines, beeing entered into the citie of the Veij, that hee might take it with greater facilitie, and diſarme the enemie of that terrible weapon of neceſsitie, hee cauſed it to bee proclaimed, that no Veian ſhoulde bee hurt, that was founde vnarmed. Whereupon euery man caſt away his weapon, and ſo the towne was taken without bloudſhed.

Let a ſoldiour therefore take ſuch holde of occaſions, and oportunities that are offered vnto him, that in time of battaile hee may ſeeme to caſt neceſsitie vpon his own cauſe, and retaine it in his paie: conſidering how the power therof altereth the workes of nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations, being neuer ſubiect to any ordinance or lawe; and yet making that lawful which proceedeth from it.

CHAP. IIII.

The Germans, contrary to their owne requeſt made to Cæſar, ſet vpon the Romaine horſemen, and ouerthrew them.

Cæſar. *Notwithſtanding the Germans requeſt, concerning the truce, aſſoone as they ſaw the Romaine horſemen, which were in number 5000, (whereas the Germans had not aboue 800. herſe) they charged vpon the Romains, not expecting any hoſtile incounter, inaſmuch as their ambaſſadours were newly departed from Cæſar, and had obtained that daie of truce; but*

being

being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their vsuall custome, forsooke their horse, and fighting on foote, did easely put the Romains to flight; who neuer looked backe, vntill they came into the sight of the legions: in that battell were slaine 74. Romaine horsemen. After this battel, Cæsar thought it not safe, either to harken to anie conditions, or to receiue any message from them, that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, and ment nothing but warr: And to attende any longer vntil their horsemen returned, was but to giue them that aduantage against him, especially considering the weakenesse of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battel had gained great reputation; and therfore he durst not giue them space to thinke vpon it.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speake somewhat, concerning that maine controuersie of policie, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great commanders, are alwaies to bee attended with integrity, and faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherin I wil only set down such arguments, and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honesty on the one part, (for we wil make it no question to a Christian minde) and the daily practise of states men on the other side, alleadge, to make good their contrary affections.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend vertue in a shew, and not in *esse* and being, and study to maintaine their states onely with humane reason, not regarding the authority of diuine ordinance, set this downe as a maxime in their Arts. That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an ende sorting to his contentment, must in all respects bee like qualified, both in iudgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himselfe strong in the matter, which he vndertaketh. For a wrastler that cõmeth with meere strength to incounter an other that hath both strength & cunning, may beshrew his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skil, and be laught at, as an vnworthy chãpion for serious sports: in like maner in this vniuersall confusion of infidelitie, wherein subtilty flieth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicitie of spirit to winde through the labyrinths of falshood, and auoide the snares of deceit, shall finde himselfe too weake for so difficult a taske, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity: for it is the course that euery man taketh, which must bring vs to the place, to which euery man goeth: and he that opposeth himselfe against the current of the world, may stand alone in his own conceit, and neuer attaine that which the world seeketh after. For asmuch therfore, as craft and deceit are so general, it behoueth a man of publike negotiations, to carry a mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which anciẽt writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Centaure, half a man & half a beast, to be instructed in the rudimẽts of princely cariage; that of the brutish part, he might learn to strengthen himself, with force & courage; & of the humane shape, so to

manage reason, that it might bee a fit instrument to answere or preuent, what soeuer mans wit might forge to ouerthrow it. Neither ought a priuate man to wonder at the strangenesse of these positions; considering that the gouernment of kingdomes, and Empires is caried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affaires in a well ordered state: wherein truth-breakers and faithlesse-dissemblers are worthely condemned, inasmuch as they necessarilie enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helme of gouernment, and are to shape the course of a state, according to the variation of times and fortunes, deriue their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferiour subiects are no more capable, then men are able to vnderstande the workes of the Godes: and therefore they are called *arcana imperij*, to bee reuerenced rather, then lookt into.

To conclude, the affaires of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compasse, that a meane capacitie may easily apprehend the aduantages or inconueniences, which may ensue vppon the contract: and therefore it is requisite they should stande to the aduenture, and their iudgement is worthely taxed with the losse: but the businesses of a common weale are, both subiect to so many casualties of fortune, and relie vpon such vnexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, howe prouident soeuer, to foresee the issue, in that variety of chances. Besides that, euery particular subiect is much interessed in the fortune of the euent, and may iustly chalenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwracke through the errour of their Pilot: And so the safety of the state doth balance out the losse of credit in the Gouernor.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirme vertue to be the same both in prince and people; neither doth condition of state, or calling, or the qualitie of publike or priuate businesses, alter the nature and essence of goodnes: for to depriue the toung of truth and fidelitie were to breake the bond of ciuill societie, which is the basis and ground plot of all states and commonweales. They doe not denie but that a wise Prince maie so carrie a treatie, that he maie seeme to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answere doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that he maie vse with great honour the practises and stratagems of warre, when the fortune of both parties consisteth vpon their owne industrie: but to breake any couenants agreed vpon, may well get a kingdome, but neuer honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the meanes, whereby a state is continued in happie gouernment: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this historie, that he who falsifieth his words vpon aduantage, howsoeuer he regardeth his honour, had neede to paie them home in regard of his owne safetie: for if they once recouer the losse, and get any aduantage against those truth-breakers, they will finde as little fauour, as the Germans did with Cæsar.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar marched directly to the campe of the Germans, and cut them all in pieces, and so ended that warre.

Caesar.

VPON these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Questor; there happened a very fortunate accident. For the next daie, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefest of the Germans came vnto Cæsar into his campe, to excuse their fraudulent practises, and withall to continue their petition of truce. Whereof Cæsar was exceeding glad, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant, brought his Armie out of the campe, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had beene daunted with so late an ouerthrow: And making a triple battell, marched speedely eight miles, and so came vpon the Germans, before they had notice what had happened; and being terrified with our sudden arriuall, and the departure of their owne leaders, knew not whether it were their best course, to bring forth their forces, or to defend their campe, or otherwise to seeke their safety by flight. Which tumult and feare was no sooner perceiued by the Roman souldier, but calling to mind their perfidious trecherie, they brake into the campe, and were at first a little resisted, in the meane time, the women and children fled euery one awaie: which Cæsar perceiuing, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans hearing the clamour and schrichings behinde their backes, and seeing their friends put to flight and slaine, did cast awaie their weapons, and fled out of the campe, and comming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped cast themselues into the riuer; where, what through feare, and wearinesse, and the force of the water, were all drowned. In this conflict the Romans lost not a man: the number of the enemie was 430000 with women and children. To them, whom he had retained in his campe, he gaue leaue to depart; but they fearing the crueltie of the Galles, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Cæsar agreed vnto.

OBSERVATIONS.

THis relation affoordeth little matter of warre, but onely a seuere reuenge of hatefull trecherie: notwithstanding I will hence take occasion, to discouer the offices of the Questor and the Legates; and shew what place they had in the Armie. And first concerning the Questor, we are to vnderstand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same court, which was called to creat the Generall. His office was, to take charge of the publike treasure, whether it came out of their Ærarium, for the paie of the Armie; or otherwise was taken from the enemie. Of

him the ſouldiers receiued their ſtipend both in corne and money; and what other bootie was taken from the enemie, they either kept them, or ſolde them, for the vſe of the common-weale.

The Legates were not choſen, by the people, but appointed by the Senat, as aſſiſtants & Coadiutors to the Emperor, for the publike ſeruice, and were altogether directed by the Generall, in whoſe abſence they had the abſolute command: and their number was for the moſt part vncertaine; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Armie.

Cæſar.

CHAP. VI.

Cæſar maketh a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Germanie.

Caſar.

HE German warre being thus ended, Cæſar thought it neceſſarie, to tranſport his Armie ouer the Rhene into the continent of Germanie, for manie cauſes: whereof this was not the leaſt, that ſeeing the Germans were ſo eaſily perſwaded, to bring their colonies and their vagrant multitudes into Gallia: he thought it good to make knowen vnto them, that the Roman people could, at their pleaſure, carrie their forces ouer the Rhene into Germanie. Moreouer, thoſe troupes of horſe, which were abſent at the late ouerthrow of the Germans, were fled into the confines of the Siaambri; to whom, when Cæſar ſent meſſengers to demand them to be ſent vnto him, they anſwered, that the Roman Empire was limited by the Rhene: and if the Germans were interdicted Gallia, why ſhould Cæſar challenge any authority in their quarters? Laſtly, the Vbij, who amongſt all the reſt of the Germans had only accepted of Cæſars friendſhip, and giuen pledges of their fidelitie, had made earneſt ſuit vnto him, to ſend them aid againſt the Sueui, or at the leaſt to tranſport his Armie ouer the Rhene: for the name and opinion of the Roman Armie was ſo great, and of ſuch fame, what with Arioniſtus ouerthrow, and this laſt ſeruice, that it ſounded honourable amongſt the furtheſt nations of Germany. For theſe reaſons, Cæſar reſolued to paſſe the Rhene: but to carrie his Armie ouer by boate, was neither ſafe, nor for the maieſtie of the people of Rome. And albeit it ſeemed a matter of great difficultie, by reaſon of the breadth, ſwiftnes, and depth of the riuer, to make a bridge; yet he reſolued to trie what he could doe, otherwiſe he determined not to paſſe ouer at all: and ſo he built a bridge after this maner.

At two foote diſtance, he placed two trees of a foot and halfe ſquare, ſharpened at the lower end, and cut anſwerable to the depth of the riuer: theſe he let downe into the water with engines, and droue them in with commanders, not perpendicularly, after the faſhion of a pile, but gable wiſe and bending with the courſe of the water: oppoſite vnto theſe he placed two other trees, ioyned together after the ſame faſhion, being 40 foote diſtant from the former, by the dimenſion betweene their lower parts

in

in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the riuer: these two paire of couples thus placed, he ioyned together with a beame of two foote square, equall to the distance betweene the said couples, and fastened them at each ende on either side of the couples, with braces and pins: whereby the strength of the worke, and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the streame was, and the faster it fell vpon the timber worke, the stronger the bridge was vnited in the couplings and iointes. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beames, vntill the worke was brought vnto the other side of the riuer: and then he laide straight planks from beame to beame, and couered them with hurdles; and so he made a floore to the bridge. Moreouer, on the lower side of the bridge, he drone downe supporters, which being fastened to the timber worke, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the vpper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boates, or what els the enemie might cast downe to trouble the worke: within ten daies, that the timber began to be cut downe and carried, the worke was ended, and the Armie transported. Cæsar, leauing a strong garrison at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri.

OBSERVATIONS.

IT shall not be amisse, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge; as wel in regard of the ingenious Architecture therof, as also that we may somwhat imitate Cæsar, whom we may obserue to insist with as great plenty of wit & eloquẽce, in presenting vnto vs the subtilty of his inuentiõ in such maner of handy works, as vpon any other part of his actiõs; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiẽtly witnes: besides the fortifications at Alesia, and the intrenchments in Britanie, for the safetie of his shipping, with many other workes, which he might well record, as the greatest dessignes of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effectes of magnanimous industrie; that succeeding ages might not boast either of Arte or prowes, which his vertue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder at that worth, which they themselues coulde not attaine vnto: And to that purpose hee entertained Vitruuius, the father of architecture, and as worthilie to bee imitated in that facultie, as his maister Cæsar is in feates of armes. By whose example a great commander may learne howe much it importeth the eternitie of his fame, to beautifie his greatest dessignes with arte, and to esteeme of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall muses, to shew themselues vnder the shape of a sensible forme; which albeit through the rudenesse of the matter, fall farre short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beautie expresseth such a maiestie of Arte, that no time will suffer the memorie thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefely in the oblique situation of the double postes, whereof the first order bending with the streame, and the lower ranke against the streame, when they came to be coupled together with ouerthwart beames, which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the streame fell vpon the worke, the faster the

the ioinres of the building were vnited, as may better appeare by a modell of that making, then can be expreſſed by any circumſtance of wordes.

I might hence take occaſion to ſpeake of the diuerſitie of bridges, and of the practiſes which antiquitie hath deuiſed to tranſport Armies ouer riuers: but inaſmuch as it is a common ſubiect for all that vndertake this militarie taske, and hath beene handled by Lipſius, vpon the occaſion of this bridge, I will refer the reader to that place; and only note the ſingular diſpoſition of this action, in as much as Cæſar made the meanes correſpondent to that end which he intended. For conſidering that the chiefeſt end of his paſſage was, to let the Germans vnderſtand, that the power of the Roman Empire was not bouńded with the Rhene; and that a riuer could not ſo ſeparate their Territories, but that they were able to ioine both the continents together, and make a common roade waie, where it ſeemed moſt vnpaſſable: he thought it beſt to paſſe ouer his Army by a bridge, that ſo the Germans might know the power of his forces, and alſo conceit their Territories, as vnited vnto Gallia; or to be vnited at the pleaſure of the Romans, with a firme Iſthmus & plaine paſſage by foot, which in times paſt had alwaies been ſeparated by a mightie riuer. Neither would a tranſportation by boat haue wrought that effect, for as much as the daily vſe thereof was ſo familiar to the Germans, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an vnacceſſible paſſage: but when they ſaw ſo ſtrange a thing attempted, and ſo ſuddenly performed, they would eaſily vnderſtand, that they were not ſo farre off, but that they might be ouertaken; and ſo direct their demeanour accordingly.

Lib. de Machi.

Let this ſuffice therfore to proue, that a paſſage quer a riuer by a bridge, is more honourable, ſafe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be deuiſed; eſpecially if the riuer carrie any depth, ſuch as the Rhene is; otherwiſe, if it haue either ſhallowes or foordes, whereby men may wade ouer, without any great incombrance, it were but loſt labour to ſtand about a bridge, but rather to thinke of it, as of a place incombred with ſuch hindrances, as men often meete with in a march.

CHAP. VII.

Cæſar taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri: giueth libertie to the Vbij; and returneth againe into Gallia.

Cæſar.

THE Sicambri, vnderſtanding that Cæſar was making a bridge ouer the Rhene, prepared themſelues to flie; and at the perſwaſion of the Vſipetes, forſooke their country, and conuaied ſelues and their poſſeſſions into woods, and ſolitarie deſartes. Cæſar continuing a few daies in their quarters, hauing ſet on fire their villages and houſes, and burned vp their corne and prouiſion; he came to the Vbij, promiſing them aide againſt the Sueui: by whom he vnderſtood, that aſſoone as the Sueui had intelligence, that he went

went about to make a bridge, calling a councell according to their maner, they ſent vnto all quarters of their ſtate, that they ſhould forſake their townes, and carie their wiues and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to beare Armes, ſhould make head in one place, which they appointed to bee the midſt of their countrey, and there they attended the comming of the Romaines, and were reſolued in that place to giue them battell. Which when Cæſar vnderſtood, hauing ended all thoſe thinges, in regard whereof he came into Germanie, which was chiefely to terrifie the Germans, to be reuenged vpon the Sicambri, to ſet the Vbij at libertie; hauing ſpent in all 18 daies beyond the Rhene, as well in regard of his owne honour, and the good of the common-weale: he returned into Gallia, and brake vp the bridge.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæſar thinketh of a voiage into Britanie: he enquireth of marchants, concerning the nature of that people.

ALTHOVGH the ſommer was almoſt ſpent, and that in thoſe partes the winter haſteneth on a pace, inaſmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithſtanding he reſolued to go ouer into Britanie: foraſmuch as he vnderſtood, that in all the former wars of Gallia, the enemie had receiued moſt of their ſupply from thence. And although the time of the yeare would not ſuffer him to finiſh that warre; yet he thought it would be to good purpoſe, if he went only to view the Iland, to vnderſtand the qualitie of the inhabitants, and to know their coaſt, their portes, and their landing places; whereof the Galles were altogether ignorant: for ſeldome any man, but marchants, did trauell vnto them. Neither was there any thing diſcouered but the ſea-coaſt, and thoſe regions which were oppoſite vnto Gallia: And therefore calling marchants together from all quarters, he neither could vnderſtand of what quantitie the Iland was, what nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what vſe or experience of warre they had; what lawes or cuſtomes they vſed; nor what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great ſhipping. Cæſar.

OBSERVATIONS.

AS the Germans had oftentimes ſtirred vp motions of rebellion amongſt the Galles, by ſending their ſuperfluous multitudes into their kingdome; ſo the Britaines had vpheld moſt of their warres, by furniſhing them with ſuch ſupplies, as from time to time they ſtood in neede of. So that if Cæſar, or the Roman people, would reſt ſecure of their quiet and peaceable gouernment in Gallia, as they had chaſtiſed the inſo-

lencie of the Germans,& ſent them backe againe, with greater loſſe then gaine; ſo was it neceſſarie to make the Britains know, that their aſſiſtance in the warre of Gallia would draw more buſineſſes vpon them, then they were well able to manage. For as I haue noted in my former diſcourſes, the cauſes of an vnpeaceable gouernment are as well externall and forraine, as internall and bred in the bodie; which neede the helpe of a Phiſition, to continue the bodie in a perfect ſtate of health, and require as great a diligence to qualifie their malicious operations, as any internall ſickneſſe whatſoeuer.

In the ſecond Commentarie, I briefely touched the commoditie of good diſcouerie; but becauſe it is a matter of great conſequence, in the fortunate cariage of a warre, I will once againe by this example of Cæſar, remember a Generall not to be negligent in this dutie. Suetonius in the life of our Cæſar reporteth, that he neuer vndertooke any expedition, but he firſt receiued true intelligence of the particular ſite, and nature of the country, as alſo of the maners and qualitie of the people; and that he would not vndertake the voiage into Britanie, vntill he had made perfect diſcouerie by himſelfe, of the magnitude and ſituation of the Iland. Which Suetonius might vnderſtand by this firſt voiage, which Cæſar would needes vndertake in the latter end of a ſommer, although it were as he himſelfe ſaith, but to diſcouer.

It is recorded by auncient writers, that thoſe demigods that gouerned the world in their time, gaue great honor to the exerciſe of hunting, as the perfect image of warre in the reſemblance of all parts, and namely in the diſcouerie and knowledge of a country; without which all enterpriſes, either of ſport in hunting, or earneſt in warres were friuolous and of no effect. And therefore Zenophon in the life of Cyrus, ſheweth that his expedition againſt the king of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of ſuch ſportes, as he had vſed in hunting. Howſoeuer, if the infinite examples regiſtred in hiſtorie, how by the dexteritie of ſome leaders it hath gained great victories, & through the negligence of others, irrecouerable ouerthrowes; are not ſufficient motiues to perſwade thē to this duty: let their owne experience in matters of ſmall moment, manifeſt the weakeneſſe of their proceedings, when they are ignorant of the chiefeſt circumſtances of the matter they haue in hand. But let this ſuffice in the ſecond place, to proue the neceſſitie of good diſcouerie; and let vs learne of Cæſar, what is principally to be inquired after in the diſcouerie of an vnknowne country; as firſt the quantitie of the land: ſecondly, what nations inhabite it: thirdly, their vſe of warre: fourthly, their ciuill gouernment: and laſtly, what hauens they had to receiue a nauie of great ſhipping. All which circumſtances are ſuch principall Arteries in the bodie of a ſtate, that the diſcouerie of any one of theſe demaundes would haue giuen great light, concerning the motion of the whole bodie.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Voluſenus, to diſcouer the coaſt of Britanie; and prepareth himſelfe for that voiage.

CAESAR ſent out Caius Voluſenus, with a gallie to diſcouer what he could concerning theſe thinges; and to returne againe vnto him very ſpeedely: he himſelfe marched in the meane time, with all his forces, vnto the Morini; foraſmuch as from thence laie the ſhorteſt cut into Britanie. Thither he commanded that ſhippes ſhould be brought from all the maritimate cities of that quarter, and namely that fleete, which he had built the yeare before for the warre at Vannes. In the meane time his reſolution being knowen, and carried into Britanie by merchants and others, manie priuate ſtates of that Iland ſent ambaſſadours vnto him, promiſing him hoſtages of their loialtie, and ſignifying their readineſe to ſubmit themſelues to the Roman Empire. To theſe he made liberall promiſes, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and ſo ſent them backe againe. And with them he ſent Comius, whom he had made king of Arras, whoſe wiſdome and vertue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authoritie in thoſe Regions: to him he gaue in charge to go to as many of the ſtates as he could, and perſwade them to accept of the friendſhip of the Roman Empire, and that Cæsar himſelfe would preſently follow after.

Caſar. Teroanne or Monſtrell.

Voluſenus, hauing taken what view of the country he could; for he durſt not go on ſhore to commit himſelfe to the barbariſme of the enemy; after fiue daies returned to Cæsar: and while he ſtaied in theſe places for the furniſhing of his fleete, the Morini ſent meſſengers vnto him, excuſing their former faultes, and manifeſting their readineſe to obey his mandates. Cæsar not willing to leaue any enemy behinde him, or to neglect his voiage into Britanie, for ſuch ſmall matters; hee willingly accepted of their ſubmiſſion, hauing firſt receiued manie hoſtages of them, and hauing made readie eightie ſhippes of burthen, which he thought ſufficient to tranſport two legions, he deuided the Galleies to the Queſtor, the Legates and the commanders of the horſe. There were alſo eighteene ſhippes of burthen more, which laie windbound at a port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horſemen: the reſt of the Armie he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commanding them to go to the confines of the Menapy: and appointed P. Sulp. Ruffus, a Legate, to keepe the port, with a ſufficient garriſon.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie, and landeth his men.

Cæsar.

THESE thinges being thus dispatched: hauing a good winde in the third watch, he put out to sea, commanding his horsmen to imbarke themselues at the further port, which was but slowlie performed: hee himselfe arriued vpon the coast about the fourth houre of the daie, where he found all the cliftes possessed with the forces of the enemie. The nature of the place was such, that the hils laie so steepe ouer the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher ground vpon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place, notwithstanding he cast anker vntill the rest of the nauie were come vp vnto him. In the meane time calling a councell of the Legates and Tribunes, he declared vnto them what aduertisements he had receiued by Volusenus, and told them what he would haue done; and withall admanished them that the course of militarie affaires, and especially sea matters, that had so sudden and an vnconstant motion, required all thinges to be done at a becke, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, hauing both wind and tide with him, he waighed anker, and sailed eight miles from that place, vnto a plaine and open shore. The Britaines perceiuing the Romans determination, sent their horse and chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romans intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respectes: the ships were so great, that they could not be brought neere vnto the shore: the souldiers in strange and vnknowne places, hauing their hands laden with great and heauie weapons, were at one instant to go out of the shippe, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemie: whereas the Britaines either standing vpon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did boldly cast their weapons in knowen and frequented places, and managed their horses as accustomed to such seruice.

The Romans being terrified with these thinges, and altogether vnskilfull of this kinde of fight, did vse the same courage, as they were woont to doe in land seruices: which when Cæsar perceiued, he caused the Galleies, that were both strange to the Britaines, and readier for vse, to be remoued from the shippes of burthen, and to be rowed vp and downe, and laide against the open side of the enemie; that from thence with slinges, engines & arrowes, the enemy might be beaten vp from the water side, which stood the Romans in good steede: for the Britaines, being troubled with the strangenesse of the Galleies, the motion of their Oares, and the vnusuall kinde of engines; were somewhat dismaied, and began to retire backe, and giue waie to the Romans: but the souldiers still lingering and especially for feare of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happely to the legion: If you will (saith he) forsake your Eagle, O ye souldiers, and betraie it to the

the enemy, for mine owne part I will do my duty both to the common weale, and to my Imperator, and hauing spoken this, with a loud voice, hee cast himselfe into the sea, and caried the Eagle towarde the enemy; the Romaines exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the ship: which when others that were neere at hande perceiued, they followed them with as great alacritie, and pressed towards the enemy to incounter with them. The fight on both partes was very eager; the Romaines not being able to keepe any order of battell, nor to get any firme footing, nor to follow their ensignes, forasmuch as euery man kept with those ensignes, which he first met withal, were wonderfully troubled: But the enemy acquainted with the flats and shallowes, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their ships, putting spurs to their horse, woulde set vpon them incombred and vnprepared, and many of them would ouerlay a few; others would get the aduantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troupes of them: which when Cæsar perceiued, he caused the shipboates and smaller vessels to be manned with soldiours, and where he sawe neede of helpe, he sent them to succour such as were ouercharged. As soone as the Romaines got footing on the firme land, they made head together and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight: but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Iland at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was only wanting to Cæsars fortune.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

VPon this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuersie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, and in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our coast, or quietly to suffer him to set his men on shore, and retire our forces into some inland place, and there attend to giue him battell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion, that we ought not by any meanes to encounter an enemy at his landing, for so woe might much endanger our selues and our countrey, did ground themselues vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference betweene an Iland and a continent. For where he setteth down that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon an other in the same continent: but where their territories are diuoyned by so great a barre as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to supplant one an other, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Wherein I will first laie downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vnsafe to oppose an enemy at his landing; not as beeing vrged by that party, for I neuer hearde any probable motiue from them which might induce any such opinion, but set down by such as haue looked into the controuersies, both with experience and good iudgement.

And first, it may be obiected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertaintie of place, as of time: for beeing ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defende all

places of excesse, or our intentions wil proue meere friuolous; and to performe that, it is requisite that our defensiue forces be sufficient, according to the particular qualitie of euery place subiect to danger: which considering the large extension of our maritimate parts, and the manie landing places on our coast, will require a greater number of men, then this Iland canne affoord. And although it coulde furnish such a competent number, as might seeme in some sort sufficient; yet the vncertainty of the time of the enemies arriuall, would require that they should be lodged, either vpon or neere the places of danger, manie daies at least, if not many weekes, before the instant of their attempt, which woulde exhaust a greater masse of treasure, then could bee well affoorded by the state.

Secondly, it may be obiected, that all our landing places are of such disaduantage, for the defendantes; that it were no safetie at all to make heade against him at the landing: for in asmuch as such places are open and plaine, they yeelde no commodity to shelter the defendantes from the fury of the artillerie, wherewith the enemy will plentifullie furnish their long boates and landing vessailes; which beating vpon the beach (for most of our landing places are of that quality) will so scatter them, that no man shall bee able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The thirde obiection may arise from the disparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the first it must needes bee granted, that the defendantes being to garde so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to euerie particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence. Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without question, that a great and potent Prince, (for such a one it must bee, that vndertaketh to inuade the territories of so absolute and well obeied a Princesse as her Maiestie is) woulde drawe out the floure of his soldierie whersoeuer; besides the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which do commonly attend such seruices. Now these being thus qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one body: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants should equal them with forces of like vertue and experience?

These are the reasons, which may be drawne from the disaduantage, which they haue that go about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that haue beene vrged, by such as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceede to the answere of these reasons, I will lay this downe for a principle. That it is impossible for any forraine Prince how puissant soeuer, to make such a preparation as shal be fitting to inuade a state so populous, and respective of their soueraigne, (notwithstanding the pretenses deuised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessitie be discouered, before it can bee made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleete. But I will rest my selfe, in the example of the yeere 88. which proueth the discouery of the pretended inuasion, before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed bee denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of accesse: but that our defensiue forces are not sufficient in a competent maner to garde all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question. To proue that our forces are sufficient: wee must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritimate partes, as any other within this kingdom, for the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vtermost skirt vpon the coast of Sussex, vnto Margate vppon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twenty foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy, as wee speake of, partly in regarde of the hugenesse of the cliffes, which do inclose a great part of that skirt; and partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an armie that shoulde put it selfe there on shore, shoulde find it selfe being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces. Further it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a nauie of great ships canne haue no commodity to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it wil appeare that this large skirt of Kent will affoord a far lesser part fit for the landing of an army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publike a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make it so euident, by the particular description both of the number, quantity and qualitie of the places themselues; as no man of an indifferent iudgement would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to affoord euery of them such a safe and sure garde, as shall bee thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is vnfitting to giue such particular satisfaction in this publike discourse, giue me leaue, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall taste of that meanes as woulde secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Answere to the first obiection.

Hauing shewed you before the circuit of the maritimat parts of Kent, I would obserue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shall be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I wil suppose the number to be 12000 of which I would lodge 3000. about the point of Nesse, and 3000. about Margate, & 6000. about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the center: for my greatest care should be so to dispose of them, as they might not only succor one an other in the same shire, but as euery shire bordereth one vpon an other; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto an other, as occasion should bee offered: as if the enemy shoulde attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the 6000. lodged as before, shoulde march to their succours, but such also of the

Sussex

Sussex forces as were neere vnto that part; and so likewise of the rest: by which you may see how great a force would in few houres bee assembled, for the renforcing of any of these out skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one halfe of the whole forces are thus lodged in the center of the shire, which is neerer to all parts then any other place whatsoeuer. There woulde also in the quartering of them, an especiall care bee had to the places of daunger, as might bee answerable to the importance thereof: for my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast by regiments and companies, as the country might affoord best oportunity, to entertaine them.

Now concerning the latter part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncertainty of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I holde it most requisite that our defensiue forces should be drawne into a heade, before the enemy should be discouered neere our coast ready to put himselfe on shoare: for it were a grosse absurdity to imagine, that companies coulde vppon such a sodaine be assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessity of the occasion would require. Nowe for that husbanding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremity, as it would be vnsupportable for this state to beare: as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much out of season to dispute about vnnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

Vt iugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones,
Non expergesceris, vt te ipsum serues?

The enemy (peraduenture) hath kept 30000. men in paie 2. months before, to make hauocke of our countrey, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome; shal we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vppon our coast, to assure our selues, that no such enemy shall enter into our countrey? the extremity of this charge woulde bee qualified by our good espiall, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessity which is imposed vpon vs to bee carefull in businesses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are sufficient to keepe the sea cost; and that the vncertainty of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and countrey imposeth vpon euerie good subiect, which is the substance of the first reason, which I set downe in the beginning of this discourse.

The answere to the second reason.

Now concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disaduantage of the place, in regarde of the fury of the enemies artillery. True it is, that such places as yeelde the enemy commodity of landing, are for the most parte plaine and open, and affoord naturally no couert at all. What then? shall a soldiour take euery place as hee findeth it, and vse no arte to qualifie the disaduantages thereof? or shall a man forgo the benefit of a place of aduantage rather, then hee will relieue with industry the discommoditie of some particular circumstance? I make no question but an ingenious commander, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea vppon the

beach

beach it selfe, which is vnapt to make defensible, as anie place whatsoeuer; woulde vse such industrie as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, and ouerwaie the enemie with aduantage of place; especially considering that this age hath affoorded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that behalfe: but this cannot be done, if our forces doe not make head before the instant of the enemies attempt, that our commanders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, handbaskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble anie man, for I dare auouch it, that if our forces are not drawne into a heade before the enemie bee discouered vppon the coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attende them in some inlande place, to giue them battaile; our Commanders will bee farre to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessaries, and we will easilie ouercome all these difficulties, and vse the benefit of the firme lande to repell an enemie, weakened with the sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with manie other hinderances and discouragementes, which are presented vnto him both from the land and the sea. He that saw the landing of our forces in the Iland of Fiall, in the yeere 97. can somewhat iudge of the difficulty of that matter: for what with the working of the sea, the steepnesse of the cliffes, the troublesomnes of their armes, the soldiors were so incombred, that had not the enemie beene more then a coward, he might wel with 200. men haue kept vs from entering any part of that Iland.

The answere to the third reason.

Concerning the thirde obiection, this briefelie shall bee sufficient, that wee are not so much to regarde that our forces doe equall them in number, as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the enemies landing: for wee knowe that in places of aduantage and difficult accesse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not but all circumstances duelie considered, wee shall proportionablie equall the enemie, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our state shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trained, and exercised in a competent maner, to defende their Countrey from forraine enemies. For the neglect thereof, were to drawe on such as of themselues are but too forwarde, to make a praie of vs; and to make vs vnapt, not onelie to oppose an enemies landing, but to defende our selues from beeing ouerrunne, as other nations liuing in security, without due regarde thereof, haue beene.

And this much concerning the answere to those three reasons, which seeme to prooue that an enemie is not to bee resisted at his landing. Nowe if we do but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the landing of an enemy, we shall easilie discouer the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leaue to liue vpon the spoile of our countrey, which cannot be preuented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our prouisions, in so plentiful a countrey as this is, especially considering that wee haue no strong townes

at all to repose our selues vpon. Whereof wee neede no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seuenth booke of these Commentaries, in that war, which Cæsar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly, weakened at such times; whereby all necessary meanes to maintaine a war is hardly drawn from the subiect. Thirdly, oportunity is giuen to malecontents and ill disposed persons, either to make head themselues, or to flie to the enemy. Fourthly, the madnes to aduenture a kingdom vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disaduantages, which the oportunity of any such occasion would discouer.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Of the name Imperator.

THe worde *imperator*, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romaine leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploite, and after a iust victorie obtained; and then in the place where the battaile was fought, and the enemie ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of *Imperator*, with the triumphant shoute of the whole armie; by which acclamation, the soldiours gaue testimonie of his worth; and made it equiualent with the most fortunate Commaunders.

3. Annal.

This ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Romaine Empire, as appeareth by manie histories, and namelie by Tacitus, where hee saith, that Tyberius gaue that honour to Blesus, that hee should be saluted Imperator by the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Captaines, after they had foiled the enemy, with an eminent ouerthrowe. For euerie victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might chalenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the enemies to be slaine. Apian in his second booke saieth, that in olde time, the name of Imperator was neuer taken, but vpon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000 of the enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero saith, that 2000 slaine in the place, especiallie of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles, did worthely merit the name of Imperator. Howsoeuer it seemeth by the same author, that there was a certain number of the enemy required to be slaine, where he saith, *Se iusta victoria Imperatorem appellatum.*

Phil. 14.

Lib. 2 epist. 9

CHAP. XI.

The Britains make peace with Cæsar, but breake it againe, vpon the losse of the Romain shipping.

THE Britaines being ouerthrowne in this battaile; assoone as they had recouered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreate for peace, promising hostages and obedience, in what soeuer he commanded. And with these ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britanie. Cæsar complained, that, whereas they sent vnto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his comming they made warre against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, he commanded hostages to be deliuered vnto him: which they presently performed in parte; and the rest being to bee fet further off, shoulde likewise be rendered within a short time; in the meane while, they commanded their people to returne to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commende themselues and their states to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded; foure daies after that Cæsar came into Britanie, the eighteen shippes which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle winde, and approaching so neere the coast of Britanie, that they were within viewe of the Romaine campe: there arose such a sodaine tempest, that none of them were able to holde their course, but some of them returned to the porte from whence they came; other some were cast vpon the lower part of the Ilande, which lieth to the West warde; and there casting anchor tooke in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselues againe to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moone being in the full, the tides were verie high in those seas; whereof the Romaines being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies which were drawne vp vpon the shore were filde with the tide, and the shippes of burthen that laie at anchor, were shaken with the tempest; neither was there anie helpe to be giuen vnto them: so that many of them were rent, and split in peeces; and the rest lost both their anchors, Gables and other tackling: and by that meanes became altogether vnseruiceable. Whereat the whole armie was exceedinglie troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarrie them backe againe: Neither had they anie necessaries to newe furnish the olde: and euerie man knew that they must needes winter in Gallia, for as much as there was no prouision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing beeing knowne to the Princes of Britanie, that were assembled to confer of such thinges as Cæsar had commanded them to performe, when they vnderstood that the Romaines wanted both their horsemen, shipping, and prouision of corne, and coniecturing of the paucitie of their forces, by the small circuit of their camp; and that which was more important then all the rest, that Cæsar had transported his soldiours without such necessarie cariages, as they vsed to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keepe the Romaines from corne and conuoies of prouision, and so prolong the matter, vntil winter came on. For they thought that if these were once ouerthrown

Cæsar.

and cut off from returning into Gallia, neuer any man would afterward aduenture to bring an army into Britanie: therefore they conspired againe the second time, and conuaied themselues by stealth out of the campe, and got their men priuily out of the fields, to make head in some conuenient place against the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

COncerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already beene handled in the second booke, to which I will adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romaines became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and new of the moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogither directed by the course of the moon, wherin she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And for asmuch as all mediterrean seas, and such gulfes as are inclosed in sinues and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallnes of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power; as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuskane seas, wherwith the Romains were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the maine sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plenteous abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the moone. The Ocean therfore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking hir course of flowing from the North, falleth with such a currant between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channel between England and France, with great swelling tides; and maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other partes of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it commeth, and hauing withall a plaine leuelled belly, and a very smal fresh currant, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known riuer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the ful of the moone.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SVch as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the gouernment of common weales, are not ignorant with what difficulty a nation, that either hath long liued in liberty, or bin gouerned by cōmanders of their own chosing, is made subiect to the yoake of bondage, or reduced vnder the obediēce of a stranger. For as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill societie; so by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our selues and possessions, as the cheefest end of the saide society: And therefore in the gouernment of a subdued state, what losse or disaduantage happeneth to the victor, or how indirectlie soeuer

soeuer it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captiue people behold it as a part of their aduersaries ouerthrow; and conceiue thereupon such spirites, as answere the greatnes of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwaies maketh that seeme easie to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason, that the Britaines altered their resolution of peace, vpon the losse which the Romans had receiued in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken nauie: the Britaines set vpon the Romans as they haruested; but were put off by Cæsar.

CAESAR although he had not discouered their determination, yet coniecturing of the euent by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of giuing vppe hostages; hee prouided against all chances: for he brought corne daily out of the fields into his camp; and tooke the huls of such ships as were most dismembred, and with the tymber and brasse thereof hee mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessaries to bee brought out of Gallia. Which being handeled with the great industrie and trauell of the souldiers, he lost onely twelue shippes, and made the other able to abide the sea.

While these thinges were in action, the seuenth legion being sent out by course, to fetch in corne, and little suspecting any motion of warre; as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came betweene them and the campe, the station that watched before the gate of the campe, gaue aduertisement to Cæsar, that the same way which the legion went, there appeared a greater dust then was vsually seene. Cæsar suspecting that which in deede was true, that the Britaines were entered into some new resolution, he tooke those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arme themselues, and presently to follow him, and went that waie, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the campe, he saw his men ouercharged with the enemie, and scarce able to sustaine the assault, the legion thronged together on a heape, and weapons cast from all partes amongst them. For when they had haruested all other quarters, there remained one piece of corne, whither the enemie suspected the Romans would at last come; and in the night time conuaied themselues secretly into the woods, where they continued, vntill the Romans were come into the field, and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed and occupied in reaping; they suddenly set vpon them, and slaying some few of them, rowted the rest and incompassed them about with their horsemen, and chariots. Their manner of fight with chariots, was first to ride vp and downe and cast their weapons, as they saw aduantage; and with the terrour of their horses & ratteling of their wheeles, to disorder the companies; and when

they had wound themselues betweene anie troupes of horse, they forsooke their chariots and fought on foot: in the meane time the guiders of their chariots would driue a little aside, and so place themselues, that if their maisters needed anie helpe, they might haue an easie passage vnto them. And thus they performed in all their fightes, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firme stabilitie of footmen; and were so readie with daily practise, that they could staie in the declinitie of a steepe hill, and turne short or moderate their going, as it seemed best vnto them; and runne along the beame of the coach and rest vpon the yoake, or harnesse of their horses, and returne as speedely againe at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæsar came to rescue them in verie good time: for at his comming, the enemie stood still; and the souldiers gathered their spirits vnto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Cæsar, thinking it an vnfit time, either to prouoke the enemy, or to giue him battell; he continued a while in the same place: And then returned with the legions into the campe. While these thinges were a doing, and the Romaines thus busied; the Britaines that were in the field, conuaied themselues all awaie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

BY this wee plainely finde, that there were vsually two cohortes (which according to the rate of 120 in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720 men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the campe, and were alwaies in readinesse vpon any seruice. The commoditie whereof appeareth by this accident, for considering that the aduertisement required haste and speedie recourse, it greatly furthered their rescue to haue so manie men readie to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, vntill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THeir manner of fight with chariots, is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to bee stood vpon any longer: onely I obserue, that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europe, the vse of chariots is neuer mentioned: but they haue euer beene attributed, as a peculiar fight, vnto the easterne countries, as sutable to the plaine and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scripture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troie in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly we may obſerue, the diſcreete or moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes he vſed to make his ſouldiers confident in his directions: for notwithſtanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a preſent reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inaſmuch as his men had beene ſomewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britaines) hee thought it beſt to expect ſome other oportunitie. And againe, to auoid the inconueniences of a fearefull retrait, he continued a while in the ſame place, to imbolden his men with the ſight of the enemie. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perſwaſion in his ſouldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull reſpect of their ſafetie; which gaue his mē reſolution when they were caried vpon ſeruice, being aſſured that what ſeruice ſoeuer they were imploied vpon, was moſt diligently to bee performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate iſſue of that warre: whereas if they had perceiued that headſtrong furie, which carrieth men on with a deſire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes wherby it may be obtained, had directed the courſe of their proceedinges, they might with reaſon haue drawne backe from ſuch imploiments, and valewed their ſafetie aboue the iſſue of ſuch an enterpriſe. And hence ariſeth that confident opinion, which the ſoldiers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the courſe of a warre.

CHAP. XIII.

The Britaines make head, with their forces; and *are beaten by Cæſar: his returne into* Gallia.

AFTER this; for manie daies together, there followed ſuch tempeſts and foule weather, that both the Romans were conſtrained to keepe their campe, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing againſt them: But in the meane time, they ſent meſſengers into all quarters, publiſhing the ſmall number of the Roman forces, and amplifying the greatneſſe of the bootie, and the eaſie means offered vnto them of perpetuall libertie, if they could take the Roman campe. Shortly vpon this, hauing gathered a great companie, both of horſe and foote; they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæſar (although he foreſaw the euent by that which before had happened, that if the enemie were beaten backe, he would auoide the danger by flight) yet hauing ſome 30 horſe, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his Cæſar.

comming into Britanie; he imbattailed his legions before his campe; and so gaue them battell. The enemie not being able to beare the assault of the Roman souldiers, turned their backes and fled: the Romans followed them, as farre as they could by running on foote; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their townes farre and neare, they returned to their campe. The same daie the Britaines sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himselfe to the winter sea, with such weake shipping: and therefore hauing got a conuenient time, he hoised saile a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe vnto the continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same hauen, put in somewhat lower into the land: the souldiers that were in them being about 300, being set on shore, and marching towardes their campe: the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a bootie, first with a few of their men stood about them, commanding them vpon paine of death to laie downe their weapons; and as the Romans, by casting themselues into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000 of the enemy. Which thing being knowen, Cæsar sent out all the horsemen to relieue them: in the meane time the Romans sustained the force of the enemie, and fought valiantly the space of foure houres; and receiuing themselues some few woundes, they slew many of the enemie. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the enemie cast awaie their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

OBSERVATIONS.

OF al the figures which the *Tactici* haue chosen to make vse of in militarie affaires; the circle hath euer beene taken for the fittest, to be applied in the defensiue part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all partes whatsoeuer is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometrie teatmeth a circumference a simple line, for as much as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another; the figure notwithstanding will remaine the same, because of the equall bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which propertie, as it proueth an vniformitie of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flanke. So doth that, which Euclide doth demonstrate in the 3 of his Elements, concerning the small affinitie betweene a right line, and a circle (which being drawen to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatnes of this strength in regard of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which, howsoeuer they seeme, as speculatiue qualities, conceiued rather by intellectuall discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proued the strength of this figure, in a defensiue part, aboue any other maner of imbattailing; let vs not neglect the knowledge of these naturall properties, which discouer the causes of this effect: neither let vs neglect this

this part of militarie knowledge, being so strong a meanes to maintaine valour, and the sinew of all our abilitie: for order correspondent to circumstances, is the whole strength and power of an Armie. Neither ought there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or voide of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eate nor sleepe, without the direction of the Consull, or chiefe commander; otherwise their valour might rather haue beene tearmed furie then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it neuer failed as long as the said order continued perfect.

It appeareth therfore, how important it is for a commander to looke into the diuersitie of orders for imbattailing, and to waigh the nature thereof; that hee may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans tearmed this figure *Orbis*, which signifieth a round body both with a concaue, and a conuex surface: in resemblance whereof, I vnderstand this Orbe of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peraduenture consist of fiue or more or fewer rankes, inclosing one another after the nature of so manie circles, described about one Center: so that either the middest thereof remained voide, or otherwise contained such cariages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This forme of imbattailing was neuer vsed, but in great extremitie: for as it was the safest of all other; so it gaue suspition to the souldiers of exceeding danger, which abated much of their heat in battell, as wil hereafter appeare by the testimonie of Cæsar himselfe, in the fift Commentarie, vpon the occasion which happened vnto Sabinus and Cotta.

CHAP. XIIII.

THE next daie, Cæsar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of Britanie, against the reuolted Morini, who hauing no place of refuge because their boges & fens were dried vp, where they had sheltered themselues the yeare before; they all fell vnder the power of his mercie. Q. Titurius, and A. Cotta the Legats, who had led the legions against the Menapij, after they had wasted their fieldes, cut vp their corne, burned their houses, for the Menapij were all hid in thicke woods; they returned to Cæsar: these thinges being thus ended, Cæsar placed the wintering campes of all his legions amongst the Belgæ; to which place two only of all the cities in Britanie, sent hostages vnto him: the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: vpon the relation of Cæsars letters, the senate decreed a supplication for the space of 20 daies. Cæsar.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN the ende of the second Commentarie, we reade of a supplication granted by the senate, for 15 daies; which was neuer granted to anie man before that time, since the first building of the citie: but forasmuch as in this fourth yeare of the warres in Gallia, it was augmented from 15

vnto 20 daies, I thought it fit to referre the handling thereof, vnto this place. We are therfore to vnderſtand, that whenſoeuer a Roman Generall had carried himſelfe well in the warres, by gaining a victorie, or enlarging the boundes of their Empire; that then the ſenate did decree a ſupplication to the Gods, in the name of that captaine. And this dignitie was much ſought after, not onely becauſe it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their Gods ſhould be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourſe and gratulation of the Roman people: but alſo becauſe a ſupplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greateſt honour in the Roman gouernment: And therfore Cato nameth it the prerogatiue of a triumph. And Liuie in his 26 booke ſaith, that it was long diſputed on in the ſenate, how they could denie one that was there preſent to triumph, whoſe abſence they had honoured, with ſupplication, and thankeſgiuing to the Gods, for things happily effected? The maner of the Ceremonie was; that after the Magiſtrate had publikely proclaimed it with this forme or ſtile, *quod bene & feliciter rempublicam adminiſtraſſet*; the Roman people cloathed in white garmentes and crowned with garlands, went to all the temples of the Gods, and there offered ſacrifices, to gratulate the victorie in the name of the Generall. In which time they were forbidden all other buſineſſes, but that which pertained to this ſolemnity. It ſeemeth that this time of ſupplication, was at firſt included within one or two daies at the moſt, as appeareth by Liuie in his third booke, where he ſaith, that the victorie gained by two ſeuerall battels, was ſpitefully ſhut vp by the ſenat in one daies ſupplication: the people of their owne accord keeping the next daie holie and celebrating it with greater deuotion then the former.

Li. 15. fami. Cicero.

Vpon the victorie which Camillus had againſt the Veij, there were granted foure daies of ſupplication; to which there was afterward a daie added, which was the vſuall time of ſupplication vnto the time that Pompei ended the warre, which they called Mithridaticum; when the vſuall time of fiue daies was doubled, and made 10, and in the ſecond of theſe Commentaries, made 15, and now brought to 20 daies. Which ſetteth foorth the incitements and rewardes of wel doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to ſuch as indeuoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their common-wealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentarie.

THE FIFT COMMENTARIE OF THE WAR, WHICH CÆSAR MADE IN GALLIA.

THE ARGVMENT.

CÆsar causeth a great nauie to be built in Gallia: he caried 5 legions into Britany, where he made war with the Britains, on both sides the riuer Thames: at his returne into Gallia, most of the Galles reuolted; and first the Eburones vnder the conduction of Ambiorix, set vpon the campe of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumuented by subtilty; and then besieged the campe of Cicero: but were put by, and their Armie ouerthrowen by Cæsar.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great store of shipping made by the souldiers, and commandeth them to be brought to the hauen Iccius.

LVCIVS Domitius, and Appius Claudius, being Consuls; Cæsar at his going into Italie, gaue order to the Legats to build as manie ships that winter, as possibly they could; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch then those which are vsed in the mediterraneum sea, for the speedier lading & vnlading of thē, and because the tides in these seas were verie great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottome then such as were vsuall in other places, and all of them to be made for the vse of Oares, to which purpose their low building serued verie conueniently. Other necessaries and furniture for rigging, he gaue order to haue it brought out of Spaine. Cæsar after the assembly of the states in Lombardie, and that he set free Illiricum from the incursions of the Piruſtæ, he returned into Gallia; where he found 600 ships built, by the extraordinarie industrie of the souldiers, notwithstanding the penurie and want of all necessarie matter, with 28 Gallies ready furnished, which in a few daies might be launched: hauing commended the soldiers and ouerseers of the worke, he commanded them to be brought to the port called Iccius, from whence he knew the passage into Britanie, was not aboue thirtie mile ouer. Cæsar.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis Iccius Portus Floide thinketh to be Caleis; others take it to bee Saint Omer, partly in regard of the situation of the place, which being in it selfe verie lowe, hath notwithstanding very high bankes, which incompasse the towne about; and in times past was a verie large hauen. To this maie be added the distance from this towne, to the next continent of the Iland of Britany; which Strabo maketh to containe 320 stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13 leages. Cæsar maketh it thirtie mile: this is the hauen, which Pliny calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum.*

CHAP. II.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie: landeth his forces, and seeketh the enemie.

Cæsar.

CAESAR hauing prepared all things in readinesse, he left Labienus in the continent with three legions, and 2000 horse, both to keepe the hauen and make prouision of corne; and also to obserue the motion of the Galles: and with fiue legions and the like number of horse, as he left in the continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea, with a soft south winde, which continued vntill midnight; and then ceasing, he was carried with the tide vntill the morning, when he perceiued that the Iland laie on his left hand: and againe, as the tide changed, hee laboured by rowing to reach that part of the Iland, where he had found good landing the yeare before: wherein the souldiers deserued great commendation; for by strength and force of Oares, they made their great ships of burthen to keepe waie with the Galleies. About high noone, they arriued in Britanie, with all their ships: neither was there any enemie seene in that place; but as afterward Cæsar vnderstood by the captiues, the Britains were there with a great power; but being terrified with the infinite number of shipping, which they discouered from the shore (for there were in all aboue 800) they forsooke the shore, and hid themselues in the vpland countrie. Cæsar hauing landed his men, and chosen a conuenient place to incampe, assoone as he vnderstood by the captiues where the enemy laie, in the third watch of the night, he marched towards them; leauing ten cohortes and 300 horse, for a garizon to his shipping: which he the lesse feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft and open shore: he marched that night about 12 mile before he found the enemie: The Britaines sending out their horse, and chariots to a riuer that ran betweene them and the Romans, and hauing the aduantage of the vpper ground; began to hinder the Romans, and to giue them battell, but being beaten backe with our horsemen, they conuaied themselues into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by art and nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their ciuill wars: for all the entrances were

shut

ſhut vp with great trees, laid ouerthwart the paſſages. And the Britaines ſhewed themſelues out of the wood but here and there, not ſuffering the Romans to enter the fortification: but the ſoldiors of the ſeauenth legion, with a Teſtudo which they made, and a mount which they raiſed, tooke the place and droue them all out of the woods, without any loſſe at all; ſauing ſome fewe wounds which they receiued. But Cæſar forbad his men to follow after them, with any long purſuit, becauſe hee was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that daie being ſpent, he would imploy the reſt thereof in the fortification of his campe.

OBSERVATIONS.

CÆſar, hauing taken what aſſurance of peace he could with the Galles, both by carrying the chiefeſt of their Princes with him, and by leauing three legions in the continent, to keepe the vulgar people in obedience: he imbarked al his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the ſame caſualties, and take the benefit of the ſame aduentures, which being neglected the yeare before, drew him into many inconueniences for want of horſe, which being imbarked at an other hauen met with other chãces, and ſaw other fortunes; and neuer came to him into Britanie: The place of landing in this ſecond voiage, was the ſame where he landed the yeare before: and by the circumſtances of this hiſtory, may agree with that which tradition hath deliuered of Deale in Kent, where it is ſaid that Cæſar landed. In the firſt yeere we finde, that he neuer remoued his campe from the ſea ſhore, where he firſt ſeated himſelfe; although his men went out to bring in corne, as far as they might wel returne againe at night: but now hee entered further into the Iland, and within twelue miles march came vnto a riuer, which muſt needs be that of Canturbury, which falleth into the ſea at Sandwich.

In that he ſaith that the garizon of his ſhipping conſiſted of ten cohortes, which I haue ſaid to be a legion: we muſt vnderſtande, that Cæſar left not an entire legion in that garizon; but he tooke ten cohorts out of his whole forces, peraduenture two out of euerie legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his ſhipping.

CHAP. III.

Cæſar returneth to his nauies to take order for ſuch loſſes as had happened by tempeſt the night before.

THE next daie earlie in the morning, hee deuided his forces into 3. companies, and ſent them out to purſue the enemy: but before they had marched any farre diſtance, and came to haue the reereward of the enemy in vewe; there came newes from Q. Atrius, with whom he left the ten Cæſar.

cohorts, and the charge of the ſhipping, that the night before there was ſuch a tempeſt at ſea, that the whole nauy was either ſore beaten or caſt on ſhore; and that neither anchor nor Gable coulde holde them, nor yet the Sailers indure the force of the weather; and that there was great loſſe in the ſhipping, by running againſt one another, in the violence of the tempeſt. Vpon theſe newes; Cæſar cauſed the legions to be called backe againe, and to ceaſe for that time, from following the enemy any further; he himſelfe returned to the nauy, where he found 40. ſhips loſt, and the reſt not to be repaired but with great induſtry and paines: firſt therefore he choſe ſhipwrites and Carpenters out of the legions, and cauſed others to bee ſent for out of Gallia; and writ to Labienus to make ready what ſhipping he could. And although it ſeemed a matter of great difficulty and much labour; yet he thought it beſt, to hale vp all the ſhips on ſhore, and to incloſe them within the fortification of his campe: in this buſineſſe he ſpent ten daies, without intermiſſion either of night or day, vntill hee had drawn vp the ſhips, and ſtrongly fortified the camp: leauing the ſame garriſon which was there before to defend it.

THE OBSERVATION.

WHerein we may behold the true image of vndanted valour, and the horrible induſtry (as Tully tearmeth it) which hee vſed to preuent fortune of her ſtroke in his buſines, and comprehende caſualties and future contingents, within the compas of order and the bounds of his owne power; being able in tenne daies ſpace, to ſet almoſt eight hundred ſhips from the hazarde of winde and weather; and to make his campe the Roade for his nauie, that ſo he might reſt ſecure of a meanes to returne at his pleaſure.

CHAP. IIII.

The Britains make Caſsiuellaunus generall in this warre: the Iland, and the maners of the people deſcribed.

Cæſar. *CÆSAR returning to the place from whence hee came, founde far greater forces of the Britans there aſſembled, then he left whē he went to the nauie. And that by publike conſent of the Britaines, the whole gouernment of that war was giuen to Caſsiuellaunus, whoſe kingdom lay deuided from the maritimate ſtates, with the riuer Thames, beginning at the ſea, & extending it ſelfe 80. mile into the Iland. This Caſsiuellaunus made continuall war with his neighbor ſtates: but vpon the comming of the Romans, they all forgat their home-bred quarrels, and caſt the whole gouernment vpon his ſholders, as the fitteſt to direct that war.*

The inner part of Britanie is inhabited, by ſuch as memory recordeth to be borne in the Iland; and the maritimate coaſt by ſuch as came out of Belgia, either to make incurſions or inuaſions; and after the warre was ended, they continued in the poſſeſſions they had gained, and were called by the name of the cities from whence they came: the countrey is very populous, and well inhabited with houſes, much like vnto them in Gallia. They haue great ſtore of cattell, and vſe braſſe for money, or yron ringes waighed at a certaine rate. In the mediterranean partes there is found great quantity of Tyn, and in the maritimate parts yron: their braſſe was brought in by other nations. They haue all ſorts of trees that they haue in Gallia, excepting the figge and the Beech. Their religion will not ſuffer them to eate, either Haire, Hen, or Gooſe; notwithſtandig they haue of all ſorts, as well for nouelty as variety. The country is more temperate, and not ſo colde as Gallia. The Iland lieth triangle wiſe, whereof one ſide confronteth Gallia, of which ſide that angle, wherein Kent is pointed to the Eaſt, and the other angle to the South: this ſide containeth about 500. mile. An other ſide lieth toward Spaine and the Weſt, that waie where Ireland lieth, being an Iland halfe as big as England; and as farre diſtant from it as Gallia: in the midway between England & Ireland, lieth an Iland called Mona, beſides many other ſmaller Ilands, of which ſome write that in winter time for 30. daies together, they haue continuall night, whereof we learned nothing by inquirie, only we found by certaine meaſures of water, that the nights in England were ſhorter then in the Continent. The length of this ſide, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth 700. mile. The thirde ſide lieth to the North and the open ſea, ſauing that this angle doth ſomwhat point towards Germanie; this ſide is thought to contain 800. miles: And ſo the whole Iland containeth in circuit 2000. miles. Of al the inhabitants, they of Kent are moſt curteous and ciuill; al their countrey bordering vpon the ſea, and little differing from the faſhion of Gallia. Moſt of the inlande people ſow no corne, but liue with milke and fleſh, clothed with ſkins; and hauing their faces painted with a blew colour, to the end they may ſeeme more terrible in fight: they haue the haire of their head long, hauing al other parts of their body ſhauen, ſauing their vpper lip. Their wiues are common to ten or twelue, eſpecially brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are borne, are put vnto them, vnto whom the mother was firſt giuen in mariage.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN the deſcriptions of the ancient Britains, we may firſt obſerue their pedegree, according to the Haraldry of that time: wherein we muſt vnderſtand that in thoſe ages, the Ntiaons of the worlde thought it no ſmall honor, to deriue their deſcent from a certaine beginning, and to make either ſome of their Gods, or ſome man of a famous memorie, the father of that progenie, and founder of their ſtate; that ſo they might promiſe a fortunate continuance to their gouernment, being firſt laide and eſtabliſhed by ſo powerfull a meanes. But if this failed, they then bragged of antiquitie, and caſt all their glory vpon the fertility of their ſoile, being ſo ſtrong and fruitful, that it yeelded of it ſelfe ſuch a people, as they were: and ſo we read howe the Athenians, for as much as they were ignoraunt from whence they came,

were

ware an Oaken leafe, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And hereupon alſo grew the controuerſie, betweene the Egyptians and the Scythians, concerning antiquity: wherein the Egyptians ſeemed to haue great aduantage, becauſe of the fertility and heat of their countrey; whereas the Scythians inhabited a colde climate, vnfruitfull and an enemy to generation. Of this ſort were the Britains, that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Ilande: who not knowing from whence they came, nor who firſt brought them thither, ſatisfied themſelues with that common receiued opinion, that they were borne and bred of the earth. The ſea coaſt was poſſeſt by ſuch as came out of the continent and retained the names of the cities from whence they came, as a memoriall of their progenitors.

The forme of the Iland is very well deſcribed, and meaſured out, according to the ſcale of our moderne Geographers. For concerning the difference of longitude between the Eaſterne angle of Kent, and the furtheſt point of Cornewal, they make it eight degrees; which in a maner iumpeth with Cæſars dimenſuration: the other ſides are ſomewhat longer; and therefore Tacitus in the life of Agricola, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that ſide which bordereth vpon France to reſemble the Edge; and the other two ſides to incline by little and little, one towardes an other; and ſo make the Ilande narrower at the top, according to the forme of that inſtrument. Hee ſetteth downe the whole compaſſe of the Iland, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers, who by the quantity of the circuit, did vſually iudge of the content, not conſidering that the *Area* of euery figure dependeth as well of the quantity of the angle, as the length of the ſide. Concerning the temperature of Britanie, in regard of the colde winters in France, we muſt vnderſtand that Britanie hath euer beene found of a more temperate conſtitution, in regarde of ſharpe and cold winters, then any other countrey lying vnder the ſame parallelles: whether the cauſe thereof may bee imputed to the continuall motion of the ſea about the Iland, which begetteth heat, as ſome haue imagined; or to the ſite thereof, in regard of other Continents from whence the winde alwaies riſeth, and carieth with it the nature of the countrey by which it paſſeth; and ſo the Ilande hauing no other continent lying North to it, from whence the winde may riſe, but all for the moſt part vpon the South, hath no ſuch colde windes to diſtemper it, as other parts of Germany, which are vnder the ſame parallel; but the Southern wind, which is ſo frequent in Britanie, tempereth ayre, with a mild diſpoſition, and ſo keepeth it warme; or whether it be ſome other vnknowne cauſe, our Philoſophers reſt vnſatisfied. But as touching Gallia, it may bee ſaide, that foraſmuch as it beareth more to the South, then this Iland doth, the aire thereof by reaſon of the continuall heate, is of a farre purer diſpoſition; and ſo pierceth more then this groſſer aire of Britany, & carieth the cold further into the pores; and ſo ſeemeth ſharper and of a far colder diſpoſition.

This Iland, which Cæſar nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of *Man*, and lieth betweene Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemie calleth it *Monæda*, Tacitus calleth Angleſey by the name of *Mona*, peraduenture from the nomination of the Britains, who calleth it *Tyrmon*, the land of Mon.

Concer-

Concerning thoſe places, where the night continueth in the midſt of winter for 30. dayes together, they muſt be ſited 6. degrees beyond the circle Articke, and haue a day in ſummer of like continuance, according to the rules of Aſtronomy. In that he found the nights in Britanie ſhorter then in the continent, we muſt vnderſtand it to be only in ſummer: for the more oblique the horizon is, the more vneuen are the portions of the diurnall circles which it cutteth; and the nearer it commeth to a right horizon, the nearer it commeth to an equality of day and night: and hence it happeneth, that in ſummer time, the nights in France are longer then here in England, and the winter ſhorter. The like we muſt vnderſtand of all Southerne and Northerne countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the ciuility of the Kentiſh men, and their curteous diſpoſition aboue the reſt of the Britaines, which muſt be imputed to that ordinary courſe which brought ciuilitie vnto all other nations: of whom ſuch as were firſt ſeated in their poſſeſſions, and entertained ſocietie, were the firſt that brought in ciuill conuerſation, and by little and little were purified, and ſo attained to the perfection of ciuill gouernement. So we find that firſt Aſſirians and Babilonians (as neareſt to the mountaines of Armenia where the Arke reſted, and people firſt inhabited) reduced their ſtates into common weales of monarchies of exquiſite gouernment, floriſhing with all maner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other countries lay either waſt, or ouerwhelmed with Barbariſme. From thence it flowed into Egypt, out of Egypt into Greece, out of Greece into Italy, out of Italy into Gallia, and from thence into England, where our Kentiſh men firſt entertained it, as bordering vpon France, and frequented with merchants of thoſe countries.

CHAP. V.

Diuers skirmiſhes betweene the Romaines *and the Britaines.*

THE caualrie of the enemie and their chariots, gaue a ſharpe conflict to the Romaine horſemen in their march: but ſo, that the Romaines got the better euery way, driuing them with great ſlaughter to the woods and hils, and looſing alſo ſome of their owne men, being too venturous in the purſuit. The Britaines after ſome intermiſſion of time, when the Romanes litle thought of them, and were buſied in fortifying their campe, came ſodainly out of the woods, and charged vpon thoſe that kept ſtation before the campe. Cæſar ſent out two the chiefeſt cohorts of two legions to ſecond their fellowes: theſe two cohorts ſtanding with a ſmall alley betweene them, the other that were firſt charged, being terrified with that ſtraunge kind of fight, boldly brake through the thickeſt of the enemie, and ſo returned in ſafetie to their fellowes. That day Quintus Laberius Durus, a Tribune of the ſouldiers was ſlaine; the Britaines were repelled with moe cohorts, which Cæſar ſent to ſecond the former. Cæſar.

And forasmuch as the fight happened in the view of all the campe, it was plainely perceiued, that the legionarie ſouldiers, being neither able for the waight of their armour, to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to go farre from his enſigne; was not a fit aduerſary to conteſt this kind of enemie: and that the horſemen likewiſe fought with no leſſe danger, inaſmuch as the enemie would retire backe of purpoſe, and when they had drawne them a litle from the legions, they would then light from their chariots and encounter them, with that aduantage which is betweene a footman and a horſeman. Furthermore, they neuer fought thicke and cloſe together, but thin and in great diſtances, hauing ſtations of men to ſuccour one another, to receiue the weary, and to ſend out freſh ſupplies.

OBSERVATIONS.

VPon this occaſion of their heauy armour, I will deſcribe a legionary ſoldier in his compleat furniture, that we may better iudge of their maner of warfare, and vnderſtand wherein their greateſt ſtrength conſiſted. And firſt we are to learne, that their legionary ſouldiers were called *Milites grauis armaturæ*, ſoldiers wearing heauy armor, to diſtinguiſh them from the Velites, the archers, ſlingers, and other light armed men. Their offenſiue armes were a couple of piles, or as ſome wil, but one pile, and a Spaniſh ſword, ſhort and ſtrong, to ſtrike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defenſiue armes, were a helmet, a corſlet, and bootes of braſſe, with a large target, which in ſome ſort was offenſiue, in regard of that *vmbonem* which ſtucke out in the middeſt thereof. The pile is deſcribed at large in the firſt booke, and the target in the ſecond: the ſword (as Polybius witneſſeth) was ſhort, two edged, very ſharpe, and of a ſtrong point: and therefore Liuie in his 22. Booke ſayeth, that the Gaules vſed very long ſwordes without pointes; but the Romaines had ſhort ſwordes, readier for vſe; theſe they called Spaniſh ſwordes, becauſe they borrowed that faſhion from the Spaniard. The old Romaines were ſo girt with their ſwords, as appeareth by Polybius, and their monuments in marble, that from their left ſhoulder it hung vpon their right thigh, contrary to the vſe of theſe times, which as I haue noted before, was in regard of their target, which they caried on their left arme: this ſword was hung with a belt of leather, beſet with ſtuds, as Varro noteth, and theſe were their offenſiue weapons.

Lib. 4.

Pli. lib. 10.

Their helmet was of braſſe, adorned with three Oſtrich feathers of a cubite in length, by which the ſouldier appeared of a larger ſtature, and more terrible to the enemy, as Polybius ſaith in his ſixt booke. Their breaſt-plate was either of braſſe or yron, ioynted together after the manner of ſcales, or platted with little rings of yron: their bootes were made of barres of braſſe, from the foote vp to the knee. And thus were the legionarie ſouldiers armed, to ſtand firme rather then to vſe any nimble motion, and to combine themſelues into a bodie of that ſtrength which might not eaſily recoile at the oppoſition of any confrontment; for agilitie ſtandeth indifferent to helpe either a retreit

or

or a purſuit, and nimble footed ſoldiors are as readie to flie backe, as to march forward; but a waighty body keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffe: ſo that whenſoeuer they came to firme buckeling, and felt the enemy ſtand ſtiffe before them, ſuch was their practiſe, and exerciſe in continual workes, that they neuer fainted vnder any ſuch taske; but the victorie went alwayes cleere on their ſide. But if the enemy gaue waie to their violence, and came not in but for aduantage, and then as ſpeedilie retired, before the counterbuffe were well diſcharged; then did their nimbleneſſe much helpe their weakeneſſe, and fruſtrate the greateſt parte of the Romaine diſcipline. This is alſo proued in the ouerthrowe of Sabinus and Cotta, where Ambiorix finding the inconuenience of buckeling at handy blowes, commaunded his men to fight a far off; and if they were aſſaulted, to giue backe; and to come on againe as they ſaw occaſion: which ſo wearied out the Romaines, that they all fell vnder the execution of the Galles. Let this ſuffice therefore to ſhew, how vnapt the Romans were to flie vpon any occaſion, when their armour was ſuch, that it kept them from al ſtarting motions, and made thē ſutable to the ſtaied and wel aſſured rules of their diſcipline, which were as certaine principles in the execution of a ſtanding battaile; and therefore not ſo fit either for a purſuit, or a flight.

Concerning the vnequall combat betweene a horſeman and a footeman, it may be thought ſtrange, that a footeman ſhoulde haue ſuch an aduantage againſt a horſeman, beeing ouermatched, at leaſt with a Sextuple proportion both of ſtrength and agilitie: but wee muſt vnderſtande, that as the horſe is much ſwifter in a long cariere; ſo in ſpeedie and nimble turning at hand, wherein the ſubſtance of the combate conſiſteth, the footeman farre exceedeth the horſeman in aduantage, hauing a larger marke to hit by the Horſe, then the other hath. Beſides, the horſeman ingageth both his valour, and his fortune in the good ſpeede of his horſe, his woundes and his death doe conſequentlie pull the rider after, his feare or furie maketh his maiſter either deſperate or ſlowe of performance, and what defect ſoeuer riſeth from the horſe, muſt bee anſwered out of the honour of the rider. And ſurely it ſeemeth reaſonable, that what thing ſoeuer draweth vs into the ſocietie of ſo great a hazard, ſhould as much as is poſſible, be contained in the compaſſe of our owne power. The ſword which we manage with our owne hand, affoordeth greater aſſurance then the harquebuſe, wherein there are many partes belonging to the action, as the pouder, the ſtone, the ſpring, and ſuch like; whereof if the leaſt faile of his part, we likewiſe faile of our fortune: but howe probable ſoeuer this ſeemeth, this is certaine, that in the courſe of the Roman wars, the horſe were euer defeated by the foot, as is manifeſtly proued in the firſt of theſe bookes.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar giueth the Britains two seuerall ouerthrowes.

Cæsar.

THE next daie, the enemie made a stand vpon the hils a far off from the campe, and shewed themselues not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen, as they were the day before: but about noone, when Cæsar sent out three legions, and al his Caualry to get forrage, vnder the conduction of the Caius Trebonius a legate, they made a sodaine assault vpon the forragers, and fell in close with the Ensignes, and the legions. The Romans charged very fiercely vpon them, and beate them backe; neither did they make an end of following them, vntill the horsemen trusting to the succour of the legions which were behinde them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they giue them respite either to make head, to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots. After this ouerthrow, all their Auxiliarie forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romans with any great power. Cæsar vnderstanding their determination, caried his armie to the riuer Thames, and so to the confines of Cassiuellaunus, which riuer was passable by foot but in one place only, and that very hardly; at his comming hee found a great power of the enemy to be imbattailed on the other side, and the banck fortified with many sharpe stakes, and many other also were planted couertly vnder the water. These things being discouered to the Romans by the Captiues and fugitiues; Cæsar putting his horse before, caused the legions to followe sodainlie after, who notwithstanding they had but their heades cleere aboue the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the bancke and betooke themselues to flight.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis attempt of Cæsar seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that hee runneth into as strange conclusions, concerning this matter, as first that he that imitateth Cæsar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great commander hath nothing common with other leaders: but especially, he crieth out at the baseneſse of the Britains, that woulde suffer themselues so cowardly to be beaten. But if wee looke into the circumstances of the action, we shal find both Art & good direction therein; for being assured by the fugitiues, that the riuer was passable in that place, & in that place onlie, he knew that he must either aduēture ouer there, or leaue Cassiuellaunus for an other sūmer, which was a very strong inducement to vrge him to that enterprise. The difficultie

difficultie wherof was much relieued by good direction, which conſiſted of two pointes, firſt, by ſending ouer the horſemen in the front of the legions, who might better indure the charge of the enemie, then the footmen coulde, that were vppe to the necke in water; and withall, to ſhelter the footmen from the furie of the enemie. Secondly, he ſent them ouer with that ſpeede, that they were on the other ſide of the water, before the enemie coulde tell what they attempted: for if he had lingered in the ſeruice, and giuen the enemie leaue to find the aduantage which he had by experience, his men had neuer bin able to haue indured the hazard of ſo dangerous a ſeruice. It is hard to coniecture at the place, where this ſeruice was performed; for ſince the building of London bridge, manie foordes haue beene ſcoured with the current, and fall of the water, which before that time carried not ſuch a depth as now they doe.

CHAP. VII.

The concluſion of the Britiſh warre: Cæſar returneth into Gallia.

Caſſiuellaunus hauing no courage to contend anie longer, diſmiſſed his greateſt forces, and retaining onely foure thouſand chariots, obſerued their iourneies, keeping the wood countries, and driuing men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, for feare of the Romans; and as their horſemen ſtraied out either for forrage or bootie, hee ſent his chariots out of the woods by vnknowne waies, and put their horſemen to great perill: in regard whereof, the horſemen durſt neuer aduenture further then the legions, neither was there anie more ſpoile done in the countrey, then that which the legionarie ſouldiers did of themſelues. In the meane time, the Trinobantes, being almoſt the greateſt ſtate of all thoſe countries (from whom Mandubratius had fled to Cæſar into Gallia, for that his father Imanuentius holding the kingdome, was ſlaine by Caſſiuellaunus) ſent Ambaſſadours to Cæſar, to offer their ſubmiſsion, and to intreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppreſsion of Caſſiuellaunus, and ſent vnto them to take the kingdome. Cæſar hauing receiued from them fortie pledges, and corne for his Armie, ſent Mandubratius vnto them. The Trinobantes, being thus kept from the violence of the ſouldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Anacalites, Bibrocaſſi, yeelded themſelues to Cæſar. By theſe he vnderſtood, that Caſſiuellaunus his towne was not farre off, fortified with woods and bogges, and well ſtored with men and cattell. The Britaines call a towne a thicke wood, incloſed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retrait when they ſtood in feare of incurſions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæſar with his Armie, and found it well fortified both by arte and nature: And as he aſſaulted it in two ſeuerall places, the enemie vnable to keepe it, caſt himſelfe out of the towne by a backe waie, and ſo he tooke it. Where he found great ſtore of cattell, and ſlew manie of the Britaines.

While theſe thinges were a doing, Caſsiuellaunus ſent meſſengers into Kent, wherin there were foure ſeuerall kinges, Cingetorix, Caruilius, Taximagulus, and Segonax, them he commanded with all the power they could make, to ſet vpon the campe where the nauie was kept. Theſe kinges comming to the place, were ouerthrowne by a ſallie which the Romans made out vpon them, manie of them being ſlaine, and Cingetorix taken priſoner. This battell concurring with the former loſſes, and eſpecially moued thereunto with the reuolt of the forenamed cities, Caſsiuellaunus intreated peace of Cæſar by Comius of Arras. Cæſar being determined to winter in the continent, for feare of ſudden commotions in Gallia, and that the ſummer was now farre ſpent, and might eaſilie be lingered out, hee commanded pledges to be brought vnto him, and ſet downe what yearely tribute the Britaines ſhould paie to the Romans: the hoſtages being taken, he caried backe his Armie to the ſea, imbarked his men and arriued ſafe with all his ſhips vpon the coaſt of Gallia.

THE OBSERVATION.

AND thus ended the warre in Britanie, which affoordeth little matter of diſcourſe, being indeede but a ſcambling warre, as wel in regard of the Britaines themſelues, who after they had felt the ſtrength of the Roman legions, would neuer aduenture to buckle with them in any ſtanding battel, as alſo in regard that there were no ſuch townes in Britany as are recorded to haue been in Gallia, which might haue giuen great honour to the warre, if there had been any ſuch to haue been beſieged, and taken in by Cæſar. And although Tacitus ſaith, that Britanie was rather viewed then ſubdued by Cæſar, being deſirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we finde here, that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirt, or the heart of Britanie, (for our Hiſtorians doe vnderſtand them to haue inhabited that part, which lieth as farre as Yorkeſhire and Lancaſhire) were brought vnder the Roman Empire by Cæſar: who was the firſt that euer laide tribute vpon Britanie, in the behalfe of the people of Rome; or caſt vpon them the heauie name of a ſubdued people.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BVT leaſt I may ſeeme negligent in theſe occurrences of Britanie, as not deeming the alteration happening in this Iſland by the power of Rome, worthy due memorie: I will briefly ſet downe the ſtate thereof from this Area during the liues of the twelue Emperours.

Iulius Cæſars next ſucceſſors, firſt Auguſtus and then Tiberius, thought it policie to reſtraine the infinite deſire of inlarging the Romaine Empire, and ſo left this entrance into Britanie vnſeconded. Caius is ſaid to haue had a meaning to inuade it, but did nothing. Claudius tranſported legions and aides, and firſt ſent Aulus Plautius gouernour, and after him Oſtorius, who ouerthrew king Cradocke in battell, and ſhewed him at Rome to Claudius, to Agrippina and the Lords of the Senate, who affirmed the ſight to be no leſſe honourable, then when P. Scipio ſhewed Siphaces, or L. Paulus Perſes; him Didius Gallus ſucceeded, who being old and full of honour, thought it ſufficient to keepe that which his predeceſſors had gotten. Next vnto Didius came Veranius, onely memorable in dying the firſt yeare of his Propretorſhip: but Suetonius Paulinus following got a great name, firſt by inuading Angleſey, ſtrong with inhabitants, and a receptacle for fugitiues; ſecondly by ouerthrowing Boodicea Queene of the Iceni, in a battell comparable to the victories of old times, wherein foureſcore thouſand Britaines were ſlaine, with the loſſe of foure hundred Romaine ſouldiers; but being thought to be ouer ſeuere, he left his charge to Petronius Turpilianus, who compoſing former troubles with a milder cariage, was ſucceeded by Trebellius Maximus, whoſe eaſie courſe of gouernement taught the Britaines good manners, and made the ſouldiers firſt wanton with eaſe, and then mutinous, which by his gentle intreatie being ended without bloodſhed, he left his place to Vectius Bolanus, of like looſeneſſe of diſcipline, but in ſtead of obedience got much good wil. The errours of theſe three ſoft Proprætors, were holpen by Petilius Cærealis a great commaunder, and worthy his place, he ſubdued the Brigantes, and left the place to Iulius Frontinus, who with no leſſe happineſſe vanquiſhed the Silures. The laſt was Agricola, fortunate in diuers battels againſt the Britaines, and as vnhappie in his reward; for Domitian maligning his honour, firſt diſcharged him of his place, and then as it is thought poiſoned him. And this was the ſtate of Britanie vnder the twelue Emperours.

Tacit. 12. Annal.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their wintering campes.

Cæsar.
* Either Cambray, Amiens or S. Quintin

AFter he had put his ships in harbor, and held a councell of the Gaules at Samarobrina; forasmuch as that yeare by reason of the drought, there was some scarsitie of corne in Gallia; he was constrained to garrison his armie, and to disperse them into more cities then he had done the yeares before. And first he gaue one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Quintus Cicero, to be caried to the Neruij; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Essui; a fourth he commaunded to winter amongst the men of Rhemes, in the marches of the Treuiri vnder T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgia, with whom he sent Marcus Crassus his Questor, L. Munatius Planus, and C. Trebonius Legates; he sent one legion, that which he had last inrolled, beyond the riuer Po in Italy, with fiue cohorts, vnto the Eburones, the greatest part of whose countrie lyeth betweene the Maze and the Rheine; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Arunculeius Cotta. By distributing his legions in this maner, he thought to remedie the scarcitie of corne; and yet the garrisons of all these legions, excepting that which Roscius caried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of 100 mile: and vntill his legions were setled, and their wintering campes fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.*

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IHaue heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that vnderstand not the waight of a multitude, when it was said, that an armie keeping head continually in one part of a kingdome, was more burthensome to the common-wealth in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and inrolement: for (say they) in the generall account of the publike weale, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000. men be maintained with necessary prouisions in one intire bodie together, or dispersed particularly throughout euery part of the countrey: forasmuch as euery man hath but a competent quantitie allotted vnto him, which he cannot want, in what sort or condition of life soeuer he be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are vnited together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude whersoeuer. But such as looke into the difference with iudgement, shall find a maruellous inequalitie, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the meanes whereby it is prouided: for first we must vnderstand,

ſtand, that an armie lying continually in one place, falleth ſo heauie vpon that part, that it quickly conſumeth both the fatte and the fleſh (as they ſay) and leaueth nothing vnſpent, which that part can affoord them; and without further ſupply of prouiſions, would in a ſmall time come to vtter deſtruction. This want then muſt be relieued by taking from the plentie of other bordering quarters, to furniſh the wants of ſo great a multitude: wherin there cannot be obſerued that proportion of moderate taking, to vittaile the Armie with a ſufficient competencie, but the partiall reſpect which the putueiers, and vittailers will haue to their priuat commodity, wil quickly make an inconuenience either in the countrey, from whence it is taken; or in the Armie, for which it is prouided; according as the errour may beſt aduantage their particular, what diſcipline ſoeuer be eſtabliſhed in that behalfe. Whereas on the contrarie part, when euerie particular man of that multitude ſhal be billeted in a ſeueral family, throughout all parts of the kingdome, the charge will be ſo inſenſible, in regard of the expence of the ſaid families, that the country will neuer feele any inconuenience. And if euerie houſholder that had receiued into his houſe one of the ſaid army, ſhould giue a true account of that which riſeth aboue his ordinary expence; by the addition of one man, it would fall farre ſhort of that treaſure, which is neceſſarily required, to maintaine the ſaide number of men vnited together into one bodie. Neither doth the difference conſiſt in the quantitie of vittailes, which euerie man hath for his portion, whether they be diſperſed or vnited; but in the maner of prouiſion, and the meanes which is vſed to maintaine them: wherein euery maſter or ſteward of a familie, endeuoureth to make his prouiſions at the beſt hand, & ſo to husband it, that it may ſerue for competencie, and not for ſuperfluitie; and by that means, the general plenty of the country is maintained, & the cõmon-wealth floriſheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualing of an army, there is no ſuch reſpect had, which may any way aduantage the publike good; for there the gaine of the purueier riſeth by experience & ſuperfluous waſting, rather then by thrift and ſauing frugalitie: and ſo the commonwealth is weakned by the il husbanding of that great portion of vittaile, which is allowed for ſo great a multitude. And if they ſhould haue ſuch varietie of viands in an Armie, as they haue when they are in ſeuerall families, it were vnpoſſible it ſhould continue any time together. And therefore the Romans, notwithſtanding the exactneſſe of their diſcipline, could affoord their armies no other prouiſion but corne, and larde, as well in regard of the commoditie which that kinde of diet affoorded them in the courſe of their warres, as alſo for the good of that countrey, wherein they were reſident. And if it ſo fell out, that the extremitie of the ſeaſon, or any other cauſe, had brought a dearth into the lande, there was no readier waie to helpe that inconuenience, then by diſperſing their Armies into diuers quarters; which Cæſar diſpoſed with that care, that they might be as neere together as they could.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

COncerning the choice of their ſouldiers and their maner of inrolement, I had rather referre the reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular diſcourſe of that action; which was carried with ſuch grauitie and religious ceremonies, as might beſt ſerue to poſſeſſe their mindes of the waight and conſequence of that buſineſſe: but for as much as the largeneſſe of their Empire, and the neceſſitie of their occaſions would not admit, that the enrolment ſhould ſtill be made at Rome amongſt the citizens, as it appeareth by this legion which was inrolled beyond the riuer Po; it conſequently followeth, that ſuch Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot ſpeake of that which the olde Romans did in that part of their diſcipline, as a thing continued vnto Cæſars time. But he that deſireth to ſee the maner of their choiſe, with ſuch complements as might adde both a reuerent reſpect, and a Maieſtie to the worke; let him reade Polybius of that argument.

CHAP. IX.

Ambiorix attempteth to ſurpriſe the campe of *Sabinus and Cotta*; *and failing*, *practiſeth* to take them by *guile*.

Cæſar. *FIFTEENE daies after the legions were ſettled in their wintering campes, there began a ſudden tumult and rebellion by the meanes of Ambiorix, and Catiunculus, who, hauing receiued Sabinus & Cotta into their confines, and brought them in corne to the place, where they laie; at the inducement of Induciomarus of Triers, they ſtirred vp their people to rebellion: and ſuddenly ſurpriſing thoſe that were gone abroad to get wood, came with a great power to aſſault the campe. But when our men had tooke Armes, and were got vppe vpon the rampier, and had ouermatched them in a skirmiſh of horſe, which made a ſallie out of the campe vpon the Galles: Ambiorix deſpairing of good ſucceſſe, withdrew his men from the aſſault; and then after their manner, they cried vnto vs, that ſome of our companie ſhould come and ſpeake with them: for they had ſomewhat to diſcouer touching the publike ſtate, whereby they hoped all controuerſies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineius a Roman horſeman, and one of Titurius his familiar friendes, and one Iunius a Spaniard, who*

diuers

diuers times before had beene sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix; were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himselfe much indebted to Cæsar, for manie curtesies, in that by his meanes hee was freed from a pension which hee paied to the Aduatici; and for that both his own sonne, and his brothers sonne, whom the Aduatici had held in prison under the name of hostages, were by Cæsar released and sent home againe. And touching the assault of the campe, hee had done nothing of himselfe, but by the impulsion of the state, among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authoritie ouer him, as he himselfe had in regard of the people: who were likewise inforced to this warre, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Galles, whereof his small meanes might be a sufficient argument. For his experience was not so little, to thinke himselfe able with so small a power to ouerthrow the people of Rome, but it was a generall appointment throughout all Gallia, vpon this daie to assault all Cæsars garrizons, to the end that one legion might not giue reliefe vnto another: Galles could not easily denie the request of Galles, especially when it concerned their publike libertie. Newe hauing satisfied that duetie which he owed to his countrey, hee had respect to Cæsar and his benefites, in regard whereof, he admonished them, and praied Titurius for the hospitalitie that had beene betweene them, that he would looke to the safetie of himselfe, and his souldiers. There were a great number of Germaines that had alreadie passed the Rhene, and would be here within two daies: and therefore let them aduise themselues, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceiued it, to depart with their soldiers out of their wintering places, either to Cicero or Labienus, of who the one was not past fiftie mile off, and the other a little further; for his owne part, he promised them this much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should haue safe passage through his territories; for so he should both doe a pleasure to his countrey, in disburdening it of garrizons, and shew himselfe thankefull to Cæsar for his benefits. This speech being ended, Ambiorix departed, and Carpineius and Iunius made report thereof to the Legates.

OBSERVATIONS.

LEander his counsell, to vse the foxes skin where the lyons faileth, doth shew, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with errour, then the powers of our bodie are ouercome with force. For oftentimes the minde is so disquieted, with the extremitie of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take sound instructions, nor the iudgment determine of that which is most for our good: but according as any passion shall happen to raigne in our disposition; so are we caried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of errour, or mistrust of welsucceeding: where as the bodie continueth firme in his owne strength, and is subiect onelie to a greater waight of power, by which it maie bee subdued and ouerthrowen. It behooueth vs therefore to take good heed, that our surest holde bee not vnfastened by the subtiltie of the foxe, when it

hath continued firme against the force of the Lyon: and that the trecherie of the spirit doe not disaduantage those meanes, which either our owne power or oportunitie, hath gained in our actions. Wherein a commander cannot haue a better rule for his direction, then to beware, that violence of passion doe not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withall, to bee iealous of whatsoeuer an enemie shall, either by speech or action, seeme to thrust vpon him, how colourable soeuer the reasons maie be, which are alleadged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the minde be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitlesse apprehensions, it may easily bee seduced either by feare or vaine imagination, diffident conceptions or ouer easie credulitie, with manie other such disturbing powers, from that waie, which a good discretion and an vnderstanding, free from passion, would haue taken. First therefore I holde it necessarie, to haue the consistorie of our iudgment well settled, with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the minde, before wee enter into deliberation of such thinges, as are made happie vnto vs by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will giue some helpe to a good conclusion; when we consider how improbable it is, that an enemie, whose chiefest care is to weaken his aduersarie, and bring him to ruine, should aduise him of anie thing that maie concerne his good; vnlesse the profite, which he himselfe shall thereby gather, doe farre exceede that which the contrarie part may expect. I grant that in ciuill warres, where there are many frendes on either partie, and haue the aduerse cause as deere vnto them as their owne; there are oftentimes many aduertisements giuen, which proceede from a true and sincere affection, and maie aduantage the partie whom it concerneth, as well in prehenting any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be waied by circumstances, and accordingly to be respected; whereof wee haue manie pregnant examples in the ciuill warres of France, and particularly in *Monsieur La Nou* his discourses: But where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humor, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth vnto one of them; where care to keepe that which is deerest vnto them, possesseth the one, and hope of gaine stirreth vp the other; there is commonlie such an vniuersall hatred betweene them, that they are to looke for small aduantage, by aduertisements from the enemie: which if the Romans had well considered, this subtile Gall had not dispossest them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The Romans call a councell vpon this aduertiſement, and reſolue to depart, and ioyne themſelues to ſome other of the legions.

THE Romans being troubled at the ſodainneſſe of the matter, albeit thoſe thinges were ſpoken by an enemie, yet they thought them no way to be neglected; but eſpecially it moued them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones, beeing baſe and of no reputation, durſt of themſelues make war againſt the people of Rome: and therefore they propounded the matter in a councell, wherein there grew a great controuerſie among them: L. Arunculeius and moſt of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the firſt orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing raſhlie, nor to depart out of their wintering campes, without expreſſe commandement from Caeſar; for aſmuch as they were able to reſiſt neuer ſo great a power, yea euen of the Germans, hauing their garizons wel fortified: an argument whereof was, that they had valiantly withſtood the firſt aſſault of the enemy, and giuen them many wounds. Neither wanted they anie victuals, and before that prouiſion which they had was ſpent, there would come ſuccor frõ other garizons and from Caeſar. And to conclude, what was more diſhonorable, or ſauored of greater inconſtancy, then to conſult of their waightieſt affaires, by the aduertiſement of an enemy? Titurius vrged vehementlie to the contrarie, that it then would be too late for them to ſeeke a remedie, when a greater power of the enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were aſſembled againſt them; or when anie blow were giuen to anie of the next wintering campes: hee tooke Caeſar to be gone into Italie, for otherwiſe the Eburones would not haue come ſo proudly to the camp. Let them not reſpect the authour, but the thing it ſelfe; the Rhene was not far off, and hee knewe well that the ouerthrow of Arioviſtus, and their former victories, were greeuous to the Germans. The Galles were vexed with the contumelies they had receiued, being brought in ſubiection to the Romaine Empire, and hauing loſt their former reputation in deedes of armes. And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix ſhould enterpriſe ſuch a matter, without any ground, or certaintie thereof? but howſoeuer thinges ſtoode, his counſell was ſure, and could bring no harme: for if there were no worſe thing intended, they ſhould but goe ſafelie to the next garizons; or otherwiſe, if the Galles conſpired with the Germans, their onelie ſafetie conſiſted in celeritie. As for the counſell of Cotta, and ſuch as were of the contrarie opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not preſent danger; yet aſſuredly famine was to be feared by long ſiege. The diſputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the firſt orders, earneſtly repugning it; doe as pleaſe you, ſince you will needes haue it ſo, ſaith Sabinus; and that he ſpake with a loud voice, that a great part of the ſoldiours might well heare him. For I am not he that moſt feareth death among you, let

Caeſar.

let these be wise: and if any mischance happen vnto them, they shall aske account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldest let them, they might ioine themselues within 2. daies to the next garizons, & with them sustaine what chance soeuer their common destinie should allot them; and not perish with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellowes. After these wordes, they began to rise out of the counsell; but holde was laide vpon them both; entreatie was made that they would not obstinatelie bring all vnto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staied, so that they all agreed vpon one thing; wheras in disagreeing, there was no likelihood of well doing: the disputation was prolonged vntill midnight; at length Cotta yeelded, and the sentence of Sabinus tooke place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the breake of day: the rest of the night was spent in watching, euery soldior sought out vvhat he had to carry with him, and what he should be constrained to leaue behind him of such necessaries, as he had prepared for winter: all things were disposed in such sort, to make the soldiours beleeue, that they could not stay without danger.

OBSERVATIONS.

BY the resolution in this disputation, it appeareth how little a graue and wise deliberation auaileth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former obseruation; for the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded vpon thinges certaine, and well knowne to the whole councell: and yet the feare of Sabinus was such, that it caried the conclusion by such supposed assertions, as the qualitie of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether vpon that which the enemy had suggested, and not vpon any certaine knowledge of the truth: neither is it often seene, when a Councell disputeth vpon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether cleere from such troublesome motions, but that it will somwhat incline to the partialitie of a strong affection; so powerfull is passion in the gouernment of the soule, and so interessed in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the vncertainty of mans iudgement, from whence all contrarie and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a councell of warre should so much varie in case of deliberation, when as many especiall points of military discipline remaine yet vndecided; hauing the authoritie of the great Commaunders of all ages, to ratifie the trueth on either parte; whereof I coulde alleage many examples. But concerning the issue and euent of our deliberations, what can bee more truelie saide then that of the Poet?

Et malè consultis pretium est, prudentia fallax,
Nec fortuna probat causas, sequiturque merentes;
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur:
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogat que regatque
Maius, & in proprias ducat mortalia leges.

Notwithstan-

Notwithſtanding, foraſmuch as our wiſdome is not ſo ſubiect to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it ſelfe, the good direction of moſt of the occurrences, which fall within the courſe of our buſineſſe; or if we muſt needes miſcarrie, yet it ſomwhat helpeth our ill fortune to thinke, that we went vpon beſt probabilities; it ſhall not be amiſſe to ſet down ſome rules for the better directing of a mature conſultation. Wherein we are to vnderſtand, that as all our knowledge ariſeth from ſome of our ſenſes, and our ſenſes comprehende onely particularities, which being caried vnto the apprehenſion, are diſpoſed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or diſagree in their ſeuerall properties: from whence there ariſe intellectual notions, and rules of Arte; wherein the ſcience of the ſaid particulars conſiſteth: ſo hee that intendeth to debate a matter, with ſound deliberation, muſt deſcend from confuſed conceptions and a knowledge in generall, to the exact diſtinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the materiall ſubſtance of euery action: he therfore that can giue beſt direction, either by experience, or iudicious diſcourſe, concerning ſuch particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can beſt aduiſe which is the ſafeſt way to auoid the oppoſition of contradicting natures. But to make this ſomewhat plainer, I will alleage 2. examples: the one moderne in caſe of conſultation; the other ancient, and may ſeeme not ſo pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meere Apology, yet foraſmuch as it freely cenſureth the quality of particular circumſtances, it may giue great light to that which we ſeeke after.

The moderne example is taken out of Guicherdin, from the warres which *Lewis* the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the ſtate of Ferrara and the Duchie of Milan: wherein there aroſe a controuerſie among the French captaines, whether it were better to go directlie to ſeeke the enemy, who albeit were lodged in a ſtrong and ſecure place, yet there was hope, that with the virtue of armes and importunitie of artillerie, they might bee diſlodged and driuen to a retreit: or otherwiſe, to take the way either of Modina or Bolognia, that ſo the enemy for feare of looſing either of thoſe townes, might quit their holde, and by that meanes Ferrara ſhould bee freed from the warre. Monſieur Chaumont the Generall of the French, inclined to the former aduiſe: But Triuulce, a man of great authoritie and experience, hauing beene an executioner in 18. battailes, reaſoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (ſaith he) to go ſeeke the enemy to fight with him; and I haue alwaies heard great captaines holde this as a firme principle: Not to attempt the fortune of a battell, vnleſſe there be either an offer of an eſpeciall aduantage, or otherwiſe, compulſion by neceſſitie. The rules of warre giue it to the enemy that is the inuader, and hath vndertaken the conqueſt of Ferrara, to ſeeke to aſſaile and charge vs; but to vs, to whom it is ſufficient to defende our ſelues, it cannot be but impertinent to vndertake an action, contrary to all direction and diſcipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by euident reaſon, that there is no poſsibility to execute that deuiſe, but to our harmes and diſaduantage: for we cannot go to their campe but by the ſide of a hill, a ſtreight and narrowe way, where all our forces cannot be imploied; and yet they

Lib. 9.

they with ſmall numbers will make reſiſtance, hauing the oportunitie of the place fauourable to their vertues: wee muſt march by the riſing of a hill, one horſe after another; neither haue we anie other waie to draw our Artillerie, our baggage, our cartes and bridges, but by the ſtreight of the hill: and who doubteth not but in a waie ſo narrowe and combrous, euerie artillerie, euerie carte, or euery wheele that ſhall breake, will not ſtay the Armie a whole houre at the leaſt? By which impediments euerie contrarie accident may put vs to diſorder. The enemie is lodged in couert, prouided of victuals and forrage; and wee muſt incampe all bare and naked, not carying with vs that which ſhould ſerue for our neceſſarie nouriture, but expect the things to come after; which in reaſon ought to go with vs. To attempt newe enterpriſes, whereof the victorie is leſſe certaine then the perill, is contrarie to the grauitie and reputation of a leader; and in actions of the warre, thoſe enterpriſes are put to aduenture, that are done by will and not by reaſon. Many difficulties may compell vs to make our aboade there, two or three daies; yea the ſnowes and raines ioyned with the extremitie of the ſeaſon, may ſuffice to detaine vs: how ſhall we then doe for victuals and forrages? What ſhall we be able to doe in the warres, wanting the thinges that ſhould giue vs ſtrength and ſuſtenance? What is he that conſidereth not, how dangerous it is to go ſeeke the enemie in a ſtrong campe, and to be driuen at one time to fight againſt them, and againſt the diſcommoditie of the place? If we compell them not to abandon their campe, wee cannot but be inforced to retire; a matter of great difficultie in a countrey ſo wholy againſt vs, and where euerie little diſfauour will turne to our great diſaduantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that graue diſcourſe, in the diſcouerie of the particular occurrences, incident to that enterpriſe; which being laied open to their confuſed iudgments, did manifeſtly point at the great diſaduantages, which were to be vndergone, by that attempt.

Anal. 6. The other example is of more antiquitie, taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the araignment of certaine ſenatours, for the friendſhip that had paſt betweene Seianus and them. Amongſt whom M. Terentius thus anſwered for himſelfe; according as it hath of late been publiſhed by tranſlation.

It would be peraduenture leſſe behoouefull for my eſtate to acknowledge, then to denie the crime I am charged with: but happe what happe maie, I will confeſſe that I haue beene Seianus friend, and that I deſired ſo to bee, and that after I had obtained his friendſhip, I was glad of it. I had ſeene him ioint officer with my father, in the gouernment of the pretorian cohort; and not long after in managing the cittie affaires, and matters of warre: his kinſemen and allies were aduanced to honour, as euerie man was inward with Seianus, ſo he was graced by Cæſar: and contrariwiſe, ſuch as were not in his fauour, liued in feare, and diſtreſſed with pouertie. Neither doe I alleadge any man for an example of this; all of vs who were not priuie to his laſt attempts, with the danger of my onely eſtate I will defend: not Seianus the Vulſinienſis, but a part of the Claudian and Iulian familie, which by alliance hee had entered into; thy ſonne in law Cæſar, thy companion in the Conſulſhip, and him, who tooke vpon him thy charge of adminiſtring the common-wealth, wee did reuerence

and

and honor. It is not our part to iudge of him, whom thou doest exalt aboue the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest iudgement of thinges the gods haue giuen; and to vs the glory of obedience is left. We looke into those thinges which we see before our eies, whom thou doest inrich, whome thou doest aduance to honours, who haue greatest power of hurting or helping, which Seianus to haue had, no man will denie. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about any secret drift, it is not lawful to sound, and dangerous; neither shalt thou in the ende reach vnto them. Thinke not onely Lordes of the senate, of Seianus last daie; but of sixteene yeeres, in which wee did likewise fawne vppon and court Satrius, and Pomponius; and to be knowne vnto his freed men and partners, was reckoned for a high fauour. What then? shall this defence bee generall, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his latter actions? no, but let it by iust boundes and tearmes be deuided: let the treasons against the common wealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour bee punished; but as for the friendships, dueties, pleasures and good turnes, the same ende shall discharge and quit thee, O Cæsar, and vs! The constancie of this Oration preuailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus wee see howe particularities decide the controuersie, and make the waie plaine to good direction.

CHAP. XI.

The Romaines take their iourney towardes the next legion; and are set vpon by the Galles.

AS soone as the daye light appeared, they set foorth of their Campe, like men perswaded that the counsell had beene giuen them not by an enemie, but by Ambiorix an especiall friende, with a long tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carrie. The Galles vnderstanding of their iourney, by their noise and watching in the night; secretlie in the woodes some two miles off layed an Ambuscado, in two seuerall places of aduantage, and there attended the comming of the Romaines; and when the greatest part of the troupes were entered into a valley, sodainlie they shewed themselues on both sides the vale, pressing harde vppon the rereward, and hindering the formost from going vppe the hill; and so beganne to charge vppon the Romaines in a place of as great disaduantage for them as coulde bee. Then at length Titurius, as one that had prouided for nothing before hande, began to tremble, ran Caesar.

vp and down, and disposed his cohorts, but so fearefully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him; as it happeneth for the most part to such, as are forced to consult in the instance of execution.

THE OBSERVATION.

IT howe plainelie appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the vnlooked for incounter which the Galles gaue thē; that feare had ratified in the iudgment of Sabinus the smooth suggestion of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certaine truth; and laied that for a principle, which a discourse free from passion would haue discerned to be but weake, and of no probabilitie: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by howe much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betraied good counsell to a course full of danger; which as Cæsar noteth, must needes fall vpon such, as are then to seeke for direction when the businesse requireth execution. I haue handled alreadie the inconueniences of disappointment; and therfore at this time wil but bring it only into remembrance, that wee may take the greater care to preuent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedie for an euill is to foresee it, according to the saying, *praeuisa pereunt mala*; so the greatest mischiefe in an euill, is when it commeth vnthought of, and besides our expectation; for then it falleth vpon vs with a supernaturall waight, and affrighteth the minde with a superstitious astonishment, as though the diuine powers had preuented our designements, with an irremediable calamitie, and cut off our appointment with a contrarie decree: although peraduenture the thing it selfe carie no such importance, but might be remedied, if wee were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen. It were no ill counsell therefore, what resolution soeuer bee taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likelie to happen from the direction of our chiefest proiects; and so we shall be sure to haue a present mind in the middest of our occasions, and feele no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The Romans caſt themſelues into an Orbe; *and are much diſcouraged.*

BVT Cotta, who had before thought that theſe things might happen by the waie, and for that cauſe would not bee the author of the iourney, was not wanting in anie thing that concerned their common ſafetie: for both in calling vppon the ſoldiours and incouraging them, hee executed the place of a Commaunder; and in fighting, the dutie of a ſoldiour. And when they found, that by reaſon of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their owne perſons to ſee all thinges doone, and to giue direction in euerie place; they cauſed it to bee proclaimed, that they ſhould all forſake their baggage, and caſt themſelues into an Orbe: which direction, although in ſuch a caſe bee not to be reprooued; yet it fell out ill fauoredlie: for it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gaue the enemie greater incouragement, inaſmuch as it ſeemed that that courſe was not taken, but vppon a great feare and in extremitie of perill. Moreouer, it happened, as it toulde not otherwiſe chooſe, that the ſoldiours went from their Enſignes, to take from the cariages ſuch thinges as were moſt deere vnto them: and there was nothing heard amongſt them but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Galles were not to learne howe to carrie themſelues: for their Commaunders cauſed it to bee proclaimed, that no man ſhoulde ſturre out of his place; for the praie was theirs, and all that the Romaines had laide aparte, was reſerued for them: and therefore let them ſuppoſe that al things conſiſted in the victorie. The Romans were equal to the Galles, both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were deſtitute of good Captaines, and of good fortune, yet they repoſed in their manhoode al the hope of their ſafety: and as often as any cohort iſſued out, they failed not to make a great ſlaughter of the enemy on that part.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

I Haue alreadie handeled the nature of an Orbe, with ſuch properties as are incident to a circle; wherein I ſhewed the conueniencie of this figure, in regarde of ſafe and ſtrong imbattailing: I will nowe adde this much concerning the vſe thereof, that as it is the beſt manner of imbattailing for a defenſiue ſtrength, and therefore neuer vſed but in extremitie; ſo we muſt be very carefull, that the ſodaine betaking of our ſelues to ſuch a refuge, doe not more diſmaie the ſoldiours, then the aduantage of that imbattailing canne benefit them.

them. For vnleſſe a leader be carefull to keepe his men in courage, that their hearts may bee free from deſpaire and amazement, what profit can there ariſe from any diſpoſition or bodie ſoeuer, when the particular members ſhall bee ſenceleſſe of that duty, which belongeth vnto them? for order is nothing but an aſsiſtance to courage, giuing meanes to manage our valour with aduantage. In the warre of Africke wee reade, that Cæſars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orbe; but he quicklie turned it to a better vſe, by aduancing the two Cornets two contrary waies, and ſo deuided the enemy into two partes; and then beate them backe to their great diſaduantage.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

I Neede not ſtand vpon this order which the Galles heere tooke, concerning pillage, that no ſoldior ſhould forſake his ſtation, or diſranke himſelfe in hope of ſpoile; which is a thing that from the very infancie of warres hath often changed the fortune of the day, and ſolde the honor of a publike victorie, for priuate lucre and petty pilfering. Amongſt other examples, let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battell of Taro, ſuffice to warne a well directed armie, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, receiued at that time, as by the loſſe which the Italians felt by that diſorder, not to ſeeke after pillage vntil the victory be obtained.

Lib. 20

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe inſufficiency of theſe Commanders, whereof Cæſar now complaineth as the only want, which theſe Romans had to cleere themſelues of this daunger; bringeth to our conſideration that which former times haue made a queſtion, which is, whether it were the vertue of the Roman leaders, or the valor of their ſoldiers, that inlarged their Empire to that greatnes, and made their people and ſenate Lords of the world? Polybius waighing the cauſes of a victorie, which the Carthagineans gained of the Romans, by the counſell and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, hauing before that time receiued diuers ouerthrowes, during the time of thoſe warres in Africke; concluded, that it was more in the worthines of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the ſoldiours, that the Romans atchieued ſo many conqueſts. And beſides the preſent example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hanniball; who from the beginning of the ſecond punicke warre, ſtill gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and ſtreightening the iuriſdiction of mightie Rome, vntill it had got a leader matchable to that ſubtle Carthagineian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be addded that famous

SABINVS AND COTTA



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famous battell betweene the olde Romans, and the laſt Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballaunced, both in number and quality of their ſouldiers, hauing both the ſame Armes, the ſame vſe of their weapons, and the ſame diſcipline, as if it had beene in a Ciuill warre: neither could fortune tell by the preſence of their Armies, where to beſtowe her fauour, or where to ſhewe her diſdaine; but that the worthineſſe of the Roman leaders brought the oddes in the triall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Whereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of an Armie, to haue a leader worthie of the place which he holdeth: foraſmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequalitie betweene two equall Armies, then the wiſedome and experience of a graue commander, or the diſabilitie of an vnskilfull leader; which are ſo powerfull in their ſeuerall effectes, that there is greater hope of a heard of Hartes led by a Lyon, then of ſo many Lyons conducted by a Harte.

CHAP. XIII.

Ambiorix directeth the Galles how they might beſt fight with aduantage, and fruſtrate the weapons of Romaine ſouldiers.

THE *which thing when Ambiorix perceiued; he commanded his men to throwe their caſting weapons a farre off, and keepe themſelues from comming neare at hand, and where the Romans charged vpon them to giue waie; and againe, as they ſawe them retire to their enſignes, then to purſue them. Which commandement was ſo diligently obſerued by the Galles, that as oft as any cohort ſallied out of the Orbe to giue an aſſault, the enemie gaue backe as faſt as they could; and in the meane time there was no help, but that part muſt be left naked and open to the inconuenience of caſting weapons; and againe, as they retired to their place, they were circumuented as well by them that had giuen place vnto them, as by ſuch as ſtood neere about them: And if they went about to keepe their ground, they could neither helpe themſelues by their manhood; nor ſtanding thicke together, auoide the dartes that ſuch a multitude caſt vpon them: and yet notwithſtanding theſe inconueniences beſides the woundes which they had receiued, they ſtood ſtill at their defence, and hauing ſo ſpent the greateſt part of the daie (for they had fought eight houres together) they counted nothing diſhonourable or vnworthie of themſelues.* Caſar.

THE OBSERVATION.

I Haue ſpoken alreadie of the manner of the Romain fight, conſiſting altogether in good diſpoſition of imbattailing, and in firme ſtanding, and buckling at handy-blowes: as may appeare by this circumſtance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to giue backe and follow on againe, as the lightneſſe of their Armes gaue them oportunitie. In like manner in the firſt booke of the Ciuill warres, in the battell betweene Cæſar and Affranius, it appeareth, that Cæſar his ſouldiers were bound to keepe their araie, not to leaue their enſignes, nor without a waightie occaſion to forſake their ſtations appointed them: whereas the Affranians fought thinne, and ſcattered here and there; and if they were hard laied vnto, they thought it no diſhonour to retire and giue backe, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous nations.

CHAP. XIIII.

The Romans are ouerthrowen.

THEN T. Baluentius, who the yeare before had beene Primipile of that legion, a valiant man and of great authoritie, had both his thighes darted through with a Iauelin: and Q. Lucanius, of the ſame order, valiantly fighting to ſuccour his ſonne, was ſlaine: and L. Cotta the Legate, as he buſilie incouraged all the Cohortes and Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a ſling. Titurius mooued with theſe thinges, as he beheld Ambiorix a farre off incouraging his men, ſent C. Pompeius vnto him, to intreat him that he would ſpare him and his ſouldiers. Ambiorix anſwered, that if he were deſirous to treat, he might: for he hoped to obtaine ſo much of the people, to ſaue the ſouldiers: but for himſelfe he ſhould haue no harme at all; for the aſſurance whereof, he gaue him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, who abſolutely denied to go to an armed enemie, and continued reſolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded ſuch Tribunes and Centurions that were preſent, to follow him; and when he came neere to Ambiorix, being commanded to caſt awaie his armes, hee obeied, and willed thoſe that were with him, doe the ſame. In the meane time while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a ſolemne proteſtation of purpoſe, Titurius was by little and little incompaſſed about and ſlaine. Then according to their cuſtome, they cried victorie, and taking vp a houling, charged the Romans with a freſh aſſault, and routed their troupes. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly was ſlaine, with the moſt part of the ſouldiers with him. The remnant retired into their campe, amongſt whom L. Petroſidius the eagle-bearer, when he ſawe himſelfe ouercharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the rampier, and fighting with a great courage,

rage, before the campe was slaine. The rest with much adoe indured the assault vntill night, and in the night being in despaire of all succour slewe themselues euerie man: a few, that escaped from the battell, came by vnknowne waies through the woods to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

OBSERVATIONS.

AND thus haue we heard of the greatest losse, that euer fel at any one time vpon Cæsar his Armie, from the time that hee was first Proconsull in Gallia, vnto the ende of his dictatorship. For in the two ouerthrowes at Dirrachium, he lost not aboue 1000 men, and in that at Gergouia not so manie: but here fifteene cohortes were cut in pieces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice, and ill direction the more hatefull, in regard that the great victorie, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the liues of two hundreth men. The resolution of such as returned to the campe, witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman souldier, if a valiant leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had beene absolute commander, there had beene great hope of better fortune in the successe: but here it happened as it commonly doth, that where there are many that are equall sharers in the chiefe authoritie, the direction for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a propertie rather of passion then of iudicious discourse, forceth a consent against the temperat opposition of a true discerning vnderstanding; and so consequently it falleth out, that one coward, hauing place and authoritie in the councel, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the leaders: for his timerousnesse flieth alwaies to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptorie in opinion, and base in case of perill; all which are enemies to good direction, and the onely instruments of mischieuing fortune.

CHAP. XV.

Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero; and stirreth vp the *Aduatici*, the *Neruij*; and so raiseth a great power.

AMBIORIX tooke such spirites vnto him vpon this victorie, that with his horsemen he went immediatly vnto the Aduatici, being the next borderers vpon his kingdome, without intermission of night, commanding his footmen to follow him: The Aduatici being stirred vp to Commotion, the next daie after he came to the Neruij, exhorting

ting them not to let ſlippe this occaſion of taking to themſelues perpetuall libertie, and reuenging them of the Romans for the wrong they had receiued. He tolde them that two Legates were alreadie ſlaine, and a great part of the Armie ouerthrowne: it was now no great matter, ſuddenly to ſurpriſe the legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof, he offered himſelfe to be their aſſiſtant. Theſe remonſtrances eaſilie perſwaded the Neruij, and therefore they diſpatched ſpeedie meſſengers to the Centrones, Grudij and other people vnder their dominion, and raiſed verie great forces, and with them they haſted to the campe where Cicero wintered, before anie inkling of the death of Titurius was brought vnto him.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe ambitious and working ſpirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raiſe the baſeneſſe of a ſmall and ignoble ſtate, to ſo high a point of reſolution, that they durſt aduenture vpon the Roman legions, being ſetled in the ſtrength of their Empire, by the memorie of ſo manie victories in Gallia: wanted now no meanes to make an ouerture to a vniuerſall commotion, propounding libertie and reuenge to the Galles, two the ſweeteſt conditions that can happen to a ſubdued people, if they would but ſtretch out their hands to take it, and follow that courſe which his example had proued ſure and eaſie. Which maie ſerue to ſhewe, that he that will attempt vpon doubtfull and vnſafe Principles, will take great aduantage from a probable entrance, and make a ſmall beginning a ſufficient meanes for his greateſt deſſignes.

CHAP. XVI.

Cicero defendeth his campe from the ſurpriſe *of the Neruij, and prepareth himſelfe* againſt a ſiege.

IT happened to Cicero alſo (as it coulde not otherwiſe chuſe) that manie of the ſouldiers, that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the ſudden approach of the enemies horſemen. Theſe being circumuented, the Eburones, Neruij, and Aduatici, with all their confederates and clientes, began to aſſault the campe. The Romans betooke them ſpeedily to their weapons; and got vpon the rampier, with much adoe they helde out that daie: for the Galles truſted much vpon celeritie, hoping if they ſped well in that action, to be victors euer after. Cicero diſpatched letters

letters with all ſpeede to Cæſar, promiſing great rewardes to him that ſhould carie them: but all the waies were ſo forelaid, that the meſſengers were taken. In one night there was built in the campe 120 towers, of ſuch timber as was brought in for fortification, & whatſoeuer wanted of the reſt of the worke, was perfected. The enemie the next daie with a farre greater power aſſaulted the campe, and filled vp the ditch: the Romans made the like defence, as they had done the daie before; the like was continued diuers daies after. The Romaines made no intermiſſion of their worke at anie part of the night, nor gaue anie reſt either to the ſicke or the wounded. Whatſoeuer was needfull for the next daies aſſault, was prouided in a readineſſe the night before; a great number of ſtakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and manie murall piles were made; the towers were floored in their ſtories, Pinacles and Parapets were ſet vp of hurdles: and Cicero himſelfe being ſickly, and of a weake conſtitution, tooke not ſo much leaſure as to reſt himſelfe in the night time; ſo that the ſouldiers of their owne accord compeld him, by intreatie, to ſpare himſelfe.

THE OBSERVATION.

THis Q. Cicero is ſaid to bee the brother of Marcus Cicero the famous Oratour, & to him were the letters ſent which are found in his Epiſtles, directed *Quincto fratri*. In this action his cariage deſerued as great reputation, in the true cenſure of honor, as euer his brother did for his eloquence, *pro Roſtris*. And if it had been the others fortune to haue performed the like ſeruice, he would haue made it the greateſt exploit that euer Roman had atchieued by armes: wherein particularly may be commended the diligence and induſtrie, which was vſed in raiſing ſo manie towers, in ſo ſmall a time; for prouiding the night before, ſuch thinges as were neceſſarie for the next daies defence; for making ſo manie ſtakes hardened at the ende with fire, for the defence of the rampier; and for the ſtore of theſe murall piles, which reſembled the forme of the ordinarie pile, but were farre greater and waightier in regard they were to be caſt from the rampier; which gaue them ſuch aduantage, by reaſon of the height, that being caſt by a ſtrong and well practiſed arme, they were verie effectuall and of great terrour.

CHAP. XVII.

The Neruij propound the ſame things to Cicero *which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus*; but are reiected.

THEN the Princes and chiefe commanders of the Neruij, which had anie entrance of ſpeech and cauſe of acquaintance with Cicero, ſignified their deſire to ſpeake with him: which being granted, they propounded the ſame things they had vſed to deceiue Sabinus; all Gallia was in Armes; the Germans were come ouer the Rhene; Cæſar and the reſt were beſieged in their wintering campes; Sabinus and his men were cut in pieces; notwithſtanding they carried this minde to Cicero, that they refuſed nothing but their wintering among them, they might depart in ſafetie whither they would, without diſturbance or feare of danger. Cicero onely made this anſwere: that it was not the cuſtome of the people of Rome, to take anie article or condition from an armed enemie; but if they would laie their armes aſide, let them vſe his furtherance in the matter, and ſend ſome to negotiat it with Cæſar; there was great hope in regard of his iuſtice and equitie, that they ſhould not returne vnſatiſfied.

THE OBSERVATION.

THe firſt attempt, which Ambiorix made vpon the campe of Sabinus and Cotta, was but ſhort; but here what with the pride of the former victorie, and the great multitude of the aſſailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carrie it by aſſault: for the firſt aſſault of a place, eſpecially when it commeth by waie of ſurpriſe, is of greater hope to the aſſailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, then ſuch as afterward are made in the ſequell of the warre: for after the firſt brunt, the heate of the enemy is much abated, as well through the nature of a hot deſire, which is moſt violent in the beginning, and afterward groweth colde and remiſſe, as alſo with the harmes and perill which they meete with in the incounter; and on the contrarie ſide, the defendants hauing withſtood the firſt furie, wherein there is moſt terrour and diſtruſt, grow more confident and better aſſured of their manhood, and in experience of their ſtrength ſtand firme againſt anie charge whatſoeuer.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Neruij beſiege Cicero, with a ditch and a *rampier, and worke meanes to ſet fire* on their tents.

THE Neruij diſappointed of this hope, carried a ditch and a rampier round about the campe; the rampier was 11 foot high, and the ditch 15 foote deepe; which they had learned of the Romaines, partly by being conuerſant among them certaine yeares before, and partly by the priſoners and captiues which they had taken: but they had no yron tooles fit for that purpoſe, but were driuen to cut vp turfe with their ſwords, and gather earth with their hands, and carrie it away with their mantles and gaberdines. Wherby may be gathered, what a multitude of men there were at the ſiege; for in leſſe then three houres, they finiſhed the fortification of fifteene miles in circuit. The daies following, the enemy built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great hooks and ſtrong penthouſes, or ſauegardes of boords and timber, according as the captiues had giuen them inſtruction. The ſeauenth daie of the ſiege being a very windie daie, they caſt hoat bullets of claie out of ſlinges, and burning dartes vpon the cabines of the Romains, which after the manner of the Galles, were thatched with ſtrawe: theſe cabines were quickly ſet on fire, which by the violence of the winde was carried ouer all the campe; the enemie preſſing forward with a great clamour, as though the victorie were alreadie gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Teſtudines to the rampier, and to ſcale it with ladders. But ſuch was the valour of the Roman ſouldiers, that albeit they were ſcorched on all ſides with fire, and ouer-charged with multitude of weapons, and ſaw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forſooke the rampier, or ſcarce looked backe at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage.

OBSERVATIONS.


THis one example may ſerue to ſhew the excellencie of the Romaine diſcipline, and the wiſedome of the firſt founders of that Arte: for they perceiuing that the fortune of warres conſiſted chiefelie in the maſtering of particular occurrences, trained their ſouldiers in that forme of diſcipline, as might ſtruggle with inconueniences, and ſtrong oppoſitions of contradicting accidents; and ſo ouerwage all difficulties and hinderances, with a conſtant perſeueration and a courage inuincible. For the great attempting ſpirit of an ambitious commãder, that ſeeketh to ouertop the trophes of honour, with the memorie of his exploites, will quickly periſh by his owne direction, if the inſtruments of execution be weaker, then the meanes which

lead him to his deſſignments. For where the waight is greater then the ſtrength, the engine will ſooner breake, then lift it vp. Let a diſcreet leader therefore ſo leuell his thoughts, that his reſolution may not exceede the abilitie of his particular means; but firſt let him be well aſſured what his ſouldiers can doe, before he reſolue what he will doe: or otherwiſe, let him ſo inable them by diſcipline and inſtructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth maie anſwere the height of his deſires and follow his aſpiring minde, with a reſolution grounded vpon knowledge and valour; and ſo making their ability the ground of his deſſignes, he ſhall neuer faile of meanes to performe what he intendeth. The want of this conſideration hath, within theſe late yeares, repaide our commanders in many partes of Chriſtendome with loſſe and diſhonour; when as they meaſured the humour of their poore needie and vndiſciplined ſouldier, by the garbe of their ambitious thoughtes, and ſo laide ſuch proiects of difficultie, as were verie vnſuitable in the particularitie of occurrences to that, which their ſouldiers were fit to execute.

CHAP. XIX.

The æmulation betweene two Centurions, Pulfio, and Varenus, with their fortunes in the incounter.

THERE were in that legion two valiant men, Titus Pulfio, and L. Varenus Centurions, comming on a pace to the dignitie of the firſt orders: theſe two were at continuall debate which of them ſhould be preferred one before another, & euery yeare contended for place of preferment, with much ſtrife and emulation. Pulfio at a time, that the fortification was very ſharply aſſaulted, called to Varenus, and asked him why he now ſtood doubtfull? or what other place he did looke for to make triall of his manhood? this is the daie (ſaith hee) that ſhall decide our controuerſies; and when he had ſpoken theſe wordes, he went out of the fortification, and where he ſaw the enemie thickeſt, he fiercely ſet vpon thē: then could not Varenus hold himſelfe within the rampier, but followed after in a reaſonable diſtance. Pulfio caſt his pile at the enemie, and ſtrooke one of the multitude through that came running out againſt him; he being ſlaine, all caſt their weapons at him, giuing no reſpite or time of retrait: Pulfio had his target ſtrooke through, and the dart ſtucke faſt in his girdle: this chance turned aſide his ſcabberd and hindered his right hand from pulling out his ſword, in which diſaduantage the enemy preſſed hard vpon him; Varenus came and reſcued him: immediatly the whole multitude, thinking Pulfio to be ſlaine with the darte, turned to Varenus, who ſpeedely betooke him to his ſword, and came to handy-ſtrokes, and hauing ſlaine one he put the reſt ſomewhat backe. But as he followed ouerhaſtely vpon them, he fell downe: him did Pulfio reſcue, being



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being circumuented and in danger, and ſo both of them hauing ſlaine manie of the enemie, retired to their campe in ſafety, to their great honour. Thus fortune caried as well the contention, as the incounter of them both, that being enemies, they neuertheleſſe gaue helpe to ſaue each others life, in ſuch ſort, that it was not to bee iudged which of them deſerued greateſt honor.

OBSERVATIONS.

CÆſar inſerteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthie to be related amongſt the deeds of armes contained in theſe commẽtaries: wherein we are firſt to obſerue the grounds of this quarrel, which was their continual ſtrife for place of preferment, which they ſought after by ſhewing their valour in time of danger, and approouing their worth by the greatneſſe of their deſert; a contention worthy the Roman diſcipline, and may ſerue for a pateme of true honour full of courage, accompliſhed with vertue. For theſe *Simultates*, which deſire of honor had caſt between them, brought forth emulation which is the ſpur of vertue, far from enmitie or hatefull contention: for the difference betweene theſe two qualities is, that enmitie hunteth after deſtruction, and onely reioiceth in that which bringeth to our aduerſary vtter ruine, diſhonour or ill atchieuement: but emulation contendeth only by well deſeruing; to gaine the aduantage of an other mans fame, that vſeth the ſame meanes to attaine to the like end; and is alwaies mixed with loue, in regard of the affinity of their affections, and the ſympathie of their deſires, not ſeeking the ouerthrow of their Competitor, but ſuccouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foule and vnfortunate calamitie, that he may ſtill continue to ſhew the greatnes of his worth by the oppoſition of inferior actions, which are as a leſſer ſcantling of deſert to meaſure the eſtimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and vnknowne in theſe daies, and would hardly find ſubiects to be reſident in, if ſhe ſhould offer her helpe in the courſe of our affaires, or ſue to be entertained by the crooked diſpoſitiõs of our times: for we can no ſooner conceiue the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth preſently to hatred, which is followed to the vttermoſt of our malice, and reſteth better ſatisfied with the miſerable end of our oppoſed partner, then with thouſand of Trophes deſeruedly erected to our honor. Which maketh me wonder, when I looke into the difference of theſe and thoſe ages, whether it were the diſcipline of that time, which brought forth ſuch honeſt effectes of vertue, to their glory and our ignominy, hauing learned better rules then were known vnto them, or whether the world weakened with age, want ſtrength in theſe times to bring foorth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in thoſe daies; or what other cauſe hath made our worſt affections ſo violent, and our better faculties ſo remiſſe and negligent, that vertue hath no part in vs but wordes of praiſe, our whole practiſe being conſecrated to actions of reproch. The iniuries, murthers, ſcandalous cariages of one towards an other, which in theſe daies are ſo readily offe-

red, and ſo impatienthe digeſted, will admit no ſatisfaction but priuate combate, which in the firſt monarchies was granted only againſt ſtrangers, and forraine enemies, as the only obiects of armes and wrath, and capable of that iuſtice, which the priuate ſworde ſhoulde execute: for they well perceiued that theſe ſingle battels were, as ſparkles of ciuill diſcorde, and inteſtine warres; although not ſo apparant in the generall viewe of their ſtate, yet as odious in particular, and as diſhonourable to good gouernment. And if there were a true recorde of ſuch, as haue beene either ſlaine or wounded within theſe fortie yeeres, either in this kingdome, or in France, or in Germanie, by this licentious and brutiſh cuſtome; I make no queſtion, but they woulde amount to a number capable of that fearefull ſtile, which is attributed to ciuill warres.

Neither is there any lawe howe rigorous or harde ſoeuer, that can giue reliefe to this diſorder, but the reſtraint will drawe on as great enormities, and as vntolerable in a good gouernment. Rotaris king of the Lumbardes forbade his ſubiectes this manner of combate; but ſhortlie after, hee was conſtrained to recall the edict, for the auoiding of greater euils; although hee proteſted the thing to bee both inhumane, and barbarous. The like edict was publiſhed in France by Philip the Faire, but was within two yeeres reuoked againe, at the inſtante requeſt of his ſubiectes, in regarde of the murthers and aſſaſinats committed in that kingdome. The onelie remedie, that I finde to take effect in this caſe, was that of late time, which the Prince of Melphe in Piemont, inuented to preuent this euill: for perceiuing howe ordinarie quarrels and bloudſhed were in his campe, hee aſſigned a place betweene two bridges for the performance of the *Duellum*, with this charge; that hee that had the worſt ſhoulde alwaies bee ſlaine, and caſt from the bridge into the water; the daunger ioyned with diſhonour (which by this decree attended ſuch as vndertooke priuate combate) made the ſoldiours wiſer in their cariage, and put an end to their ſedition and ciuill diſcordes. But that which is yet worſt of all, is that cuſtome hath now made it ſo familiar, that euery trifle ſeemeth ſufficient to call the matter to a priuate combate; a croſſe looke calleth an others mans honour in queſtion; but the word lye is of as great conſequence, as any ſtabbe or villanie whatſoeuer. Whereat we may well wonder howe it happeneth, that wee feele our ſelues ſo much exaſperated at the reproch of that vice, which we ſo ordinarilie commit; for in the cuſtome of theſe times to caſt vpon vs the lie, is the greateſt iniurie that wordes can doe vnto vs; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a propertie in our nature, to ſtand chiefely in the defence of that corruption vnto which wee are moſt ſubiect: I ſpeake not this to qualifie the foulenеſſe of this vice; for I holde a lier to bee a monſter in nature, one that contemneth God and feareth man, as an ancient father ſaith; but to ſhew the crookedneſſe of our diſpoſition in diſdaining to acknowledge that fault, which wee ſo commonlie commit. But I would faine learne when honor firſt came to be meaſured with words, for from the beginning it was not ſo. Cæſar was often called to his face theefe, and dronkard, without any further matter; and the liberty of inuectiues, which great

great personages vsed one against an other, as it began, so it ended with words. And so I thinke our lie might too, for I take him that returneth the lie, and so letteth it rest vntill further proofe, to haue as great aduantage in the reputation of honor, as the former that first gaue the disgrace.

CHAP. XX.

Cicero sendeth to Cæsar, at whose comming *the siege was raised, and the Galles* ouerthrowne.

AT length Cicero found meanes, by a Gall to aduertise Cæsar of the danger wherein he was: who speedily hasted with two legions to giue him succour; the Neruij vnderstanding of Cæsars approach, forsooke the siege and went to meet him. Cæsar finding the enemy to be 60000. strong, and himselfe not to haue aboue 7000. men, incamped himsefe in a place of aduantage; and sought by counterfeiting feare, to draw the enemy to come and assault his campe, which he handled with that dexteritie, that the Galles came vp vnto him, with a full assurance of victory: but Cæsar sending out two sallies at two seueral gates of the campe, ouerthrew the greatest part of them, and dispossest the rest of their armes; and so ended that war.

FINIS.